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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the behaviour of foreign exchange intervention in China and 
its effects on the RMB’s exchange rate levels and volatility. The research first 
examines what drives Chinese central bank’s intervention through buying and 
selling foreign exchange (the CB intervention) in a bivariate probit model and shows 
that intervention is driven by an array of factors including exchange rate deviations, 
conditional volatility, national economic conditions, interest rate differentials. The 
PBOC conducts intervention in a leaning-against-the-wind fashion in the medium 
term, while leaning-with-the-wind intervention is used in the short term.  
 
The thesis next focuses on the intervention in the central parity rate (the CPR 
intervention). Evidence from a Bayes Tobit model shows that the CPR intervention 
is determined by the market price (proxied by the proposed price by designated 
market makers), broad currency index and the yield curve spread. The PBOC adopts 
a leaning-against-the-wind strategy for the intervention in that when the market price 
appreciates (depreciates), the PBOC sets a higher (lower) central parity rate to 
dampen or even reverse the appreciation (depreciation).  
 
To what extent the CB and CPR interventions are effective is then estimated in 
threshold GARCH models. Results show that while CPR intervention focuses on 
combating appreciation, intervention by the central bank’s purchase or sale 
operations (CB intervention) impacts on exchange rate levels when the RMB 
depreciates. While interventions would move exchange rate levels to the direction 
desired by the authorities, they tend to increase exchange rate volatility.  
 
Finally, event study methodology is deployed to explore the properties and impacts 
of China’s oral intervention. The estimation adopts four criteria (event, direction, 
reversal and smoothing) to test to what extent oral intervention is effective. Evidence 
indicates oral intervention through exchange rate communications can influence 
exchange rate levels and the RMB exchange rate is responsive to international 
pressure. Furthermore, sequential oral interventions can reduce exchange rate 
volatility.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent decades, China’s exchange rate policy has been the subject of much debate. 
One crucial aspect of China’s exchange rate policy is the country’s official 
intervention in the foreign exchange market. Given the nation’s rising importance in 
the world economy, and the growing openness of the Chinese foreign exchange 
market, it is desirable, although challenging, to achieve a better understanding of the 
forms, determinants, strategies and consequences of China’s intervention. By 
exploring into these fundamental issues, this research attempts to contribute to the 
on-going debate with a clearer picture of China’s exchange rate policy and hence to 
enrich the literature on a crucial issue that is having global repercussions.  
 
1.1 Motivations and Research Questions 
 
Untill the 1990s and early 2000s, advanced countries, such as the US and Japan, 
frequently used foreign exchange intervention to influence exchange rate 
movements (Kim and Sheen, 2002; Ito and Yabu, 2007). However, since then, as 
intervention operations have become much less common in advanced markets, 
researchers have paid increasing attention to interventions in the emerging markets, 
such as Turkey (Akinci et al., 2006; Herrera and Ozbay, 2005), Argentina (Brause, 
2008) and Pakistan (Mehdi et al., 2012), where this tool is now used extensively. 
Among the emerging economies, China in particular is regarded as using 
intervention frequently and to have significant effects. This issue is being watched 
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internationally, and has become so charged that since 2005 there have been several 
bipartisan attempts in the US Congress trying to label China as a currency 
manipulator and to implement punitive actions accordingly.1 However, despite the 
great international concern and the potential global impacts, there is a surprising 
lack of studies of China’s foreign exchange intervention. This thesis is intended to 
fulfil this crucial void in the literature. 
 
In addition to offer a better and fuller picture of how China’s monetary authorities 
determine the intervention decision, the second motivation of this thesis is to 
research the effects of intervention on China’s foreign exchange market and 
therefore to achieve a better understanding of China’s exchange rate policy. In 
conducting interventions as an important policy instrument to influence the foreign 
exchange market, central banks have two main objectives, which are to move the 
level of the exchange rate in the intended direction, and to calm excessive volatility 
in terms of both the level and the speed of fluctuation (Utsunomiya, 2013). However, 
empirical studies find that intervention can actually move the exchange rate in the 
wrong direction (Baillie and Osterberg, 1997; Galati et al., 2005), or increase 
exchange rate volatility (Dominguez, 1998; Baillie et al., 2000; Nagayasu, 2004; 
Beine et al., 2009). Such an outcome could happen to China’s intervention 
operations as well. This research intends to determine to what extent China’s 
intervention is effective in meeting the intended objectives. 
 
																																								 																				
1	In 2005, the first Chinese currency bill was put forward by Senators Charles Schumer (Dem., New 
York) and Lindsey Graham (Rep., South Carolina). Both parties pushed modified bills in September 
2010 in the House of Representatives and in October 2011 in the Senate. However, these later failed to 
become law. 
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This thesis aims to achieve a better understanding of China’s exchange rate policy 
by offering a comprehensive investigation of China’s official intervention in the 
foreign exchange market. China’s foreign exchange intervention is a complex 
system that takes three major forms, namely CB intervention i.e. intervention by the 
central bank through buying and selling foreign exchange, CPR intervention, i.e. the 
central bank’s intervention in the central parity rate, and oral intervention i.e. in 
response to domestic or international events that have a bearing on China’s exchange 
rate policy China’s monetary authorities intervention through oral communications 
to state banks about actions to be taken.  
 
We in this thesis investigate these interventions’ respective determinants, operational 
strategies and to what extent they are effective. Using various techniques of 
empirical approaches across different sub-samples, this thesis attempts to address 
the following research questions: 
 
1. What are the driving forces behind Chinese monetary authorities’ intervention in 
the foreign exchange market?  In particular, given data availability, what are the 
determinants of Chinese central bank’s intervention through purchase and sale of 
foreign exchange (CB intervention) in the open market? 	
 
2. Intervention in the central parity exchange rate (CPR intervention) is one of the 
most important form of interventions in China. What is China’s decision-making 
process about this intervention?  Once decided, what strategies that the Chinese 
central bank has adopted and in what situations?  
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3. The Chinese monetary authorities conduct interventions mainly to move the 
level of the exchange rate towards policy-desired direction and to main a stable 
and orderly condition in the foreign exchange market. To what extent China’s 
CB intervention and CPR intervention are effective in reaching these policy 
objectives?  In the meantime, is there any downside of intervention, despite the 
possible success of the intervention operations?  
4. China has a special form of intervention, which is oral intervention by the 
authorities to state banks or foreign exchange dealers. On the external front, 
there is also an international dimension to this intervention, which involves 
international dialogues with the Chinese government about concerns with the 
RMB exchange rate. How effective is China’s exchange rate communications to 
domestic agents? To what extent China’s exchange rate policy is responsive to 
international concerns?  
 
1.2 Main Findings and Contributions of the Research 
 
In order to explore these questions, this thesis first explains three forms of 
intervention in China and constructs a measure of daily intervention. Then, using 
the bivariate probit approach, we test for the determinants of CB intervention based 
on three sets of determinants: basic, domestic and foreign exchange market 
determinants. We find that CB intervention follows a leaning-against-the-wind 
policy in the medium term, while in the short term it follows a leaning-with-the-
wind strategy. In addition, the CB intervention decision takes into account volatility 
that exceeds the average level. 
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Through calculating the fair value of the RMB exchange rate, this research 
constructs a CPR intervention index as the proxy of CPR intervention. The results 
from the Bayes Tobit models show that China’s CPR intervention decision is driven 
by market developments, international currency movements and macroeconomic 
conditions. The results further suggest that the objectives of China’s CPR 
intervention change not only over time, but also between high and low interventions. 
 
In order to test the effects of CB and CPR interventions on exchange rate levels and 
volatility, we employ threshold GARCH models. Using Hansen’s model-based 
bootstrap procedure (Hansen, 1999), we find that in the whole sample period under 
examination there are three regimes: two regimes in the first and third sub-sample 
periods, and one regime in the second sub-sample period. We find evidence that 
CPR and CB interventions have effects on exchange rate levels but tend to increase 
exchange rate volatility. We also find that the effects of CPR intervention are larger 
than those of CB intervention. In addition, intervention frequency also turns out to 
be a factor affecting the performance of intervention. Results show that low-
frequency intervention has effects on exchange rate levels, while high-frequency 
intervention can reduce exchange rate volatility. 
 
For examining the properties and impacts of oral intervention, this research employs 
the event study methodology, which is considered to be good at capturing the 
clustered property of interventions. Oral intervention is found to impact on moving 
Chinese exchange rate levels in the desired direction by the monetary authorities. In 
addition, this research finds that while the Chinese government stands firm 
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publically to external pressure, the Chinese exchange rate policy exhibits noticeable 
flexibility in response to US calls for RMB’s appreciation. Furthermore, using 
range-based variance, we find that successive oral interventions can reduce volatility, 
but single oral interventions cannot. 
 
This research expects to make several contributions to the literature. First, we shed 
lights on the property and mechanics of China’s intervention, which the Chinese 
monetary authorities have wrapped in secrecy. Based on section 2.2.3 of the 
literature review chapter, foreign reserves are employed as a major proxy for China’s 
intervention. Applying a wide range of sources, this research identifies China’s 
intervention operations including the dates, forms and strategies of the intervention. 
We gather newswire reports about China’s interventions from one of the world’s 
biggest news databases, Factiva, along with data from Reuters China, and the 
Chinese official sources such the PBOC and SAFE (State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange) official websites to estimate the Chinese monetary authorities’ 
intervention action. In addition, we construct a new index as the proxy of 
intervention in the central parity rate. 
 
Second, Because of very few published studies in China on the determinants of 
intervention, the research makes an important contribution with regard to the 
varying determinants and effects of China’s intervention. The sample period chosen 
by this research is from 2005 to 2013. This represents an eventful period, because it 
includes two changes of the Chinese foreign exchange rate regime, the global 
financial crisis, and many major political changes around the global. Hence, it 
provides a rich context for the research, which aims at a better understanding of why 
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the Chinese monetary authorities intervene in the foreign exchange market, and the 
consequences thereof. 
 
The third main contribution to the literature is in the application of new 
methodologies. Normally, the published Chinese literature would use methods such 
as GARCH, IV, GMM and so on. Intervention data tends to be clustered, and time-
series econometric analysis of intervention is inconsistent; that is, the residuals of 
the reaction functions are related with the explanatory variables. Therefore, in order 
to get the right determinants, we use the bivariate probit model and the Bayes Tobit 
model. Because there exists asymmetric volatility of the RMB exchange rate series, 
this research applies the threshold autoregressive models, which are capable of 
yielding asymmetric limit cycles, to test effects of intervention on exchange rate 
levels and volatility. For testing the effects of oral intervention through exchange 
rate communications by the government, we use the event study approach. 
 
Finally, in selecting our determinants and effects factors with regard to the process 
of China’s intervention decision and the consequences thereof, three determinant 
sets are used to consider the decision on intervention through the central bank’s 
buying and selling foreign exchange more comprehensively, while three 
determinants of the intervention in the central parity rate are based on the process of 
setting the central parity rate. Effects factors include the intervention frequency and 
different event criteria for testing effects of intervention on exchange rate levels and 
the volatility. 
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1.3 Overview of China’s Intervention 
 
1.3.1 Objectives of Intervention 
 
The objectives of China’s intervention are reflected in Chinese authorities’ policy 
announcement regarding the RMB exchange rate policy.  From these policy 
documents, we could infer what the Chinese central bank would after in pursuing its 
intervention operations. For instance, 21 July 2005, the PBOC, with authorization of 
the State Council, made announcements that the exchange rate regime is reformed by 
moving into a managed floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and 
demand with reference to a basket of currencies, and ‘the RMB exchange rate will be 
more flexible based on market condition’2; 5 March 2008, Premier Wen Jiabao stated 
that the mechanism for the RMB exchange rate continued to be improved and the 
exchange rate elasticity was gradually raised3 ; 19 June 2010, PBOC continued to 
enhance the importance of the market forces in the exchange rate, keep the exchange 
rate basically stable at an adaptive and equilibrium level, and safeguard 
macroeconomic and financial stability4 ; 20 November 2013, based on the foreign 
exchange market and financial conditions, the PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan 
announced to increase the exchange rate band gradually, enhance the exchange rate 
floating elasticity, and keep the exchange rate basically stable at an adaptive and 
																																								 																				
2	The	People’s	Bank	of	China,	21/07/2005,	 ‘Public	Announcement	of	the	People’s	Bank	of	China	on	
Reforming	 the	RMB	Exchange	Rate	Regime’,	 http://na.chineseembassy.org/eng/xwdt/t204468.htm,	
accessed	on	21	August	2016.	
3	Wen	Jiabao,	05/03/2008,	 ‘Report	on	the	Work	of	the	Government’,	http://www.gov.cn/test/2009-
03/16/content_1260198.htm,	accessed	on	04	September	2016.	
4	The	People’s	Bank	of	China,	19/06/2010,	‘To	Further	Promote	the	Reform	of	the	RMB	Exchange	Rate	
Formation	 Mechanism	 and	 Enhance	 the	 RMB	 Exchange	 Rate	 Flexibility’,	
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/bangongting/135485/135491/135597/1002571/index.html,	 accessed	 on	 04	
September	2016.	
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equilibrium level5; 5 August 2016, the PBOC continued to make the announcements 
that improving the market-based mechanism for the RMB exchange rate, allowing 
the RMB exchange rate to float more freely, and keeping the RMB exchange rate at 
an appropriate and balanced level6. 
 
Based on above policy documents, the target for the RMB exchange rate policy is to 
gradually establish a market-based and well-managed floating exchange rate system 
so as to safeguard macroeconomic and financial stability, and keep the RMB 
exchange rate basically stable at an adaptive and equilibrium level. The objectives of 
China’s intervention are to keep the economic growth rate, the exchange rate levels 
close to the fundamental level and maintain the RMB exchange rate stable. 
 
1.3.2 Forms of Intervention in China 
 
The Chinese government has been reluctant to admit that intervention has ever 
occurred in the Chinese foreign exchange market, fearing that such an admission 
would fuel the international concerns for China’s control over the RMB exchange 
rate. However, from an operational standpoint, there are three major ways in which 
the Chinese monetary authorities may intervene in the foreign exchange market: 
 
																																								 																				
5	Zhou	Xiaochuan,	‘Decision	of	the	Central	Committee	of	the	Communist	Party	of	China	on	Some	Major	
Issues	 Concerning	 Comprehensively	 Deepening	 the	 Reform’,	
http://www.chinairn.com/news/20131120/11524562.html,	accessed	on	04	September	2016.	
6	 	The	 People’s	 Bank	 of	 China,	 05/08/2016,	 ‘Q2	 Monetary	 Policy	 Implementation	 Report’,	
http://www.gov.cn/shuju/2016-08/05/5097889/files/21c2e01a61c34f2b8ebf4e5e59b236f2.pdf,	
accessed	on	21	August	2016.	
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(1) The central bank intervenes by directly selling or purchasing foreign currencies 
in the open market. In the case of purchase intervention, the central bank trades 
foreign currencies with central bank notes; in selling intervention, it pours foreign 
reserves into the market. We term this type of intervention ‘quantity intervention’.  
It can also be termed as CB intervention, as it involves the central bank 
participating in market transactions. Only very rarely would the Chinese 
monetary authorities intervene through adjusting the interest rate or changing 
commercial banks’ required reserve rate. 
 
(2) The central bank controls the level and growth of the RMB exchange rate by 
specifying the central parity and the range around which the daily trading prices 
are allowed to fluctuate. We call this ‘price intervention’, and it can also be 
termed as CPR intervention, since this intervention operation involves the setting 
and adjustment of the central parity exchange rate.  
 
(3) Intervention may also take an oral form, including policy briefing, moral 
persuasion, formal and informal meetings, and telephone conversations. We call 
this ‘oral intervention’. It is straightforward for the Chinese central bank to 
effectuate this form of intervention by instructing or directing the attention of the 
state-owned banks, which are dominant forces in the Chinese foreign exchange 
market, towards ‘things to note’. 
 
In what follows, Chapter 4 will concentrate on CB intervention, Chapter 5 focuses on 
CPR intervention, effectiveness of two forms of intervention will be examined in 
Chapter 6. Then Chapter 7 explores China’s oral intervention.   
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1.3.3 Channels of Intervention Effects 
 
Generally, the literature has established five possible channels through which 
intervention may exert its effects (Sarno and Taylor, 2001; Chutasripanich and 
Yetman, 2015): 
 
(1) The monetary channel. Foreign exchange intervention can affect the exchange 
rate by changing money supply, interest rates and market expectation. 
 
(2) The portfolio balance channel. Foreign exchange intervention can affect the 
exchange rate by changing investors’ portfolio consisting of the assets of various 
countries on the basis of their expected returns. 
 
 
(3) The signalling channel, also known the expectation channel. Intervention can 
affect the exchange rate expectations by providing the market with new relevant 
information. 
 
(4) The microstructure channel, also known the order flow channel. Intervention can 
affect the exchange rate by changing order flow that contains relevant 
information about fundamentals, market pressure or traders’ expectations. 
 
(5) The noise trading channel, also known the coordination channel. Intervention 
can affect the exchange rate by changing the noise traders’ future expectations. 
12	
	
 
The details for these five channels in the sector 2.1.1. 
 
China’s intervention has effects only via the noise trading channel. Because of the 
capital control, the interest rates cannot be flexibly changed. Therefore, the 
intervention cannot affect the exchange rate by the monetary channel. The portfolio 
balance channel is not working neither. Even there is Qualified Domestic Institutional 
Investor (QDII) and Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (DFII)/Renminbi 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (RQFII), the domestic and foreign investors 
still are restricted to do the investment in the Chinese foreign exchange market. In the 
signalling channel, it might be difficult to justify the use of secret rather than ‘public’ 
interventions (Beine and Lecourt, 2004). The China’s intervention is secret. Therefore, 
we assume the signalling channel is hard to work in Chinese foreign exchange market. 
Last, the microstructure channel is based on the order flow data, and the order flow 
data is high frequency, which is intra daily data. Because of the data availability, we 
do not consider this channel. In summary, only the noise trading channel is working. 
Because of only one intervention channel, China’s intervention has its own characters: 
intervention is secret, except for the oral intervention, and the forms of intervention 
are not only one form (3 forms). 
 
1.4 Organization of the Study 
 
This thesis comprises eight chapters. Following this introductory chapter, the rest of 
the thesis is structured as follows: 
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Chapter 2 provides a review of the relevant literature. In this chapter, we review the 
literature of foreign exchange intervention, thus offer a comprehensive survey and 
critical assessments relevant to the research in this thesis. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces the evolving Chinese foreign exchange policy. In the process, 
this chapter provides a general introduction to the background of China’s foreign 
exchange intervention and developments of China’s foreign exchange rate regime. 
 
Chapter 4 explores the driving forces behind China’s CB intervention or the central 
bank’s intervention through buying and selling foreign exchange. In the main, three 
groups of determining factors are investigated in terms of their relationship with 
China’s decision on CB intervention. 
 
CPR Intervention is examined in Chapter 5. In this Chapter, we propose an advanced 
nonlinear model to analyse the behaviour of the Chinese government’s CPR 
intervention as reflected in the determination of the CPR intervention.  
 
In Chapter 6, we consider the effects of CB and CPR interventions on exchange rate 
levels and volatility. The examination involves different aspects of intervention 
consequences from CB and CPR interventions. 
 
Oral intervention and its effects are the subject matters studied by Chapter 7. This 
special form of intervention is conducted by the Chinese central bank through 
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communications with domestic units. But such intervention also has an international 
aspect, which involves external events concerning China’s exchange rate policy. As 
a response, the Chinese monetary authorities may communicate to domestic traders 
in instructions or notes about official intentions about magnitude and direction of 
exchange rate changes.  In the chapter, the event study methodology is deployed to 
detect the consequences of oral intervention. 
 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. This final chapter links research findings scatted in 
different chapters to present an integral picture of China’s official intervention in the 
sample period under examination. Limitations of the research and possible avenues 
for future research are also discussed. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Theoretical Background 
 
2.1.1 Main Channels 
 
In recent decades, very many academic and policy-related studies have focused on 
investigating the efficiency of foreign exchange intervention in the exchange rate, a 
practice that began following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Traditional 
economic theory suggests that the effects of central bank intervention on exchange 
rate work through five main channels: the monetary channel, the portfolio balance 
channel, the signalling channel, the microstructure (order flow) channel and the 
noise trading channel (Sarno and Taylor, 2001; Chutasripanich and Yetman, 2015). 
 
According to Galati and Melick (2002), the monetary channel works only if the 
foreign exchange intervention is non-sterilized. In this context, foreign exchange 
intervention by a central bank causes changes in the relative supplies of domestic 
and foreign assets, interest rates and market expectations (Edison, 1993; Sarno and 
Taylor, 2001), just as described in traditional monetary models.7 For example, if a 
central bank wants to depreciate the domestic currency without counteracting the 
																																								 																				
7	For	 a	 survey	and	discussion	of	monetary	models	of	 exchange	 rate	determination,	 see	Bilson	and	
Marston	(1984).	
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effect of higher money supply, it will purchase FX, which will lead to excess supply 
of domestic assets. Then, short-term interest rates will decline in the domestic 
money market and investors will sell assets for foreign assets. Hence, the domestic 
currency will depreciate. Some researchers, such as Edison (1993) and Sarno and 
Taylor (2001), have shown that non-sterilized intervention can affect exchange rates 
similarly to monetary policy by influencing money supply, interest rates and market 
expectation. In addition, continuing discussion about the precise effects of changes 
in monetary based on interest rates and interest rates change on exchange rates 
signals some further research into the functioning of this channel (Taylor, 1995; 
Borio, 1997). 
 
Second, the theoretical literature on the portfolio balance channel, which considers 
that foreign and domestic assets substitute investor portfolios imperfectly, uses the 
framework of a portfolio balance model to analyse the effect of sterilized 
intervention, and assumes that investors balance their portfolio based on their 
expected relative returns (Branson, 1983 and 1984; Dooley and Isard, 1983; Taylor, 
1995; Mongkol, 2011). Edison (1993), Taylor (1995) and Gersl (2004) build up a 
basic portfolio balance model to explain how the portfolio balance channel works: 
 
!" = ! $, $∗ + (),* ,!+ < 0,!+∗./0 < 0,!1 = 0																  3" = 3 $, $∗ + (),* , 3+ > 0, 3+∗./0 < 0, 31 > 0																				  
3∗" = 5/ 3∗ $, $∗ + (),* , 3+∗ < 0, 3+∗./0 > 0, 31∗ > 0										  * ≡ ! + 3 + (3∗																																																																															                        (2.1) 
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where S means the spot exchange rate, () denotes depreciation of the expected rate, 
M represents money, !" denotes the demand for money, 3 and 3∗ are the domestic 
and foreign bonds respectively. The model assumes that the domestic economy is in 
equilibrium; that is, supplies of money and both foreign and domestic bonds equal 
demand. If a central bank uses foreign exchange intervention to reverse appreciation 
of the domestic currency, it purchases foreign bonds from private investors and sells 
them domestic bonds. Because the economy is in equilibrium, a rise in the supply 
of domestic bonds leads to a rise in the demand. If unsterilized intervention is used, 
there are three circumstances that could lead to the rise in demand: a rise in domestic 
interest rates, a depreciation of the domestic currency, and a fall in foreign interest 
rates. If the central bank uses sterilized intervention, interest rates will remain 
unchanged; in that case the exchange rate must change so that equilibrium is restored. 
 
The third channel is the signalling channel, also called the expectation channel. Even 
if foreign and domestic assets could substitute perfectly, in theory the foreign 
exchange intervention would still have effects on the exchange rate through this 
channel (Mussa, 1981). Foreign exchange intervention affects exchange rate 
expectations by providing the market with new relevant information, under the 
implicit assumption that monetary authorities have superior information to other 
market participants and are willing to reveal that information through foreign 
exchange intervention (Sarno and Taylor, 2001; Inoue, 2012). In addition, in order 
to influence exchange rates effectively, the signalling channel requires credibility of 
the central bank (Dominguez and Panthaki, 2007). There are two ways in which a 
central bank can change market expectations: First, when the central bank considers 
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that the exchange rate has appreciated more than economic fundamentals justify, it 
will buy foreign currency, thus signalling that the exchange rate level should be 
lower. If market participants agree with the central bank, they will correct their 
expectations and lower the exchange rate by trading with the new information. 
Second, when a central bank wishes to depreciate the domestic currency, it will buy 
foreign bonds, thus signalling an intention to ease monetary policy in future, through 
a fall in interest rates. Because such an intervention as a signal of future monetary 
policy is credible, since the central bank would suffer losses if it failed to validate 
its signals, the market participants will change their expectations of future interest 
rates. 
 
Recent studies, such as Peiers (1997), Lyons (1997 and 2001), Dominguez (2006), 
and Lyons and Evans (2006), use the microstructure approach to study foreign 
exchange intervention.  They identify a new channel, named the microstructure 
channel, which works under the assumption of asymmetric information between 
informed (central banks) and uninformed traders, and in which the central bank 
intervenes in the foreign exchange market secretly. Empirical researches on 
information asymmetry are based on high frequency data. Similar to the market 
channel, the microstructure channel focuses on explaining the function of the foreign 
exchange market. Private information, institutions (trading mechanisms) and 
different motives of players in the foreign exchange market have relevant 
characteristics that influence exchange rates but cannot be explained at the same 
time in the traditional macroeconomic framework of exchange rate determination. 
Order flow takes into account relevant information about fundamentals, market 
pressures or market expectations that are usually not public. Peiers (1997) explains 
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that by working through a commercial bank, the central bank can intervene in the 
foreign exchange market secretly and without an official announcement. The 
commercial bank obtains an information advantage by receiving a market order from 
the central bank, and hence a short-term profit opportunity. Then it adjusts its order 
flows and prices. Other banks in the market learn from the order flows that an 
informed agent, which is the commercial bank, is in the market. That is, other traders 
learn relevant information regarding fundamental determinants of exchange rate. 
Then, in order to minimize losses, other banks will adjust their positions accordingly. 
However, once the information is fully received by all commercial banks, they will 
return to their pre-intervention trading strategies. 
 
In order to discover whether intervention could have longer-lasting effects, Hung 
(1991, 1997) introduced a new transmission channel, also based on the function and 
the microstructure approach of the foreign exchange market, through which the 
central bank may affect not only the immediate exchange rate, but also the market 
expectations about the future exchange rate trend. The noise trading channel is under 
the assumption that there are two different market players in the foreign exchange 
market. Noise traders are chartists who often follow past trends, relying on some 
kind of feedback rule (buying when the price is going up, and selling when the price 
is going down). If the majority of traders in the FX market are noise traders, the 
likelihood of speculative bubbles and long-term misalignment increases. The second 
group of market participants are rational maximizing ‘fundamentalists’ or ‘smart 
money agents’, who place their investments largely according to their predicted 
exchange rates based on a fundamental analysis (buying when a currency is 
undervalued, and selling when the currency is overvalued). When noise traders 
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become uncertain about future exchange rate movements and question whether they 
have pushed the exchange rate too far, the central bank should intervene in order to 
give a sign, which causes the speculative traders to reverse their positions. By 
increasing exchange rate volatility, the central bank can manage the exchange rate. 
In addition, this channel offers a satisfactory explanation why monetary authorities 
often intervene in a thin market where chartists operate, why they intervene secretly, 
and why they hope (and sometimes manage) to achieve a longer lasting effect on the 
exchange rate. 
 
According to an implicit or explicit international agreement of cooperation, 
coordinated (or concerted) foreign exchange intervention by two or more central 
banks occurs when they intervene simultaneously in the foreign exchange market in 
support of the same currency (Rogoff, 1984 and 1985; Sarno and Taylor, 2001). The 
rationale for international coordination of official intervention stems from the 
existence of significant spillover effects of domestic policies across countries. For 
example, under a floating exchange rate system, official intervention in one country 
may be expected to change the value of domestic currency with respect to other 
currencies, thereby affecting trading partners’ economies. However, there is no 
persuasive empirical evidence of this channel’s functioning, compared to the 
portfolio balance channel and the signalling channel. 
 
2.1.2 Objectives of Intervention 
 
This section reviews the literature relevant to the thesis, focusing particularly on the 
studies of determinants of foreign exchange intervention. The disintegration of the 
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Bretton Woods system was the first reason leading to large-scale exchange rate 
intervention. Then, for nearly ten years until the end of the 1980s, the monetary 
authorities of the Group of Five (G5) engaged in joint interventions, and many 
countries followed the G5 to apply intervention as a useful instrument to stabilize 
their own currencies. Consequently, from the 1980s in particular, central bank 
intervention became steadily more popular as a research area. In addition to the 
studies on channels of intervention, as discussed above, and especially since 
intervention has been more widely adopted, not least by the emerging economies, 
economists have become interested in examining the objectives of countries’ 
intervention in the Forex markets. 
 
The Plaza meeting announced that the goal of intervention was to depreciate the 
dollar, while the Louvre Accord added the intention to create market stability 
(Baillie and Osterberg, 1997). The Plaza Accord, also known as the G5 meeting, 
claimed that the exchange rate ‘should better reflect fundamental economic 
conditions than has been the case’. Ito (2007) summarizes that since the Plaza 
Accord, monetary authorities tend to intervene when they observe that the exchange 
rate deviates from the level of fundamentals. In addition to this consideration, the 
G7 meeting, or Louvre Accord, advocated reducing excess volatility. Subsequently, 
the reduction of excess volatility was mentioned several times in G7 meetings: for 
example, in the G7 statements of 15 April 1998 and 20 February 1999 (Ito, 2007). 
In this context the concept of volatility is similar to that of overshooting, that is, a 
rapid moving away from the fundamentals followed quickly by a reversal. Therefore, 
from the point of view of economists, reducing volatility is a very important measure 
for the success of interventions. 
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Similar to the Jurgensen Report (1983), which studied the effectiveness of sterilized 
intervention in the short and long terms, Almekinders and Eijffinger (1994) argue 
that when central banks engage in interventions they have objectives in the short, 
medium and long terms. First, in the short term, ‘countering disorderly exchange 
market conditions’ is the common objective of all central banks. It is part of their 
commitment to foster a stable exchange rate regime in accordance with Article IV 
of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund as amended in 1978. 
According to the Working Group on Exchange Market Intervention (1983) and 
Dudler (1988), ‘disorderly market conditions’ are indicated by large intraday 
exchange rate movements, a substantial widening of bid-ask spreads, ‘thin’ or highly 
uncertain trading, destabilizing impacts of essentially non-economic shocks, and 
self-sustaining exchange rate movements which may gain a momentum of their own. 
Then, in the medium term central banks aim to resist large short-term exchange rate 
movements or ‘erratic fluctuations’. In addition, they use intervention to reassess 
their policies and to execute ‘leaning-against-the-wind’ policy over short or longer 
periods. Finally, the long-term objectives focus on resisting deviation of exchange 
rate movements from the fundamentals (money growth, inflation, balance of 
payments, etc.), lessening the impact of foreign shocks on domestic monetary 
conditions, resisting depreciation because of its inflationary effects, and resisting 
appreciation in order to maintain competitiveness. 
 
Since switching the exchange rate regime from fixed to a managed float in June 
2005, the main objective of the Chinese central bank has been to keep the exchange 
rate stable, by trying to reach equilibrium exchange level and offsetting the 
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conditional volatility of the exchange rate (Xu, 2007; Zhu, 2007; Li and Chen, 2010). 
On 9 September, 2005, the Chinese Central Bank Governor, Mr Zhou Xiaochuan, 
claimed that the role of the central bank in the new exchange rate regime was that 
of a ‘filter’; that is, there would be no intervention in normal exchange rate 
movements, but the central bank would offset abnormal volatility of the exchange 
rate, including filtering abnormally high frequency and reducing unusually large 
exchange rate volatilities (Xu, 2007). 
 
McKinnon and Schnabl (2009) argue that the expectation of further appreciation 
triggered by the sharp fall in US interest rates to below Chinese levels, a drop in the 
US Federal Funds rate from 5.25 percent in August 2007 to 2 percent in 2008, has 
become the core determinant of the huge accumulation of international reserves in 
China. To offset the liquidity from the accumulation of reserves, the Chinese central 
bank issues central bank bonds. These bond sales lead to monetary tightening, and 
interest rates tend to rise. The higher interest rates are, the more hot money is 
attracted. At this stage, official intervention could offset the effects of hot money. 
 
2.1.3 Some Conceptual Issues 
 
  Sterilized Intervention vs. Non-sterilized Intervention 
 
When a change in official foreign asset holdings occurs, monetary authorities use 
open market operations, such as domestic currency bills or bonds, to offset the 
effects of that change so that the monetary basis remains constant. This is sterilized 
intervention. Non-sterilized intervention, in contrast, uses the buying or selling of 
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foreign exchange to influence the money supply (Calvo, 1991; Mohanty and Turner, 
2006; Edison et al., 2008; Lavigne, 2008). From the perspective of economists, 
intervention is effective in impacting the exchange rate movement only when it is 
not sterilized (Hung, 1997; Fatum and Hutchison, 2006; He, 2007; Disyatat, 2008). 
Through expanding the money supply, non-sterilized intervention leads to decrease 
in the interest rate. Then, the lower interest rate triggers an increase in capital inflow 
and decrease in capital outflow, so that the home currency depreciates. In sterilized 
intervention, on the other hand, through selling domestic bonds in open market 
operations central banks absorb the expanded money supply. As a result, the interest 
rate does not change and there is no policy effect on capital flows. Therefore, the 
typical open macroeconomic model predicts that sterilized interventions are not 
effective in impacting the exchange rate movement, while non-sterilized 
interventions are effective (Ito, 2007). However, Kumhof (2010) studies a general 
equilibrium monetary portfolio choice model of a small open economy and finds 
that sterilized interventions are effective, especially in developing countries where 
domestic government debt is small and fiscal spending volatility is large. The type 
of intervention carried out in China has shifted from non-sterilized to sterilized 
intervention (Xu, 2007). 
 
Against and with the Wind 
 
The majority of interventions take place when the exchange rate is moving in a 
direction the monetary authorities regard as undesirable. These interventions, 
applied to slow down, stop, or reverse the trend, are known as leaning-against-the-
wind interventions. In contrast, interventions that lean with the wind, when the 
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monetary authorities intervene in the same direction as the exchange rate has been 
moving (Ito, 2007), happen only rarely. Because the dollar had been depreciating 
for several months before the Plaza Accord, that meeting is regarded as a leaning-
with-the-wind intervention. In China, the monetary authorities tend to use against-
the-wind intervention. In the case of RMB appreciation, the Chinese central bank 
purchases foreign currencies; when the RMB depreciates, the central bank sells 
foreign currencies (Xu, 2007). 
 
  Fear of Game Over 
 
When the home currency depreciates sharply, the monetary authorities tend to 
defend its value by selling foreign currencies and purchasing the domestic currency. 
However, if the monetary authorities run out of foreign reserves after intervening to 
support the home currency, the game is over. In that case the home currency will 
tend to suffer freefall until it reaches the bottom (Ito, 2007). This is the reason why 
fixed exchange rate regimes, such as the EMS system and the Asian exchange rate 
regimes, have collapsed. Pontines and Rajan (2011) note that after the Asian crisis 
of 1997-98, emerging Asian countries tried to build up foreign reserves. However, 
if monetary authorities act to prevent too much appreciation by selling the home 
currency, there is no apparent limit to that intervention. In 2003 and 2004, China 
intervened substantially to sell the home currency and accumulate foreign reserves. 
In February 2006, China passed Japan to become the country with the largest foreign 
reserve holdings. According to Li and Chen (2010), there is asymmetry in Chinese 
intervention: the Chinese central bank uses more interventions in response to 
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depreciation of the exchange rate than it does in response to appreciation. China 
keeps a substantial foreign reserve to keep the game continuing. 
  
2.1.3 Theoretical Underpinning 
 
UIP 
 
The majority of foreign exchange market studies take the uncovered interest parity 
(UIP) condition as their starting point (Worrell et al., 2008): 
 ∆89) = $9 − $9∗                                                                                                       (2.2) 
 
According to this equation the premium on the domestic interest rate ($9) over the 
foreign interest rate ($9∗) compensates the change in the expected spot exchange rate 
(∆89)). If the exchange rate movements have been unchanged for a long time, the 
market expectation of change in the spot rate is zero, and the domestic interest rate 
converges to the foreign interest rate. The mechanism that drives this convergence 
is the inflow and outflow of finance. The market equilibrium identity is expressed 
as: 
 ;<=9 = >?9 + ∆@9			                                                                                             (2.3) 
 
where ;<=9 is the amount of official intervention; >?9 represents flows generated by 
current account transaction, and ∆@9 is the net flow demand for domestic currency 
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through the capital account of the balance of payments (Sarno and Taylor, 2001). 
Jackman (2012) develops functions for the current account balance and the new 
demand for foreign currency: the price of international oil and tourism flows 
determine the current account balance, and interest rate spread and real estate flows 
are related to the net demand for foreign currency. 
 
Central Bank Reaction Function 
 
The development of the theoretical underpinning of determinants of intervention is 
a process from simplicity to complexity. In early studies, an ad hoc reaction function 
is usually a single equation (Edison, 1993). On the left hand side, the variable is 
either actual intervention or changes in foreign reserves as a proxy for intervention. 
Although the right hand side variables differ between researches, most studies 
include the changes in the exchange rate and deviations of the rate from a target 
level. A typical estimated equation is as follows: 
 ;9 = AB + A5 8 − 8∗ + AC∆8 + DE + F9                                                           (2.4) 
 
where ; means intervention (; > 0 for a purchase of foreign currencies, and ; < 0 
for a sale of foreign currencies); 8 is the logarithm of the exchange rate; 8∗ is the 
logarithm of the target exchange rate; E is a vector of other economic variables, such 
as lagged intervention or money supply, and ∆ is the first-difference operator. In 
equation (2.4), A5 tries to capture the policy with which the monetary authorities 
target the exchange rate level, while AC is able to capture whether they lean against 
the wind. In the 1990s, most economists utilized not only ordinary least squares 
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estimates of this equation but also an instrumental-variables estimate, whereby they 
could allow for possible simultaneity between exchange rates and intervention 
(Edison, 1993). 
 
   Loss Function 
 
Several researchers assume that the monetary authorities have a loss function of the 
deviation of the exchange rate from the target level (Almekinders, 1995; Sarno and 
Taylor, 2001). Therefore, from the central bank’s viewpoint, if the exchange rate 
deviates from the target rate, a loss occurs and increases in a convex fashion. The 
loss function is assumed to be (Chen et al., 2012): 
 G9H5IJ889 = G9H5 89 − 89∗ C                                                                               (2.5) 
 
where 89 is the current exchange rate; 89∗ represents the target exchange rate, and G9H5 is an expectation operator based on a past information set. The central bank is 
assumed to believe that the exchange rate should exhibit random movements if 
intervention is not executed, and that it is generally affected by official intervention 
(Ito and Yabu, 2007). Therefore, the process of exchange rate is as follows: 
 89 = 89H5 + A;<=9 + F9                                                                                       (2.6) 
 
where ;<=9  is the official intervention, and F9  is a white noise. Then, pulsing 
equation (2.6) into equation (2.5): 
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G9H5IJ889 = G9H5 89H5 + A;<=9 + F9 − 89∗ C                                                     (2.7) 
 
Minimizing the loss function (2.7) leads to the optimal intervention reaction function: 
 ;<=9∗ = − 5K 89H5 − 89∗                                                                                         (2.8) 
 
where ;<=9∗ means the optimal amount of official intervention. 
 
   DSGE 
 
Some papers employ the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) open 
economy macroeconomic model to study foreign exchange intervention operations 
(e.g., Ball, 1999; Lubik and Schorfheide, 2007; Bergin et al., 2007; Tovar, 2008; 
Gonzales and Garcia, 2010). Using the DSGE model, researchers are able to obtain 
results not only for the determinants of intervention, but also for the effects of 
intervention on the domestic economy, such as credit to households, and 
consumption (Moron and Winkelried, 2005; Wollmershauser, 2006; Peiris and 
Saxegaard, 2007; Cavoli, 2009). Focusing on the determinants of central bank 
intervention, Vargas et al. (2013) propose the following as a possible rule for the 
foreign exchange intervention: 
 
LMN+M∗OM = LMNPM∗OM − Q RGR9 − RGR                                                                          (2.9) 
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where S9 is the real exchange rate; T$9∗ represents real international reserves; U9 is 
loans from commercial banks; RGR9 equals tradable price divided by non-tradable 
price, and Q measures the strength of the intervention. In addition, LMNPM∗OM  and RGR 
are operational targets for the ratio of foreign reserves to foreign liabilities and RGR9. 
 
According to this rule, reserves would be bought by the central bank when RGR9 
deviates from an operational target, RGR. Therefore, when Q = 0, keeping the ratio 
of foreign reserves to foreign liabilities constant is the only determinant of 
intervention. This equation could test whether international reserves and exchange 
misalignment are determinants of intervention. 
 
With regard to the conditional volatility factor, the Taylor rule is used to compare 
the real exchange rate figures with and without active intervention. The DSGE 
model includes the macro and micro levels and is very complicated. Because this 
research does not use it to study intervention, and the Chinese exchange rate system 
is distinct from the systems of other countries, the DSGE model is not explained in 
detail here. 
 
2.2 Empirical Findings 
 
2.2.1 Determinants of Intervention 
 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, advanced countries, such as the US and Japan, often 
used foreign exchange intervention to impact exchange rates. Therefore, most 
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studies have focused on the major currencies. For instance, in order to identify the 
determinants of the intervention behaviour of the Reserve Bank of Australia from 
1983 to 1997, Kim and Sheen (2002) test five factors: exchange rate deviations, 
conditional volatility of the exchange rate changes, the overnight interest rate 
differentials between the US and Australia, profitability of foreign exchange 
intervention, and inventory consideration of foreign currency reserves. Using the 
probit model and friction model to test which factor is the motivation of central bank 
intervention, they find that with the exceptions of exchange rate deviations and 
interest rate differentials, evidence for other factors is mixed. In general, the results 
of both models provide empirical support for the leaning-against-the-wind 
hypothesis, and the interest differential parameter has correct sign and is significant 
in most periods. However, as other factors in these two models are insignificant or 
have wrong signs in some periods, their performance is mixed. 
 
Following the publication of intervention data by Japan’s central bank in 2001, Ito 
made a series of efforts to work out the determinants of intervention in the Japanese 
foreign exchange market. First, Ito (2003) estimated a reaction function in Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) to investigate the motivation of Japanese foreign exchange 
intervention using daily intervention data for the period 1991 to 2001. He estimated 
an OLS model in which the intervention is a function of the short-run exchange rate 
changes (day t-1), the change in the yen/dollar rate in the previous 21 days, and the 
deviation of the current exchange rate from 125 yen/dollar. Other determinant 
variables, such as lag of intervention, intervention by the US Federal Reserve, and 
a dummy variable for a joint intervention, are also included in this model. He found 
that the Japanese central bank tends to use lean-against-the-wind intervention in both 
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the short run and the medium run, and that the more the yen/dollar exchange rate 
deviates from 125 yen/dollar, the more likely it is that the monetary authorities will 
intervene. Based on the R2 bar shown in the results of the OLS model, intervention 
is more predictable from 1991 to the first half of 1995, while the opposite is true for 
the period from the second half of 1995 to 2001. Ito’s (2003) study is the first attempt 
to analyse the effectiveness, profits and determinants of Japanese intervention after 
disclosure of the intervention data in 2001, but misses out one very important 
variable, namely exchange rate volatility. This means that the volatility effects are 
not analysed. 
 
By taking into account the macro economy, Ito (2005) finds that the motivation for 
Japanese central bank intervention in January 2003 was to stop appreciation of the 
yen at a time when Japan was suffering macroeconomic and financial weakness, but 
intervention from October 2003 to March 2004 was to repel speculative positions 
rather than to stop appreciation. According to the Japanese central bank, the 
purposes of intervention are to make currency movement flexible, and to allow a 
weak economy to recover. Similar to his earlier study (Ito, 2003), he estimates a 
reaction function in OLS, to get the result that the central bank applies both lean-
against intervention and lean-in intervention to stop appreciation of the yen: when 
the yen appreciates, intervention is used to prevent appreciation; when the yen 
depreciates, the central bank conducts intervention to further such depreciation. 
Another test used to evaluate intervention is tactical effectiveness. Ito (2005) 
explains that intervention that took place from 2003 to 2004 helped the economy to 
recover not because it actively depreciated the currency, but because it slowed down 
the speed of appreciation. 
33	
	
 
Through the application of an ordered probit model that includes political cost of 
intervention, Ito and Yabu (2007) find that there was a change in June 1995 from 
frequent small-scale interventions to infrequent large-scale interventions, and that 
the prevailing tendency was towards lean-against-the-wind interventions. Results of 
this reaction function show that both pre- and post-June 1995 yen appreciation 
(depreciation) led to sell (buy) intervention and that deviation of current exchange 
rate from the past five-year moving average triggered foreign exchange intervention. 
In addition, similar to Herra and Ozbay (2005), they find that lags of intervention 
variables are significant in both the first half (before June 1995) and the second half 
periods (from June 1995 to March 2001). This reflects the lower political costs of 
continuous intervention. Moreover, they combine the noise-to-signal method with 
the reaction function in order to get the optimal cut-off point. The reaction function 
can be a predictor of intervention, while the purpose of the optimal cut-off point is 
to evaluate the accuracy of prediction of intervention. The optimum cut off was 
higher in the first half than in the second half. This means that compared to the first 
half, the second half of the sample is quite unpredictable, and that reflects the 
intention of the Japanese authorities. 
 
Other researchers also contribute to finding the determinants of foreign exchange 
intervention. Frenkel et al. (2004) employ a quantitative reaction function model, 
that is, the ordered probit model, to fill in the gap regarding the determinants of 
magnitude of central bank intervention. They use the data from the yen/US dollar 
market for the period 1991 to 2001, divided into two phases: 1991 to May 1995 and 
June 1995 to 2001. Testing whether intervention is used to decrease exchange rate 
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volatility and to smooth the exchange rate movements, they add the absolute 
deviation of the current yen/US dollar exchange rate from the 25-day moving 
average target variable, the daily absolute yen/US dollar returns, and one-day lagged 
interventions into the reaction function model. Their results suggest that a widening 
of the absolute band between the yen/US dollar exchange rate and the implicit target 
exchange rate of 125 yen/US dollar has a statistically significant effect on the 
probability of the Japanese central bank using large foreign exchange intervention, 
but that small intervention is influenced by the absolute deviation of the yen/US 
dollar exchange rate from its moving average. They also find that when a new 
director general of the Japanese International Finance Bureau was appointed in 1995, 
the intervention behaviour changed; that is, before 1995, the Japanese central bank 
conducted numerous small interventions, but after 1995 it conducted relatively large 
interventions. 
 
Brandner and Grech (2005) analyse the motivation of foreign exchange intervention 
in the Exchange Rate Mechanism I (ERM I) by applying a censored regression 
model (Tobit model). EMR is based on a multilateral target zone.  It has the 
characteristics that: 1. All currencies are formally linked to each other through their 
bilateral central rates, and 2. Intervention obligations exist in a mutual way. In the 
multilateral target zone, unlike in a loss function, the trade-off is not primarily 
between intervention costs and undesired exchange rate levels, but is between the 
exchange rate position in the band and volatility levels. The closer the spot rate to 
the central parity, the higher the volatility, and vice versa. Therefore, the deviation 
of conditional volatility from the target volatility is the explanatory variable to 
analyse whether the volatility changes trigger intervention. Using daily exchange 
35	
	
and intervention data from 1993 to 1998, Brandner and Grech (2005) estimate a 
Tobit model to analyse central bank interventions in ERM members Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. In addition, they include the 
deviations of the exchange rate from the bilateral Deutsche mark (DEM), and of the 
conditional volatility from the target volatility, as independent variables, and use 
conditional volatility itself and lagged spot rate change as control variables. Their 
results show that the exchange rate position in the band (deviation from DEM central 
parity) significantly leads to intervention operation. However, there is less evidence 
that a change in market conditions (the volatility variables) induces foreign 
exchange intervention. 
 
Herrera and Ozbay (2005) test the determinants of foreign exchange intervention in 
Turkey from 1993 to 2003 using a Tobit model and Powell’s CLAD estimator. The 
whole data sample is divided into two sub-samples - the managed float period from 
1995 to 1999, and the free float period from 2001 to 2003 - in order to compare the 
determinants of intervention. Results show that although the degree of persistence 
in interventions decreased after the change from managed float to free float, lags of 
intervention variables in both purchase and sale equations are statistically significant 
in both periods. This indicates the presence of political costs and/or a signal of future 
monetary policy. Results for other determinant variables show that exchange rate 
volatility and interest rate differential have effects on the foreign exchange 
intervention, but deviation from an exchange rate target has no influence. Finally, 
Herrera and Ozbay (2005) use Powell’s CLAD estimator to test non-normality and 
heteroscedasticity of the Tobit model. Because the parameter estimates obtained 
from the Tobit and Powell’s CLAD estimator are inconsistent, they find strong 
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evidence of non-normality and heteroscedasticity in the Tobit regression function. 
Their findings suggest that future investigations into the motives for foreign 
exchange intervention should consider the effect of non-normality and 
heteroscedasticity on the estimated reaction function. 
 
Guerron (2006) uses a VAR formulation to measure the effects of sterilized 
interventions on the US exchange rate, and studies the motivation for foreign 
exchange intervention based on performance of intervention during the period 1974-
2000. He finds that intervention has an effect on exchange rates in the short term 
and that monetary policy is the most effective way to appreciate or depreciate a 
currency. In addition, he adds transaction costs into the VAR model and gets the 
result that sterilized interventions are more effective when trading foreign bonds is 
more costly. Because the results of this model show that inflation and consumption 
change following sterilized intervention, central bank governors consider that 
sterilized intervention is successful, and therefore central banks will intervene in the 
foreign exchange markets. 
 
Jun (2008) compares the friction model with the linear model by using daily 
intervention data for the Deutsche mark-US dollar market from 1987 to 1993. There 
is a big challenge in estimating a reaction function, in that foreign exchange 
intervention is infrequent. In other words, the value of intervention is zero for the 
majority of the observations, particularly with daily data, while explanatory 
variables are non-zero. Jun (2008) argues that the friction model could solve this 
problem, since unlike the Tobit model it considers buying and selling interventions 
in a single equation simultaneously. In addition, the friction model is accorded the 
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reasonable hypothesis that a central bank tends to intervene in a foreign exchange 
market when the necessity grows beyond a certain threshold. Therefore, it is 
assumed that the friction model should perform better than a linear model as a 
central bank’s reaction function. However, the empirical results of Jun (2008) show 
opposite evidence. He uses in-sample fitting and out-of-sample forecast 
performance measured by RMSE (Root Mean Squared Error) and MAE (Mean 
Absolute Error) to compare the friction model with a linear model, using daily 
intervention data in the Deutsche mark-US dollar market. The friction model is 
found to have lower MAE but higher RMSE than the linear model in both in- and 
out-of-samples. Moreover, the advantage of MAE is not sufficient to offset the 
effects of RMSE when the average is taken with squared errors. This means that the 
friction model does not outperform a linear model as a central bank’s regression 
function. The reason is that intervention decisions are at the discretion of the central 
bank rather than imposed by a rule. 
 
Intervention is a complex decision process of central banks, including the 
determinants of intervention, the type of intervention, and the detection of foreign 
exchange operations by market participants (Beine et al., 2009). In order to 
recognize the determinants of intervention, the motivations for the government to 
use secret intervention, and the factors that affect the detection of foreign exchange 
operations by market participants, Beine et al. (2009) use a nested logit model. 
Explanatory variables as the determinants of intervention include exchange rate 
variation, exchange rate misalignment, exchange rate volatility, statements, and 
lagged intervention. The results for the determinants of Japanese intervention 
indicate that there are relationships between intervention and exchange rate 
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misalignment, statements, and past interventions, but that exchange rate volatility 
has no economically significant effect on intervention. In addition, they find that the 
Japanese central bank prefers to use secret, rather than public, intervention. 
Furthermore, large interventions are more easily detected than small interventions, 
so a central bank has to face a trade-off over the size of its interventions. Finally, the 
results suggest that the various determinants of the intervention process interact 
strongly. 
 
Hall and Kim (2009) study on-shore (Tokyo) and off-shore (London and New York) 
market developments to investigate the intervention reaction function of the 
Japanese central bank during the period 1991 to 2004. They divide a 24-hour trading 
day into two parts: 7:00am to 5:00pm Japanese Standard Time is the period of on-
shore trading hours, and 5:00pm to 7:00am Japanese Standard Time refers to the 
off-shore trading hours. They use friction models to test determinants of central bank 
intervention in three phases, namely Pre-Sakakibara (prior to June 1995), 
Sakakibara (June 1995 to Dec 2002), and Recent Period (Jan 2003 to Mar 2004). 
The determinants of intervention considered are exchange rate deviations, exchange 
rate volatility, one-month covered interest arbitrage transaction cost band, which is 
a broad measure of market disorderliness, and lagged intervention. The major 
findings of this study (Hall and Kim, 2009) are that prior to 1995, previous day’s 
intra-daily yen return was significant, and the lagged intervention was another 
motivation for intervention; but during June 1995 to Dec 2002, the Japanese central 
bank also reacted to overnight off-shore market returns. Furthermore, the central 
bank responded only to the one-month covered interest arbitrage transaction cost 
band in the overnight London markets. In all samples, the exchange rate volatility is 
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found to be a major determinant of intervention decisions. Moreover, Hall and Kim 
(2009) find evidence that during the period 2003 to 2004 yen depreciations triggered 
secret leaning-into-the-wind intervention. 
 
In recent years, as intervention operations have become much more common in 
emerging markets, a growing number of studies have analysed the determinants of 
intervention in those markets. Unlike the results of Kim and Sheen (2002), evidence 
gained by Akinci et al. (2006) proves that the main motivation of central bank 
intervention is to reduce the excessive volatility of exchange rate changes. They 
focus on an emerging market, the Turkish economy, under an inflation targeting 
framework during the period 2001 to 2003. A probit model and Granger causality 
tests are used to seek out the determinants of central bank intervention in Turkey; in 
addition, Granger causality tests are employed to test the effectiveness of the 
signalling channel. The results show that the main purpose of central bank 
intervention is to reduce the excessive volatility of exchange rate changes, but the 
leaning-against-the-wind hypothesis is not supported. Furthermore, Akinci et al. 
also find that the signalling channel is not completely supported in Turkey, and that 
there exists a positive relation between the interest rate and currency depreciation. 
 
Brause (2008) applies rolling estimation frameworks to obtain the changing 
intervention dynamics. There are two approaches in the empirical methodology to 
studying the motivation and effectiveness of intervention in Argentina from 2003 to 
2008, namely, a rolling reaction function (OLS model) and a rolling GARCH model. 
The OLS model unravels time-varying motives for central bank intervention, while 
the rolling GARCH model evaluates the effectiveness of central bank intervention. 
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Estimation results of the rolling reaction function comprise global results, which use 
the whole sample, and time-varying results, which apply charts to show the time-
dependent variation of intervention motivations. In the global results, the target level 
result is odd, and the overnight interest rate differentials coefficients have wrong 
signs, but conditional volatility has significant effect on daily central bank 
intervention. Time-varying results, however, are contrary to the global results. 
Specifically, in the time-varying results, target level and overnight interest rate 
differentials impact on central bank intervention significantly, but the conditional 
volatility shows a perverse result. Brause (2008) explains these contradictory results 
in terms of time-varying motives, and concludes that long-run and exchange rate 
target perspectives were given more importance than short-run and volatility issues. 
Finally, Brause (2008) proves that economic and monetary policy fundamentals can 
explain motive and impact effects. 
 
Using daily Turkish foreign exchange intervention data for the period 1993 to 2006, 
Ozlu and Prokhorov (2008) employ an m-regime threshold model that focuses on 
the determinants of intervention in order to analyse whether foreign exchange 
intervention supports the policy of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. They 
divide intervention data into two sub-periods based on the exchange rate regimes: 
the managed float period from 1995 to 1999, and the free float period from 2001 to 
2006. In the managed float period, based on the evidence of heteroscedasticity in the 
results, they find no support for a threshold in the reaction function. In addition, the 
linear model shows that the deviation from the 22-day moving average is a 
significant determinant of intervention. This is consistent with the exchange rate 
policy during the managed float period, which was based on the idea of applying 
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exchange rates to control inflation. In the free float period, they reject the linear 
model in favour of the two-regime model. In the high volatility regime, excess 
volatility is more significant than deviation from the trend to trigger intervention. 
This is consistent with the announced goal to lower excess volatility. Finally, lagged 
interventions can influence future intervention in both regimes. 
 
Detected structural breaks in the exchange rate and the intervention series are 
important in Loiseau-Aslanidi’s (2011) study of the intervention motives and 
effectiveness of the National Bank of Georgia. The paper uses unique daily data 
from the National Bank of Georgia to research the determinants and the 
effectiveness of sterilized intervention during the period from 1996 to 2007. In order 
to figure out the determinants of intervention, daily central bank reaction functions 
are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) with lagged variables and by the 
instrumental variables (IV) approach. In these models, Loiseau-Aslanidi (2011) 
considers the structural breaks that are detected. The breaks happened because of 
the Russian financial crisis in 1998, and the National Bank of Georgia responded by 
changing the exchange rate regime from fixed to free-floating. The main results of 
Loiseau-Aslanidi’s (2011) paper are that these breaks are significant for intervention 
motives and effectiveness. In order to smooth the exchange rate movements, the 
National Bank of Georgia uses lean-against-the-wind intervention. 
 
Using daily intervention data for Barbados during the period 2003 to 2011, Jackman 
(2012) estimates a dynamic complementary log-log model that associates oil price 
shocks, tourism, interest rate spreads and real estate inflows with foreign exchange 
intervention. The foreign exchange market in Barbados uses a pegged exchange rate 
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system. Because the Central Bank of Barbados does not publish the intervention 
data, Jackman (2012) applies the total of foreign currencies to replace intervention. 
The results show that intervention tends to be persistent over consecutive days; that 
is, lags of intervention have significant effects on the current intervention. The 
reason is that there are pressures tending to peg the exchange rate in subsequent days. 
In addition, the results show that seasonal movements of tourism and interest rate 
spreads are reasons for sale intervention, but do not influence purchase intervention, 
and that an influx of real estate flows is likely to affect the probability of a purchase 
intervention, but might have limited impact on the marginal tendency of a sale 
intervention. Moreover, oil price shock is the only exogenous variable that is likely 
to affect both sale and purchase interventions. 
 
Using weekly data from the Peru central bank during the period January 2001 to 
December 2010, Ventura and Rodriguez (2015) apply count data models to 
determine factors that influence intervention decisions. Count models include the 
Poisson Regression Model (PRM), the Negative Binomial Regression Model 
(NBRM) and the Zero Inflated Model (ZIM). Results of these models provide 
evidence that the deviations of the exchange rate from its long-term trend, previous 
week’s intervention, the Embig spread, differentials between foreign and domestic 
interest rate, and the spread between prime corporate and interbank interest rates, 
are economically significant determinants. The Embig spread is an indicator for 
country risk, and the spread between prime corporate and interbank interest rates is 
the devaluation expectations indicator. In their paper, Ventura and Rodriguez (2015) 
consider determinants of both purchase intervention and sale intervention. The 
results show that foreign exchange sales can be predicted more accurately, but 
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prediction of foreign exchange purchases is less precise. This implies that there are 
other determinants that cannot be included in models for foreign exchange purchases, 
such as reducing exchange rate volatility or accumulating international reserves. 
 
2.2.2 Effects of Intervention 
 
A number of studies test the effects of central bank intervention on the level and the 
volatility of exchange rate based on the five transmission channels. Because results 
depend on the types of intervention, model assumptions, and the time periods and 
exchange rates studied, they are widely conflicting. Edison (1993), Dominguez and 
Frenkel (1993), Sarno and Taylor (2001) and Neely (2005) provide detailed surveys 
of the literature about the effects of intervention. According to the Jurgensen Report 
(Jurgensen, 1983), the first study to test the effects of intervention on exchange rate, 
in the early 1980s there was broad acceptance among academics and economists that 
the effects of intervention were economically significant only in the very short term. 
 
The empirical research on intervention transmission channels finds mixed results. 
For instance, with regard to the portfolio balance effects, Ghosh (1992) uses monthly 
data of US dollar-German mark rate from 1980 to 1988, and finds that there is 
statistically significant portfolio influence on the exchange rate. However, Huang 
(2007) uses a probit model to get evidence that the portfolio channel does not work 
in practice. Similarly, following the release of daily data on intervention by the US 
authorities in the early 1990s, the strand of empirical literature studying the 
significance of the signalling channel grew rapidly, and again the findings are 
44	
	
inconsistent. For example, using weekly American data from February 1977 to 
February 1981, Dominguez (1987) finds a positive relationship between 
intervention and money supply surprises during periods when the monetary 
authorities have high credibility and reputation; Lewis (1995) finds that the foreign 
exchange intervention can change future monetary policy and that changes of 
monetary policy might induce leaning-against-the-wind intervention, while Catte et 
al. (1994) extract 17 short-term periods of definite intervention by studying the 
signalling channel. However, some empirical studies argue against a relationship 
between sterilized intervention and monetary policy. Although Kaminsky and Lewis 
(1996) find that US central bank intervention might sometimes signal monetary 
policy, their results are against the direction predicted by the conventional signalling 
hypothesis; no evidence is found for the effect of foreign exchange intervention on 
the exchange rate, and the intervention raised exchange rate volatility during the 
studied periods (Bonser-Neal and Tanner, 1996; Galati and Melick, 1999).  
 
Some studies test the effects of foreign exchange intervention without considering 
the transmission channel. After the late 1980s, direct approaches, such as multi-
variate GARCH frameworks, became popular to test the effects of foreign exchange 
intervention on the level and volatility of exchange rate. Using newly released 
official data from the Japanese Ministry of Finance for the period April 1991 to 
March 2001, Ito (2002) studies Japanese foreign exchange intervention effects on 
the level of the exchange rate. He examines the effects of the Japanese foreign 
exchange intervention from various angles: First, reviewing the history of the 
yen/dollar movement and Japanese foreign exchange intervention during the 1990s, 
he finds that the intervention strategy used by Sakakibara seemed totally different 
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from that of his predecessors.  Second, he finds that during the period under study, 
by buying the dollar low and selling it high, the Japanese monetary authorities 
produced large profits in terms of realized capital gains, unrealized capital gains, 
and carrying (interest rate differential) profits; these profits amounted to 9 trillion 
yen over the decade. Third, the GARCH regression results indicate that intervention 
operations in Japan during the second half of the 1990s produced the intended effects 
on the yen. This result suggests that large, infrequent interventions are more 
effective than small, frequent interventions. Furthermore, joint interventions are 
proved to be 20-50 times more effective than unilateral Japanese interventions. 
However, Ito (2002) does not consider volatility effects. 
 
Disyatat and Galati (2007) apply the instrumental variable (IV) approach to study 
the impact of foreign exchange intervention on the mean and conditional volatility 
of the exchange rate in the Czech exchange market during the period September 
2001-October 2002, using daily intervention data. They focus on the effect of 
intervention on the level of exchange rate, the conditional volatility and risk 
reversals (i.e. the bias of market participants with regard to the exchange rate of the 
much weaker koruna against the much stronger euro). In the IV approach, the 
reaction function for the Czech foreign exchange intervention is used as an 
instrument. The results show that foreign exchange intervention has weak 
statistically significant impact on the spot rate and the risk reversal, but this impact 
is small. In addition, they find that the Czech monetary authorities intervene in the 
exchange rate when the speed of koruna appreciation accelerates. This shows that 
the portfolio balance channel and the microstructure channel are more likely to have 
been effective in emerging market economies than in industrial countries, and also 
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that compared with a depreciation of the domestic currency, an appreciation has 
more impact on exchange rate in emerging market economies. 
 
In order to identify the efficacy of foreign exchange intervention, Kearns and 
Rigobon (2005) estimate Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) models using 
daily intervention data from Australia and Japan in the periods from July 1986 to 
November 1993 and May 1991 to June 2002 respectively. Through analysing the 
frequency and amount of foreign exchange intervention, they find the dates on which 
changes occur (i.e. the monetary authorities decide to decrease small interventions 
and concentrate on big ones) in the Australian and Japanese policy regimes, and use 
a novel identification assumption: by including a change in policy regime in the 
GMM model they are able to estimate the contemporaneous effect of foreign 
exchange intervention. Their results analysed by GMM models show that estimates 
of the effect of foreign exchange intervention are statistically and economically 
significant and have the correct signs for both the Japanese and Australian foreign 
exchange markets. In addition, they find that a USD 100 million purchase of 
Australian dollars by the Reserve Bank of Australia would be related to an 
appreciation of 1.3-1.8%, while a purchase of the same amount of yen by the Bank 
of Japan would appreciate the yen by only 0.2%. Furthermore, the largest effect on 
the exchange rate happens on the day it is conducted, while there are smaller effects 
on subsequent days. Finally, they find that both central banks tend to lean against 
the wind. 
 
Hillebrand et al. (2009) examine the relation between foreign exchange intervention 
by the Bank of Japan, and return and realized volatility of the yen/dollar exchange 
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rate. The sample period is from April 1991 to October 2004, during which they 
identify two structural breaks: In June 1995 the Japanese central bank changed the 
intervention strategy from frequent small interventions to infrequent large 
interventions (Ito and Yabu, 2004), while in April 1998 there was broad deregulation 
of the foreign exchange market, causing a change in conditional volatility (Ito and 
Melvin, 1999). Through estimating a simultaneous equations model (i.e. GMM 
approach), Hillebrand et al. (2009) find that Japanese foreign exchange intervention 
was unsuccessful during the period 1991-1995. The coefficient for return of 
yen/dollar exchange rate is negatively significant, and foreign exchange intervention 
is associated with an increase in volatility. During the period 1995-1998, Japanese 
foreign intervention could move the yen/dollar exchange rate in the desired direction, 
but the study does not find evidence of successful influence on volatility. During the 
period 1998-2004, there is strong evidence of a decrease in volatility, while return 
of yen/dollar exchange rate is not influenced by Japanese foreign exchange 
intervention. Most of the results are robust when considering other financial 
variables, unrestricted vector autoregressions, and alternative change-points. 
 
Kurihara (2013) studies the effects of Japanese foreign exchange intervention on the 
yen/US dollar exchange rate using the sample period 19 March, 2001 to 31 
December, 2012. Unlike previous studies, Kurihara (2013) takes both market 
communication and sterilized intervention into account. In order to analyse the 
effects of the portfolio balance channel, signalling channel and communication 
channel on exchange rate, he applies the OLS and GMM approaches. The empirical 
results show that foreign exchange intervention has effective impact on the Japanese 
foreign exchange market. Because the past exchange rate is important to affect the 
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movement of the spot exchange rate, the signalling effect exists. However, the 
portfolio balance channel and the communication channel do not have effects on the 
Japanese foreign exchange market. This is because the model for the portfolio 
balance channel does not fit well in the real world, and exchange rate control is not 
the objective of the Bank of Japan. Furthermore, the results from the OLS and GMM 
models indicate that the Bank of Japan uses foreign exchange intervention to prevent 
too much appreciation of the yen, to promote exports, and to expand the economy. 
 
In recent years, some studies have adopted the event study approach to test the 
effects of foreign exchange intervention on exchange rate. For example, Fatum 
(2008) studies daily effects of Bank of Canada intervention on the CAD/USD 
exchange rate during the period 1 January, 1995-30 September, 1998. By analysing 
three criteria for successful intervention, namely ‘direction’, ‘smoothing’, and 
‘volatility’, Fatum (2008) finds that foreign exchange intervention is systematically 
related with both a change in the direction and a smoothing of the exchange rate. 
However, there is no evidence that Bank of Canada intervention has effect to reduce 
the volatility of the CAD/USD exchange rate. The results also show that the effects 
of foreign exchange intervention are weakened when adjusting for general currency 
co-movements against the USD. In addition, using unique data on whether 
intervention operations were discretionary or carried out according to a mechanistic 
policy framework, Fatum (2008) is able to compare the effects of these two types of 
foreign exchange interventions. The success-to-failure ratios associated with 
mechanistic events are very similar to those related with discretionary events, 
suggesting that discretionary Canadian foreign exchange interventions are not more 
effective than mechanistic interventions. 
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Leon and Williams (2012) study the effects of intervention on the foreign exchange 
market using unique daily data for the Dominican Republic, covering 1997-2005. A 
matched-sample test of equality of means before and after intervention events is 
applied to judge the success of foreign exchange intervention based on three criteria, 
in this case ‘direction’, ‘reversal’, and ‘smoothing’. Unlike Fatum (2008), Leon and 
Williams (2012) do not consider volatility, but focus solely on the level of the 
peso/US dollar exchange rate. Their results show that foreign exchange intervention 
in the small open economy is effective in the short run when measured against the 
direction, reversal and smoothing criteria. Furthermore, these results, which are 
robust to alternative event-window definitions and to alternative criteria for 
measuring success, suggest that the monetary authorities follow a policy of ‘leaning 
against the wind’, aimed at either smoothing the exchange rate or reversing its trend 
direction. In addition, ‘fear of floating’ is found to be present in the Dominican 
foreign exchange intervention; that is, the foreign exchange intervention acts against 
strong appreciations which could conflict with the central bank’s objective of 
ensuring competitiveness. The results also imply that interventions could be an 
effective policy tool in emerging market economies in order to maintain export 
competitiveness while containing imported inflation. 
 
Echavarria et al. (2013) use an event study approach to compare the impacts of 
different types of foreign exchange intervention for the Colombian case during the 
period 2000-2012. Following Fatum and Hutchison (2003), they define four criteria 
to evaluate a successful intervention, namely ‘direction’, ‘reversal’, ‘smoothing’, 
and ‘matching’. Applying four types of interventions (international reserve 
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accumulation options, volatility options and discretionary interventions), they obtain 
evidence that all types of foreign exchange interventions have been successful 
according to the smoothing criterion. Furthermore, when considering the four 
criteria, volatility options seem to have had the strongest effect. Through using 
different window sizes and counterfactuals, they find that the results are robust.  
 
Using the daily Japanese foreign exchange intervention data for the period from 
April 1991 to December 2005, Hoshikawa (2008) examines the effects of central 
bank intervention frequency on the foreign exchange market. The conjecture effect 
of intervention frequency on exchange rate volatility and on exchange rate level is 
estimated using the GARCH methodology, specifically GARCH (1,1) and 
EGARCH estimation. Japanese central bank intervention is described by differences 
in frequency: there are high and low frequency intervention periods. Hoshikawa’s 
(2008) empirical results imply that there are two different effects according to the 
frequency of intervention. First, high frequency intervention stabilizes the exchange 
rate by decreasing exchange rate volatility. Second, compared to the high frequency 
intervention, low frequency intervention has a larger effect on the exchange rate 
level. This suggests that the Japanese monetary authority has two policy objectives, 
one with regard to exchange rate level and one related to exchange rate volatility. If 
the authority’s objective is to reduce exchange rate volatility, it may implement 
foreign exchange intervention with high frequency; on the other hand, if the 
objective is to change the exchange rate level, the authority may intervene with low 
frequency. 
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Utsunomiya (2013) also uses the daily Japanese foreign exchange intervention data 
to test the effect of intervention frequency on the yen/dollar market from April 1991 
to December 2005. Unlike Hoshikawa (2008), Utsunomiya (2013) considers periods 
of nonlinearity, which cannot be captured by standard volatility models such as the 
GARCH model. He modifies the original target zone model of Krugman to 
characterize the dynamic behaviour of an exchange rate. In addition, in order to 
determine the existence of threshold nonlinearity in the mean of the yen/dollar rate 
return, Utsunomiya (2013) applies the Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) model, and 
the results suggest that threshold nonlinearity exists in the yen/dollar rate. A Double 
Threshold GARCH (DTGARCH) model is used to consider the threshold effect of 
foreign exchange intervention frequency on exchange rate. In common with 
Hoshikawa (2008), Utsunomiya (2013) finds that high frequency intervention 
stabilizes the exchange rate by decreasing exchange rate volatility, but the effect of 
intervention frequency in Hoshikawa (2008) is underestimated, as the presence of 
asymmetry is ignored. The results of the DTGARCH model show that when 
analysing the effect of intervention frequency, considering the threshold effect is 
important. In addition, Utsunomiya (2013) finds that high-frequency interventions 
reduce exchange rate volatility more strongly when the yen appreciates. 
 
Suardi (2008) uses the DTGARCH model to study the effects of Japanese 
intervention and US intervention from 1991 to 2003. He finds that interventions by 
the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve are more effective in changing the 
direction of the exchange rate movement and reducing its volatility level in a regime 
in which the exchange rates are severely misaligned. There is also evidence that in 
such a regime a negative return of exchange rate elicits higher levels of volatility 
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than a positive return of equal magnitude. In addition, the presence of asymmetric 
volatility in exchange rate returns may be a result of active central bank intervention. 
 
2.2.3 Literature on Intervention in China 
 
Chinese Studies on Theories of Foreign Exchange Intervention before 2000 
 
Following the Asian financial crisis of 1997, foreign exchange intervention became 
a hot topic. Against the background of the RMB becoming fully convertible for 
current account transactions in 1996, Huang’s (1997) research of central bank 
intervention in China established the basic framework for studying this topic. His 
study includes the provision, purpose, necessity and technique of foreign exchange 
intervention, and specifies the two kinds of intervention, that is, non-sterilized and 
sterilized intervention. Huang (1997) finds that both non-sterilized and sterilized 
interventions are effective, but the latter can change the relative money supply of 
two countries. He concludes that intervention has a long-term influence on the 
exchange rate. 
 
Jiang (1999) analyses the relation between the openness of the financial market and 
the development of the short-term money market in China, and concludes that the 
central bank’s monetary operations are an important guarantee to allow the RMB to 
be freely convertible. Lu (1999) focuses on testing the effectiveness of foreign 
exchange intervention and summarizes theories of non-sterilized and sterilized 
intervention. Through studying the methods of Chinese official intervention, he 
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finds that in order to improve regulation, the Chinese central bank should adjust the 
elasticity and flexibility of the money supply by recycling loans. 
 
Empirical Studies on Foreign Exchange Intervention	
 
Since 2000, the Chinese literature has used econometric theories to examine foreign 
exchange intervention. The main strand of research has focused on the efficiency of 
Chinese foreign exchange intervention. With the exception of a few studies of 
intervention in other countries carried out to find useful advice for China, the 
majority of the research has tested whether or not the Chinese central bank 
intervention is effective. 
 
Zhu (2003) reviews the literature on the definition and measurement of exchange 
market pressure, and derives equations to test exchange market pressure and 
calculate a central bank intervention index. Using quarterly data for the 1994-2002 
period and simultaneous equations estimated by the two-stage least squares method, 
Zhu (2003) calculates the Chinese exchange market pressure and central 
intervention index, and discusses the movements of RMB exchange market pressure, 
the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention, and the applicability of 
simultaneous equations. 
 
Guo (2007) studies the efficiency of PBOC sterilized intervention by using re-loan, 
rediscount, deposit-reserve ratio, and open market operation to replace the foreign 
exchange intervention. He applies the quarterly data from 1996 to 2007 to regress 
the variables of the PBOC’s domestic and foreign assets, GDP, and the government 
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deficit. The regression results indicate that sterilized intervention is efficient in 
China. 
 
Gui (2008) analyses monthly data from 2004 to 2006, to test the efficiency of the 
portfolio channel and the signalling channel in China. She uses international 
reserves to replace foreign exchange intervention. The results show that the portfolio 
channel is efficient, but only in the short term, and that foreign exchange 
intervention can signal future monetary policy. 
 
Following Roper and Turnovsky (1980) and Devereux (1999), Pu (2009) estimates 
an optimal intervention function (IS-LM model) to test the Chinese quarterly data 
from 1996 to 2008. By comparing the actual intervention operation with the optimal 
intervention, he analyses the problems that exist in Chinese intervention: first, with 
the exception of the time periods from the fourth quarter of 2003 to the first quarter 
of 2008, and from the first quarter of 1998 to the fourth quarter of 1998, the direction 
of intervention is opposite to the direction of optimal intervention; second, the 
magnitude of actual intervention is dramatically larger than that of optimal 
intervention, especially during the Asian financial crisis (1997-1998) and after 2007.  
 
Liang and Mo (2013) apply the VAR model and Johansen cointegration test to 
analyse the effectiveness of Chinese intervention after adding the Non-Deliverable 
Forward (NDF) variable, which is an RMB exchange rate forecasts variable. 
Through studying the monthly data from 2004 to 2011, they find that with the 
addition of this variable, the intervention is effective in the portfolio channel. 
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Wang (2013) uses the monthly Chinese intervention data from 2002 to 2011 and 
applies an event analysis approach to study the effectiveness of intervention. Results 
show that the intervention is effective, but the effectiveness is asymmetric; that is, 
selling the US dollar to support RMB appreciation is more effective than is 
purchasing the US dollar to support RMB depreciation. 
 
Recent Developments in Intervention Research in the Chinese Literature 
 
In recent years, the research on Chinese foreign exchange intervention has 
developed in a number of interesting directions. First, Chinese studies are using a 
variety of financial instruments to study foreign exchange intervention. In their 
research on the effectiveness of central bank intervention, Gan et al. (2007) conclude 
the usefulness of the event study method. Using China data, they find that the effect 
of intervention to stop RMB depreciation (dollar appreciation) is greater than the 
effect to stop RMB appreciation (dollar depreciation). 
 
Second, the Chinese literature is using new exchange rate theories to study exchange 
intervention. For example, Xu (2006) uses microstructure theories, while Xie et al. 
(2008) investigate the effect of central bank intervention on the exchange rate market 
by assessing the relation between foreign exchange intervention and changes of 
monetary policy. Based on the assumption that central banks hold insider 
information and speculators hold private information, many studies use a GARCH 
model to reflect market participants’ analysis of information using net speculative 
positions (change) data. The results of this literature do not support the signalling 
channel, because the movements of intervention in the exchange rate market have 
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the opposite direction to the anticipation of the central bank, and the past net 
speculative positions can make intervention happen. 
 
Third, the Chinese literature discusses the cost and benefit of foreign exchange 
intervention and open market operations of intervention. Wu (2005) studies the 
effectiveness of sterilized intervention on monetary policy, and concludes that in the 
short term, sterilized intervention is effective in terms of controlling inflation and 
absorbing foreign exchange reserves, but over the long term, the effect of sterilized 
intervention is not significant. Zeng (2005) argues that there is hedging cost when 
the Chinese central bank issues central bank bills and at the same time purchases US 
treasury bills, because the interest rate of US treasury bills is lower than the interest 
rate of central bank bills. The use of central bank bills to hedge foreign exchange 
reserves cannot achieve the dual goals of stable exchange rate and the avoidance of 
inflation. 
 
The extant literature tends to first focus on advanced economies, and then on the 
emerging markets. Studies on the Chinese foreign exchange intervention are even 
fewer. Similarly, the literature on intervention channels is almost exclusively focused 
on the mature markets, leaving a considerable research gap in the field involving the 
channels through which foreign exchange intervention take place in emerging markets. 
 
Particularly in the Chinese case, studies on the country’s intervention are mostly 
concentrated on the effects of official intervention on exchange rate movements. 
Determinants of China’s intervention is under-researched and little studies are there 
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on oral intervention. Research on the intervention channels in relation to China is 
almost total absent in the literature, internationally or in the Chinese domestic 
discourse. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Background to China’s Exchange Rate Policy 
 
This chapter introduces the background to China’s exchange rate policy. The reasons 
for focusing on the Chinese case are that first, China’s exchange rate regime has 
experienced important changes in recent years. This gives us an opportunity to 
investigate into the varying determinants as well as the effects thereof in the whole 
sample and in different sub-samples. The second reason is related to the existence 
of the central parity rate and the exchange rate band, whose operation and economic 
significance are challenging to the current academic thinking and policy design. We 
could study the CPR intervention which is a new form of intervention. The last 
reason is that there is very little literature on China’s intervention. It’s a very under-
researched area whereas new contributions to the literature by the research could be	
significant. It is divided into three parts. First, it presents an overview of the regime 
shifts of the foreign exchange system to date. Then, it describes statistical features 
of RMB exchange rate movements. Finally, this chapter reviews the developments 
of financial liberalization of China’s foreign exchange market and China’s Foreign 
Exchange Trading System. 
 
3.1 An Overview of China’s Exchange Rate Policy 
 
3.1.1 Regime Shift before 2005 
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Over the last few decades, China has changed from being a self-sufficient economy 
to become the world’s second largest economy. As a result, especially since the 
country’s entry into the WTO in 2001, China’s trading system and exchange rate 
regime have received growing attention. 
 
From 1949 to the 1970s, under a planned economy, China maintained a fixed 
exchange rate at a highly overvalued level, due to an import-reducing strategy to 
decrease its dependence on other economies (Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, 2009). During that period, the official rate played an insignificant role 
in foreign trade. Because of the strong government control over the money market, 
the CNY was almost inconvertible. The overvaluation of the RMB resulted in a lack 
of incentive for domestic foreign trade companies, as the exchange rate was 
significantly lower than the price they received on the international market, and for 
each transaction, the company would incur a loss if it attempted to convert the 
earnings into renminbi. During this period China had no financial interaction with 
the wider world, and very limited external trade. 
 
Since the 1970s, China’s exchange rate regime has evolved in ‘an experiment of 
gradualism’ (Mehran et al., 1996). Botterlier (2004) and Huang and Wang (2004) 
state that the regime changed from a dual-rate system to a managed float with a de 
facto peg to the US dollar within a very narrow band. Following the reform that took 
place in 1978, the initial fixed exchange rate was detrimental to the export incentive, 
indicating that the role of exchange rate had changed. In 1980, the State Council 
introduced an ‘internal settlement rate’ (close to the average cost of earning one USD 
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in exports, RMB 2.8 to USD) to be used in trade transactions instead of the official 
rate (RMB 1.5 to USD). This arrangement continued until 1984. 
 
Following abolition of the internal settlement rate, multiple exchange rates appeared 
in the market once again. China maintained a dual exchange rate system. The period 
from 1985 to 1993 saw the emergence of regional swap markets (called Foreign 
Exchange Adjustment Centres), where foreign-funded firms could swap foreign 
exchange among themselves (Mehran et al., 1996). During this period, increasing 
amounts of corruption generated further market distortions. 
 
The crucial change came in 1994 with the establishment of the national foreign 
exchange market, which formally phased out the official rate (Xu, 2000). On January 
1, 1994, the government moved the official rate to the prevailing swap market rate 
(RMB 8.7 to USD), so unifying the official and swap market rates (Truman, 2008). 
China adopted the managed float regime with a narrow band. This reform process 
was disrupted by the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis, which caused China to 
become cautious against excessive exchange rate fluctuations. Increasingly the 
Chinese currency was pegged to the US dollar. However, the Chinese authorities 
repeatedly stated their commitment to allowing more flexibility to the exchange rate 
arrangements. In addition, by the end of 1996, the RMB had become fully 
convertible for current account transactions. This measure helped to make domestic 
prices more flexible and more closely linked with world prices. Over the following 
18 months the government revalued the currency until the exchange rate reached 
RMB 8.30 to the USD in June 1995, and then slowly appreciated to RMB 8.28 in 
October 1997. Indeed, between 1994 and 2001, the RMB steadily appreciated, apart 
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from during the East Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998, during which time China 
resisted depreciation in line with the other Asian currencies (receiving much praise 
at the time for helping to maintain stability in the region). Subsequently, the nominal 
value of currency versus the US dollar fluctuated in a very narrow range around 
RMB 8.28 until the exchange rate regime reform was initiated on July 21, 2005.  
 
From 1997 until July 2005, the RMB was effectively pegged to the US dollar at the 
rate of 8.28 RMB/dollar. On July 21, 2005, China’s exchange rate regime underwent 
a major change. The PBOC announced not only a 2.1 percent appreciation of RMB 
against USD, moving the official bilateral rate from RMB 8.28 to RMB 8.11, but 
also that the Chinese exchange rate would be administered as a managed float rather 
than as a pegged regime (PBOC, 2005).  The July 2005 announcement heralded two 
important changes: (a) the Chinese currency would be managed ‘with reference to a 
basket of currencies’ rather than being pegged to the US dollar; and (b) the exchange 
rate movements would be ‘more flexible’, with the value of exchange rate based 
more on ‘market supply and demand’ (Goldstein and Lardy, 2009). The details of 
exchange rate regime shifts from July 21, 2005 until today are explained in the next 
section. 
 
3.1.2 Regime Shifts in Recent Years 
 
The currency regime introduced in China in July 2005 ended a decade-long fixed 
nominal exchange rate, and caused immediate revaluation of the exchange rate from 
RMB 8.28 to RMB 8.11 against the dollar. Moreover, the government announced 
that the Chinese currency would be managed ‘with reference to a basket of 
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currencies’ instead of being pegged to the USD. Therefore, under the new regime 
the exchange rate would be more flexible, since the value of the RMB would depend 
on market supply and demand rather than the official settlement. These two 
important changes indicate that the first objective of the PBOC is to stabilize 
exchange rate movements. 
 
As explained above, the exchange rate was now to be influenced not only by the US 
dollar, but by a basket of foreign currencies. On August 9, 2005, in a speech marking 
the opening of the Shanghai central bank’s headquarters, Central Bank Governor 
Zhou Xiaochuan (2005) announced a list of 11 currencies to be included in the 
reference basket. He stated that the US dollar, euro, yen and Korean won would be 
the major currencies. Alongside these would be British sterling, the Singapore dollar, 
Russian rouble, Malaysian ringgit, Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, and Thai baht. 
The governor explained that these currencies had been chosen as the economies of 
their respective countries were important for China’s current account. However, in 
July, 2008, as a response to the global financial crisis, the PBOC once again pegged 
the RMB to the US dollar, and abandoned the managed float regime. This situation 
lasted for about a year and half, until June, 2010. After that date, the Chinese 
exchange rate regime changed back to the managed float, and the RMB exchange 
rate fluctuated from RMB 6.84 to RMB 6.14. 
 
An important aspect of the change to a managed float regime was that exchange rate 
movements would be more flexible. In July 2005, the PBOC set a fluctuation limit 
of 0.3 percent per day (in either direction) for the RMB against the dollar (vis-à-vis 
the central parity).  From May 21, 2007, the PBOC extended the fluctuation limit 
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from ±0.3 percent to ±0.5 percent. However, during the period July 22, 2008 to June 
21, 2010, the band was abandoned, because the RMB again pegged to the US dollar. 
Then, after June 21, 2010, the band was re-launched at ±0.5 percent. On April 16, 
2012, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) announced that the 
USD/CNY bid and ask price could fluctuate by a maximum of 2 percent around the 
central parity rate. The band became 4% on March 17, 2014. As a result of the policy 
aimed at achieving more flexible exchange rate movements, over the last eight years 
the RMB exchange rate has become more fluctuating. The details of the exchange 
rate movements are explained in the next section. 
 
In order to make the RMB exchange rate more subject to influence by market forces, 
the PBOC improved the central parity rate setting process, and on August 11, 2015 
the central parity rate changed from 6.2097 to 6.2298. The improved CPR setting 
process is based on the closing rate of the interbank foreign exchange market on the 
previous day, supply and demand in the market, price movement of major currencies, 
and daily central parity quotes from the market makers as reported to the China 
Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS). The IMF described this reform as ‘a 
welcome step’ that allows market forces to have a greater role in determining the 
exchange rate. 
 
On November 30, 2015, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) decided that the 
renminbi (10.92%) would be added to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket, 
effective from October 1, 2016. 
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December 11, 2015 saw publication of the CFETS RMB exchange rate index. It 
closed at 101.45, having gained 1.45% since the end of 2014. In order to observe 
the different aspects of RMB real effective exchange rate changes, the CFETS 
calculates this index based on the BIS basket and the SDR basket, which closed on 
that date at 102.28 and 99.52 respectively, having gained 2.28 and lost 0.48% 
respectively since the end of 2014. 
 
3.2 Statistical Features of RMB Exchange Rate Movements 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the RMB/US dollar exchange rate daily movement from 22 July, 
2005 to 22 January, 2016. The figure shows five stages in the movement of the RMB 
exchange rate. First, from 2005 to July 2008, there is a trend of sharp appreciation 
of RMB.  As discussed in section 3.1, before the change to the exchange rate system 
in 2005 the Chinese government had depressed the exchange rate level, and 
subsequently sought to find the equilibrium RMB exchange rate. This explains the 
sharp appreciation trend. Second, from July 2008 to June 2010 the RMB exchange 
rate was stable. This is explained by the fact that during this period, because of the 
global financial crisis, the RMB was fixed to the US dollar. Third, from June 2010 
to January 2014 the RMB appreciated slowly. On 21 June 2010, the PBOC began to 
implement a new ‘managed floating’ exchange rate policy (PBOC, 2010).8 The 
RMB exchange rate started to fluctuate, and the main market viewpoint was that it 
should appreciate. In addition, during this stage, the PBOC again tried to find the 
RMB exchange rate equilibrium level. From February 2014 to July 2015, the PBOC 
																																								 																				
8	On	 19	 June	 2010	 (Saturday),	 the	 PBOC	 announced	 that	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 would	 follow	 a	
‘managed	floating’	regime	with	reference	to	a	basket	of	currencies	(PBOC,	2010).	
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continued to increase the influence of market forces on the RMB exchange rate. The 
movements of the exchange rate fluctuated up and down, not just to one side. The 
final stage is from August 2015 to the present, during which period the PBOC has 
implemented deeper reform of China’s exchange rate system, in order to make it 
meet the standards of the SDR. 
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Figure 3.1 Daily RMB/US Dollar Exchange Rate, July 2005 - January 2016, Last 
Price 
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Figure 3.2 Monthly RMB/US Dollar Exchange Rate (with dot) and China Foreign 
Exchange Reserves (Billions), July 2005 - December 2015 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the relation between the RMB exchange rate price (the dot line) 
and the monthly changes of foreign exchange reserves (the straight line). From the 
figure, we can see that the foreign exchange reserves were built up rapidly during 
the period 2005 to June 2014. However, this situation was reversed after June 2014. 
Because some economists use foreign exchange reserves as a proxy of intervention 
data (Sarno and Taylor, 2001), the increase of China’s foreign exchange reserves 
could indicate that the PBOC applied intervention to affect the exchange rate 
frequently during this period. Particularly in the financial crisis period, foreign 
exchange reserves increased rapidly, but exchange rate movements were fairly stable. 
This suggests that the PBOC might have used large-scale interventions during these 
years. 
 
67	
	
3.3 Developments of Financial Liberalization and China’s Foreign Exchange 
Trading System 
 
The China spot foreign exchange markets are interbank (interdealer) markets, where 
authorized members can trade spot foreign currencies with other members in the 
CFETS. The PBOC authorizes the CFETS to publish a central parity rate before the 
market opening time of every business day. The members usually quote bid and ask 
prices no more than 1.5% above or below this CPR. The other members can then 
search their fitted quotes and contact the quoted members to complete the 
transactions. Individual institution customers can only contact the authorized banks 
as dealers to trade their currencies in private. When the customer’s contract or order 
is executed, the dealer will try to find the best quotes in the interbank RMB/FX 
trading system and trade with other members to release their position. 
 
Each member can negotiate via the electronic bilateral communication system 
supplied by the CFETS, similar to the Reuters Dealing 3000 Spot Matching. The 
CFETS also centralizes limit orders: trading price, size, direction, process, and 
members’ information are available, exclusive of trader’s identity. Even after the 
transaction is executed and cleared through the CFETS as the central trading centre, 
the counter parties will still not know each other’s identity. This clearing method 
releases the credit risk, and is convenient and very suitable for extremely price 
sensitive users in the spot FX market. 
 
3.3.1 Financial Liberalization Development 
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With the reforms, the Chinese foreign exchange market gradually became mature. 
In 1979, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) was established as a 
sub-institution of the Bank of China (BOC). In 1982, it became a part of the central 
bank, i.e. the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). 
 
In 1978, the foreign exchange retention system was set up. This allowed domestic 
exporters to retain a certain portion of their foreign exchange earnings, based on the 
quotas specified by government. The retained foreign exchange earnings could be 
used to import goods and services. Two years later, in 1980, the BOC established 
trading facilities for foreign exchange retention quotas in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai 
and Guangzhou. Authorized domestic enterprises were able to transfer their quotas 
to other domestic enterprises at a negotiated price. At the same time, the State 
Council introduced the RMB internal settlement rate for trade (ISR), effective from 
January 1, 1981. The ISR was set at RMB 2.8 per USD, while the official rate at that 
time was 1.53 per USD, implying an 83% devaluation for RMB. Foreigners could 
get the official rate with their foreign exchange certificates (FECs). 
 
Although the ISR was an important means to devalue the overvalued official 
exchange rate, Lin (1997) shows that it was not really determined by market forces. 
In December 1984, the PBOC announced the abolition of the ISR and the official 
RMB exchange rate was devalued to RMB 2.8 per USD. The second round of 
foreign exchange reform took place in 1984. In April of that year, in order to 
encourage foreign investment, the Chinese government opened up major coastal 
areas. While the previous reform had sought to decentralize foreign trade 
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management, this second round was intended to lessen government controls over 
foreign trade enterprises, thus bringing about trade liberalization. 
 
Financial liberalization was also beginning. With the foreign exchange retention 
programme, the foreign exchange swap market developed rapidly. By the end of 
1988, there were 90 foreign exchange swap centres across the country. The value of 
transactions increased from USD 4.7 billion, to USD 86 billion in 1989. The swap 
exchange rate was determined by the trading partners freely through negotiation. An 
IMF survey noted that, after 1987, China’s foreign exchange rate was under a more 
flexible arrangement. 
 
From the end of 1991, the government allowed domestic individual investors to 
participate in the swap market transactions. In 1993, the number of foreign exchange 
swap centres increased to 108, and swap transactions accounted for 80% of China’s 
total external transactions, compared with 50% in 1991 (Lardy, 1993; Zhang, 2001c). 
On April 4, 1994, an interbank market known as the China Foreign Exchange 
Trading System (CFETS) was established in Shanghai, and the previous swap 
centres were transformed into local branches of the CFETS, linked to the Shanghai 
centre through a nationally integrated electronic network. 
 
3.3.2 The Current Trading System 
 
The China Foreign Exchange Trading System (CFETS) is the interbank trading and 
foreign exchange division of China’s central bank, under the administration of the 
People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
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(SAFE). Its functions include interbank foreign exchange trading, RMB interbank 
lending, bond trading and the organization of interbank foreign exchange 
transactions. It also provides settlement facilities for foreign exchange transactions, 
delivery and settlement services for RMB interbank lending and bond trading, online 
bill pricing system, and information services for foreign exchange, bond and money 
markets. The fundamental guideline for its functioning is that of ‘adopting multiple 
technological means and trading patterns to meet market demands of various levels’.  
 
CFETS introduced the FX trading system in April 1994, the RMB credit lending 
system in January 1996, interbank bond trading in June 1997, the trading 
information system in September 1999 and the official website 
http://www.chinamoney.com.cn in June 2000. RMB voice brokering began in July 
2001 and the monthly periodical China Money went into publication in October 
2001. FX deposit brokering debuted in June 2002, and in June 2003 the paper 
quotation system was established. In May 2005, interbank trading of foreign 
currency pairs was introduced, followed in June of that year by interbank bond 
forward trading, and in August by RMB/FX forward trading. Through the modes of 
electronic trading and voice brokering, CFETS provides the interbank FX market, 
RMB lending, bond market and paper market with trading, clearing, information 
and surveillance services. CFETS has played a significant role in safeguarding RMB 
exchange rate stability, transmitting central bank monetary policies, serving 
financial institutions and supervising market operations. 
 
The CFETS headquarters are in Shanghai, while there is a back-up centre in Beijing. 
There are 18 sub-centres throughout the country, in Shenzhen, Tianjin, Guangzhou, 
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Jinan, Dalian, Nanjing, Xiamen, Qingdao, Wuhan, Chongqing, Chengdu, Zhuhai, 
Shantou, Fuzhou, Ningbo, Xi'an, Shenyang, and Haikou. At the end of April 2013, 
the CFETS had a total of 5851 members, made up of 40 solely state-owned banks, 
79 joint stock commercial banks, 3 policy banks, 149 urban commercial banks, 66 
foreign banks, 80 foreign-funded banks, 60 trust and investment companies, 492 
rural credit cooperatives, 1056 corporate pension funds and 88 social security funds. 
Its affiliated institution, the Interbank Lending Market, has a total membership of 
955. 
 
3.4 Summary 
 
Comparing with other countries’ interventions, there are two characteristics of 
China’s intervention that stands out. First, China’s intervention takes place alongside 
with several important changes in China’s exchange rate regime. After 2005, China’s 
exchange rate regime experienced further changes including the changes in the band 
width. Second, the Chinese government is a heavy interventionist and tend to 
intervene the market quite often and in large scales. In advanced countries, such as 
Japan, interventions would not happen in this high frequency. In addition, China’s 
intervention operations would take place in a complicate range of form, which 
makes China’s intervention an interesting case to study. 
 
This chapter has introduced the general background of China’s foreign exchange 
market, including its evolution, trading system, movements of the exchange rate, 
financial liberalization and international reserves. The main topics discussed in this 
thesis are all based on this background.	  
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Chapter 4 
 
Determination of Central Bank Intervention in China: 
Evidence from the Yuan/Dollar Market 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Intervention in the foreign exchange market is an essential tool, widely used by 
central banks to direct domestic currencies to a desirable level or to stabilize the 
currencies’ movements (Sarno and Taylor, 2001). In recent years, as intervention 
operations have become much less common in advanced markets, researchers have 
paid growing attention to interventions in the emerging market economies, where 
this tool is now used extensively. According to a survey by Menkhoff (2013), official 
intervention in these economies takes various subtle forms, and is an increasingly 
important force in international monetary relations. 
 
China is prominent among the emerging economies as an extensive user of 
intervention, to significant effect. However, despite great international concern and 
global repercussions, there is a surprising lack of studies of China’s foreign 
exchange intervention, especially the factors that drive the intervention decision. 
This thesis aspires to help fill this gap, and to achieve a better understanding of 
China’s exchange rate policy. 
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This chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we identify the dates 
of Chinese CB intervention. Central banks tend to operate foreign exchange 
intervention secretly, and this is especially so for China. In the Chinese context, 
intervention is commonly referred to as ‘exchange rate management’. Many secret 
foreign exchange activities would be hidden under the name of ‘management’. In 
the absence of specific intervention data, studies of foreign exchange intervention 
face the significant challenge of how to identify the dates and forms of intervention. 
This study makes a critical contribution to the literature by	using a wide range of 
media reports to identify the dates and forms of Chinese secret intervention. 
 
Second, our sample period covers 8 years, from 22 July, 2005 to 22 July, 2013, 
which provides a good opportunity window to observe evolving practice of Chinese 
intervention, including during the global financial crisis period. During this sample 
period, the Chinese exchange rate regime shifted twice. On 22 July, 2005 when the 
exchange reform was launched, China shifted from the dollar peg to a managed 
floating rate regime. However, this process was disrupted by the breakout of the 
global financial crisis, and the RMB regime reverted to the dollar peg around July 
2008. When the crisis eased, it moved back to the managed floating system in June 
2010.  
 
We test the determinants of Chinese intervention operations for the whole sample 
and for the financial crisis sub-sample using 3 determinant sets: basic determinants, 
domestic market determinants and foreign exchange market determinants. The basic 
determinants comprise the medium-term and short-term exchange rate deviations 
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from the trend, conditional volatility, and lags of intervention; the domestic market 
determinants are the stock index and the volatility dummy variables; the foreign 
exchange market determinants are interest rate differentials, deviations from the 
central parity, the reserves ratio and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. 
Identification of deviations from the central parity and the FDI flows as the 
determining factors is the novel feature of this chapter. In addition, through 
estimating the bivariate probit model, this chapter further investigates which 
determinant factors can influence purchase and sale interventions, respectively. 
 
We find evidence that medium-term deviations are an important influence on the 
adoption of leaning-against-the-wind intervention, but short-term deviations are in 
line with the leaning-with-the-wind hypothesis. We perform a further analysis of the 
exchange rate volatility, studying its effects on the days when the RMB exchange 
rate volatility exceeds its average level and when the yuan is appreciating or 
depreciating. It is found that conditional volatility can trigger intervention. In 
addition, in purchase intervention decisions the Chinese central bank, the People’s 
Bank of China (PBOC), considers a wide range of factors, such as national economic 
conditions, inventory imperatives, and FDI flows. However, in sale intervention 
decisions, the PBOC’s main consideration is the central parity deviations.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the related 
literature.  Section 4.3 introduces China’s exchange rate policy in the sample period 
and identifies the country’s intervention dates. Section 4.4 describes the data and 
variables deployed in the study. Section 4.5 estimates the bivariate probit models. 
The results are reported in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 presents the main findings. 
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4.2 Related Literature 
 
Central banks’ intervention in currency markets is generally motivated by the 
intention to move the exchange rate to a desired level and to promote market stability 
(Baille and Osterberg, 1997). Almekinders and Eijffinger (1994) suggest a finer 
classification of the intervention objectives. In the short run, central banks 
commonly operate to ‘counter disorderly exchange market conditions’ (Dudler, 
1988). Then, in the medium term, they aim to resist large short-term exchange rate 
movements or ‘erratic fluctuations’. Their long-term objectives focus on resisting 
deviations from fundamentals, lessening the impacts of foreign shocks on domestic 
monetary conditions, and avoiding undesirable impacts of currency depreciation or 
appreciation. 
 
One of the chief concerns of empirical research in this field involves the main drivers 
behind government intervention. Jurgensen (1983) was among the first to study the 
link between long- and short-run exchange rate deviations and sterilized intervention. 
He found that only short-run exchange rate deviations affect sterilized intervention. 
Following the publication of intervention data by the Japanese monetary authorities, 
Ito (2002) proves that deviations of the current exchange rate from the short-run 
(day t-1) and medium-run (21 days) trend rates, and from 125 yen/US dollar have 
effects on intervention in Japan, and that the Japanese monetary authorities tend to 
use lean-against-the-wind intervention.  Based on the results of this research, Ito and 
Yabu (2007) find that in addition to the day t-1 deviation and the previous 21 days’ 
deviation, the past five-year moving average of deviations is another determinant of 
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intervention in Japan. However, Herrera and Ozbay (2005) and Beine et al. (2009) 
do not find significant effects of such deviations.  
 
Brander and Grech (2005) study the influence of conditional volatility on the 
intervention decision. They use a GARCH model to find the conditional volatility 
for participants in Europe’s Exchange Rate Mechanism I (ERM I), i.e.  Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Their results show that the resulting 
relation between intervention and conditional volatility differs between markets. 
Using absolute returns of the yen/US dollar exchange rate as a measure of 
conditional volatility, Frenkel et al. (2004) find that volatility can affect the 
intervention decision. However, estimating a multinomial logit model and a nested 
logit model, Beine et al. (2009) find that the Japanese central bank does not take 
volatility into consideration when making decisions on intervention.  Galati et al. 
(2006) and Ito (2007) also obtain evidence that volatility is not a determinant of 
intervention. 
 
Because of the nonlinearity in the intervention data, OLS estimates of central banks’ 
intervention are inconsistent (Jun, 2008; Hall and Kim, 2009; Chen et al., 2012). In 
order to overcome this problem, researchers apply probit models in their 
intervention study. Kim and Sheen (2002) develop a probit model to investigate the 
working of five determining factors behind Australian intervention: exchange rate 
trend deviations, conditional volatility, interest rate differentials, profitability, and 
inventory imperatives. Their results show that three of these five factors have 
significant effects on intervention; the exceptions are profitability and the inventory 
factor. Akinci et al. (2006) also apply the probit model to study the determinants of 
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intervention in the Turkish economy. Similar to the Japanese results from Baillie and 
Osterberg (1997), they find evidence that, in the Turkish context, the main 
motivation of the official intervention is to reduce the excessive volatility, and hence 
the leaning-against-the-wind hypothesis is not supported. Frenkel et al. (2004) 
estimate magnitude of central bank intervention and test its determinants in an 
ordered probit model. Their results suggest that deviations from the target level of 
125 yen/US dollar are statistically significant for large foreign exchange 
intervention, but small-scale intervention is influenced by the deviation from the 
previous 25 days’ moving average. Ito and Yabu (2007) improve the specification of 
this class of ordered probit models by incorporating the political cost of intervention. 
They find that lags of the intervention variable are significant in the model, 
reflecting the lower political costs of continuous intervention. 
 
Among recent studies on intervention in emerging market economies, Loiseau-
Aslanidi (2011) considers the Georgian foreign exchange market by using squared 
changes in the exchange rate as a measurement of volatility. The findings indicate 
that volatility can trigger intervention. Jackman (2012) tests the Barbadian foreign 
exchange market and gets evidence that higher interest rate spreads may reduce sale 
intervention, but do not trigger purchase intervention. Similar research has been 
conducted for other emerging or developing economies, such as Turkey (Akinci et 
al., 2006; Herrera and Ozbay, 2005), Argentina (Brause, 2008) and Pakistan (Mehdi 
et al., 2012). Research focusing directly on the Chinese official intervention has 
started to emerge only recently. The main contributors to this sparse literature are 
Chinese economists in domestic forums, with an overwhelming focus on the effects 
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of official intervention (Lu, 1999; He, 2007; Xie et al., 2008; Liang and Mo, 2013; 
Wang, 2013). 
 
4.3 Official Central Bank Intervention in China and its Measurement 
 
4.3.1 Evolution of the RMB Exchange Rate Regime in Recent Years 
 
The currency regime introduced by China in July 2005 ended a decade-long fixed 
exchange rate system. In a policy statement at that time, the Chinese central bank 
announced that the RMB would be managed ‘with reference to a basket of currencies’ 
instead of being pegged to the US dollar. Henceforth, the renminbi exchange rate 
would be allowed to fluctuate within a narrow margin around a base rate known as 
the central parity rate. As a result, the exchange value of the RMB would come under 
the influences of market supply and demand.  
 
Under this managed floating rate regime, the RMB exchange rate is no longer 
determined solely by the US dollar, but also by the movements of a basket of 
international currencies. According to Governor Zhou Xiaochuan (2005), the 
reference basket contains 11 currencies, with the US dollar, the euro, Japanese yen 
and Korean won being the first-tier heavy weights. The other currencies comprise 
the pound sterling, the Singapore dollar, Russian rouble, Malaysian ringgit, 
Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, and Thai baht. The currencies’ weights in the 
basket are chosen according to their respective importance in China’s external trade.  
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However, when the global financial crisis hit, the dollar peg was reinstated 
unofficially. This situation lasted for about a year and half, until June 19, 2010. On 
that date, the Chinese central bank issued a statement indicating that it would 
‘proceed further with reform of the RMB exchange rate regime and increase the 
RMB exchange rate flexibility’. Since then, the Chinese exchange rate regime has 
reverted to the managed float system based on market supply and demand with 
reference to a basket of foreign currencies.  
 
When the managed floating rate system was first introduced, the daily trading price 
of the US dollar against the RMB was allowed to fluctuate within a narrow 0.3% 
band around the central parity. On May 18, 2007 this band was expanded to 0.5%, 
and then on April 14, 2012 it was expanded yet further, to 1.0%.  On April 16, 2012, 
the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) announced that, in the 
interbank foreign exchange market, the	bid-ask spread of the daily trading price of 
the US dollar against the RMB would fluctuate by a maximum of 2% around the 
central parity rate. As a result, the RMB exchange rate has shown a steady increase 
in flexibility.  
 
4.3.2 Measures of Central Bank Intervention 
 
This chapter concentrates on the CB intervention. To measure the CB intervention 
in China, we identify the dates on which the Chinese central bank has stepped into 
the foreign exchange market to conduct intervention; these dates are our proxy for 
the intervention. Following the method of Beine et al. (2009), we search the news 
media for PBOC intervention operations as reported by market traders and analysts. 
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More specifically, we scrutinize the newswire reports on the PBOC in Factiva and 
Reuters China. We deploy two basic rules: First, when it is reported that direct 
central bank intervention has occurred, we mark that day as a CB intervention day. 
If the Chinese monetary authorities are reported to have purchased (sold) the foreign 
currency (e.g. the USD), that day is designated as +1 (-1), and 0 otherwise. Second, 
when there is reporting of CB intervention via the state banks (indirect purchase or 
sale of foreign exchange), we also mark this as a CB intervention day and the sign 
of such intervention is marked the same as above. The CB intervention information 
at all degrees of certainty, including likely, clearly, covert, suspected, think, may 
have, and rumour, is counted in determining the dates of Chinese official 
intervention. 
 
For the purpose of illustration, on 10/11/2012, news reports indicate that, believing 
the RMB exchange rate to have appreciated	sufficiently, state banks including the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and the Agricultural Bank of China started 
to buy the USD, which pushed up the dollar price near the closing time of the market. 
Four traders in the market viewed this event as reflecting central bank intervention. 
Therefore, we mark this date as +1 of CB intervention. In another instance, on 
29/09/2011, because the USD index increased sharply, traders expected that 
depreciation of the RMB exchange rate would intensify. However, the state banks 
acted against the market expectation by selling the USD at the market closing time, 
which was interpreted by market participants as an intervention reflecting the central 
bank’s desire to keep the exchange rate stable. We therefore sign this date as -1 of 
CB intervention. 
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Table 4.1 shows that during the whole sample period the central bank engaged in 
purchase or sale of foreign currency on 661 trading days. Further analysis reveals 
that the PBOC does not use intervention only to address RMB appreciation, since if 
that were the case the number of purchase interventions would be significantly 
greater than the number of sales interventions (now 371 versus 290). Rather, the 
main intention of the PBOC seems to be to stabilize the exchange rate movements 
and offset abnormal exchange rate volatility.  
 
Figure 4.1 displays the official intervention in the sub-sample periods. From the 
figure, we can observe that compared to purchase intervention, sale intervention is 
an auxiliary tool to adjust the exchange rate movements. The number of purchase 
interventions is generally greater than that of sales interventions both in the normal 
period (319 versus 258) and during the financial crisis (52 versus 32). This 
difference indicates that the PBOC was more concerned regarding appreciation than 
depreciation at all times, not just during the financial crisis.  
 
Collecting intervention information from news reports is an important way of getting 
the CB intervention data. Because the Chinese CB intervention is secret and so is 
little known in the literature, construction of the intervention data in this regard 
represents a further contribution of this thesis to the literature. On the down side, the 
limitation in our approach to the construction of CB intervention is that we do not 
have a reliable way to gauge the quantity of China’s official intervention.  
 
Table 4.1 Official Chinese Interventions: 22 July 2005 - 22 July 2013 
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 Obs. Mean Std. dev. Skewness Excess 
Kurtosis 
Total 
intervention 
661 0.0388 0.5658 0.0116 3.1557 
Purchase 
intervention 
371 0.1778 0.3824 1.6857 3.8415 
Sale intervention 290 -0.139 0.3460 -2.0876 5.3579 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Official Interventions in the Sub-Sample Periods 
	
Notes: The financial crisis period is defined as from 15 July, 2008 - 23 June, 2010; 
the rest of the sample is the normal period. 
 
4.4 Data and Variables 
 
4.4.1 The Dataset 
 
To empirically examine the determinants of intervention in China, we use a daily 
time series dataset covering 8 years, from 22 July, 2005 to 22 July, 2013. Based on 
information from newswire reports provided by Factiva and Reuters China, the 
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whole sample period has a total of 2087 trading days, excluding official holidays. 
To further understand the determinants of China’s intervention, we additionally 
divide the whole sample into two sub-samples: the financial crisis period from 15 
July, 2008 to 23 June, 2010, and all the rest of the sample, which is classified as the 
normal period. From Figure 4.2, it can be seen that the movements of the RMB 
exchange rate were flat from 15 July, 2008 to 23 June, 2010 when, in response to 
the global financial crisis, China re-pegged its currency. We also use the supY(F(γ)) 
test (Andrews, 1993) to check robustness of the finding that the structural break 
dates are 15 July, 2008 and 23 June, 2010. The F-statistic at each break candidate 
(γ) can be obtained by the standard Chow test. From Figure 4.3, it can be seen that 
the largest (4.86) F-statistic is in July 2008. While the second largest (3.63) F-
statistic is in September 2010, I still choose June 2010 (2.73), because this coincides 
with the PBOC announcement of the change of China’s exchange rate regime from 
pegged to a managed float. We reject the null hypothesis that there is no break at 5% 
significance. Therefore, 15 July, 2008 and 23 June, 2010 are the structural break 
dates. 
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Figure 4.2 Movements of the USD/CNY Exchange Rate 
 
Figure 4.3 F-Test Statistic for Break 
 
4.4.2 Basic Determinants 
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Trend Deviations from Targets 
 
Following Chen et al. (2012), our intervention determinants include two target 
exchange rates: the previous week’s exchange rate as the short-term target, and the 
previous month’s moving average rate as the medium-term target. Deviations from 
the targets are calculated as follows: 
 
Short-term deviation: (^G_9 = 89H5 − 5` 89H5H++`a5                                          (4.1) 
Medium-term deviation: !^G_9 = 89H5 − 5C5 89H5H+C5+a5                                   (4.2) 
 
It is reasonable to expect that a positive/negative deviation, or an 
appreciation/depreciation of the RMB exchange rate, would induce a purchase/sale 
intervention by the PBOC to stabilize the currency. For instance, in the case of a 
RMB appreciation relative to the US dollar, the PBOC would lean against the wind 
by engaging in a purchase intervention, i.e. purchasing the US dollar. 
 
Conditional Volatility 
 
According to Hsieh (1989), Baillie and Bollerslev (1989), Kim (1998), and Akinci 
et al. (2006), GARCH (1,1) models with Student-t distribution are helpful to 
estimate the conditional volatility of daily exchange rate changes. In this study, a 
GARCH (1,1) model is deployed to estimate conditional variance for the whole 
sample period.  The model is specified as follows: 
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∆89 = DB + D5∆89H5 + DC∆89HC + Db;<=cdc8=9 + Def39 + D`;<=g,h,9H5 + i9   (4.3) ℎ9 = AB + A5ℎ9H5 + ACi9H5C + Ab;<=cdc8=9 + Aef39 + A`;<=g,h,9H5               (4.4) 
 
where ∆89  is the log difference of the USD/CNY exchange rate. ;<=cdc8=9 
represents the Shibor (Shanghai interbank) offer rate. This variable is used to 
account for the relation between the exchange rate and the interest rate. f39 is the 
Chinese government bonds yield, used as a proxy for risk measurement. ;<=g and ;<=h represent purchase and sale interventions, respectively. Table A in the Appendix 
reports the results from estimating the GARCH (1, 1) model. Given that the major 
objective of the PBOC is to stabilize the foreign exchange market, we expect that 
conditional volatility has a positive relation with intervention. 
 
Lag of Intervention 
 
Intervention is a sequential action. The central bank may intervene on many different 
days and its effects may last into next periods. In addition, the lag of intervention 
could reflect the political costs (Ito and Yabu, 2007). We use a lagged intervention 
variable to study its dynamic effects on triggering the subsequent intervention action. 
 
4.4.3 Domestic Market Determinants 
 
Conditions of the National Economy 
 
The national economy has a mutual relation with the exchange rate level. The 
Chinese government publishes the target GDP growth rate every year. In the process 
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of reaching the growth target, the exchange rate is often used as a policy tool to 
influence external trade. To this end, government intervention plays a pivotal role in 
bringing the exchange rate to the level desirable for trade promotion. In this study, 
state of the national economy is proxied by the national stock price index.  
 
  Conditional Volatility Dummy Variable 
 
In order to study different influences of the exchange rate volatility in the yuan 
appreciation or depreciation episodes, we introduce two dummy variables: one is for 
yuan appreciation, and takes the value of one when the yuan is appreciating and zero 
otherwise; the other is for yuan depreciation and takes the value of one when the 
yuan is depreciating and zero otherwise. We also use a third dummy variable, which 
takes the value of one when the conditional volatility is greater than the average 
level of volatility and zero otherwise, to test the impact of size of volatility on 
China’s intervention decision. These dummy variables allow us to test whether high 
levels of volatility could lead to intervention. 
 
4.4.3 Foreign Exchange Market Determinants 
 
   Interest Differentials 
 
Interest differentials can be a proxy to indicate the possible degree of exchange rate 
overshooting (Kim and Sheen, 2002). In this research, the interest differential is 
calculated as the difference between the overnight rate in China’s Shanghai 
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interbank market (the Shibor rate) and the US Federal Funds rate. If the interest rate 
differential increases (decreases), the RMB exchange rate would fluctuate upwards 
(downwards). The greater the exchange rate fluctuation, the higher is the possibility 
that the PBOC would step in to intervene. 
 
   Deviations from the Central Parity 
 
China has published the central parity rate on every business day since 22 July, 2005. 
The parity acts as the benchmark of rate movements to anchor the RMB exchange 
rate system. If the spot RMB exchange rate exceeds or is below the central parity by 
too great a margin, the PBOC would apply intervention to stabilize the erratic 
exchange rate movements. As such, deviations of the spot RMB exchange rate from 
the central parity can be counted as an indicator of the possible advent of official 
intervention.  
 
Inventory Imperatives 
 
Inventory consideration of foreign reserves could be a factor that leads to 
intervention. In order to ensure the maintenance of the desired level of international 
reserves, central banks use intervention to adjust the reserve stocks. We use the ratio 
of foreign reserves to imports as an indicator of inventory needs. Given the daily 
frequency of all other variables, following Kim and Sheen (2002) the monthly 
reserves and imports data are converted to daily frequency through the spline 
function.  
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   Foreign Direct Investment Flows 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a major channel through which international 
capital moves in and out of China. It is also an extremely important driver behind 
China’s economic growth. Therefore, this variable has become a focus of policy 
attention in China, and changes in it may trigger government intervention in the 
foreign exchange market.  In order to test whether FDI flows exert an effect on 
intervention, we add the FDI variable into the models. As with the inventory needs, 
we convert monthly FDI data to daily data. 
 
4.4.4 Data Statistics 
 
Table 4.2 shows the summary statistics and stationarity tests for the variables. The 
results indicate that while deviations from previous 21-day and previous 5-day 
exchange rates, conditional volatility, deviations from the central parity, and FDI are 
stationary processes, other variables such as the reserves ratio, stock index, interest 
rate differentials and USD/CNY exchange rate are all non-stationary. However, 
these series may be stationary if taking into account the regime breaks during the 
sample period (broken-trend stationarity). 
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Table 4.2 Data Summary Statistics 
 Dev21 Dev5 Stock 
index 
Interest rate 
differentials 
Conditional 
Volatility 
Central 
Parity 
Reserves 
ratio 
FDI USD/CNY 
exchange 
rate 
Observations 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 
Mean -0.0112 -0.0031 55.8076 0.4303 -14.2758 -0.0037 20.087 9.8624 6.9879 
Median -0.0069 -0.0012 58.28 1.07 -13.9956 -0.0004 20.4718 5.7414 6.8287 
Maximum 0.0739 0.0556 104.18 13.69 -11.3667 0.06957 37.58 110.3277 8.109 
Minimum -0.1588 -0.1664 26.07 -3.93 -17.0827 -0.0674 12.2317 -36.6187 6.1214 
Standard 
deviation 0.0198 0.0105 14.1108 2.5421 1.2744 0.1961 4.4964 22.1494 0.6224 
Skewness -1.5311 -2.3939 -0.0355 -0.0712 -0.5907 -1.1594 0.5414 1.4572 0.5283 
Kurtosis 9.6485 9.9252 3.2338 2.5415 2.5168 6.4435 3.7458 6.9504 1.941 
Stationarity 
test  Stationary Stationary Mixed Mixed Stationary Stationary Mixed Stationary Mixed 
91	
	
4.5 Modelling China’s Official Intervention 
 
First, we follow Almekinders and Eiffinger’s (1996) approach, in which the 
intervention reaction function is derived formally rather than in an ad hoc way. That 
is, an intervention reaction function is estimated by combining the exchange rate 
model with a loss function for the central bank. The process of exchange rate is as 
follows: 
 s" = s"$% + ρInt" + ω,- + u"                                                                             (4.5) 
 
where ,- is the past information set, and ω is a row vector of coefficients. 
 
The central bank is assumed to have a loss function that should be minimized using 
interventions. The loss function is estimated to be: 
 Min12E Loss" Ω"$% = E[(s" − s"∗)< Ω"$%]                                                          (4.6) 
 
where Ω"$%  denotes the information available to the monetary authorities and 
market participants at the end of date t − 1. The specification means that the loss is 
defined by squared deviation of the actual exchange rate from the target rate at date t. 
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Minimizing the loss function (4.6) by choosing I" subject to the constraint (4.5) leads 
to the following intervention reaction function: 
 
Int-∗ = − %? (@-$% − @-∗ + ω,-)                                                                             (4.7) 
 
Then, we generate a binary choice dependent variable which represents the 
probability of two types of intervention. The reasons for using a bivariate probit 
model are two. First, the intervention data exhibit nonlinearity, and are clustered. 
Therefore, if using the OLS estimator, the results would be inconsistent. In addition, 
errors of the OLS regression in this case may not be normally distributed. Because 
our CB intervention data are constructed as 1, 0 and -1, which is like a dummy 
variable. These promote us to use the probit model. Second, under the bivariate 
probit model, one can test for the effects of purchase and sale interventions in a 
common framework. We use the bivariate probit model as in Heckman (1987) to 
test determinants of intervention: 
 ABCD,-∗ = F%G%- + H%-                                                                                            (4.8) ABCI,-∗ = F<G<- + H<-                                                                                            (4.9) 
 
where ABCD,-∗  and ABCI,-∗  are latent variables. The actual intervention can be written as 
follows: 
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ABCJ,- = 1		LM	ABCJ,-∗ > 0ABCJ,- = 0		LM		ABCJ,-∗ ≤ 0 ;  Q = R, @                                                                  (4.10) 
 
where R and @ are the purchase and sale interventions, respectively, and: 
 ABCJ,-∗ = FJ,-G- + S-, with FJ,-G- = αU + αV,%MED" + αV,<SED" + αV,YCV"+αV,\IntV,-$%  																+αV,](CV")(^_RR-)(^@L`a-) + αV,b(CV")(^caR-)(^@L`a-)  																+αV,dSI" + αV,eID" + αV,fCP" + αV,%URR" + αV,%%FDI"                           (4.11) 
 
where Intj," is a  dummy variable that takes the value of one when the type of 
intervention is purchase and zero otherwise; Intk," is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one when the type of intervention is sale and zero otherwise.	MEDt and 
SEDt are deviations of the current exchange rate from the target exchange rate in the 
medium term (moving average of  RMB exchange rates in the previous 21 days) and 
short term (previous 5 days), respectively;	CV" indicates conditional volatility of the 
RMB exchange rate; ^_RR- and ^caR- are dummy variables for yuan appreciation 
and depreciation, respectively; ^@L`a- is a dummy variable  taking the value of one 
if the size of exchange rate volatility exceeds the average level, and zero otherwise;  Int"$% is the lag of the dependent variable. SI" is the MSCI China stock index, which 
is a proxy for conditions of the national economy; 	ID"  represents interest 
differentials between the Shibor overnight rate and the US Federal Funds rate; CP" 
denotes deviations of the current market exchange rate from the central parity; RR" 
is the ratio of official holdings of foreign reserves to Chinese imports; FDI" 
represents foreign direct investment flows. 
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The bivariate probit model is estimated by the maximum likelihood method. In 
addition, this model is adjusted with heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix 
(Huber/White). This approach can help us eliminate the effect of heteroscedasticity. 
 
4.6 Empirical Results 
 
4.6.1 Whole Sample Results 
 
Table 4.3 reports the estimation results for the whole sample using the bivariate 
probit model. The estimation is focused on the determination of China’s purchase 
and sale interventions. We divide these determinants into three sets: basic 
determinants, domestic market determinants and foreign exchange market 
determinants. The basic determinants model includes just the exchange rate 
deviations, conditional volatility and lag of intervention variables; the domestic 
market determinants model adds the volatility dummy variables and national 
economy index; the foreign exchange market determinants model is the integrated 
regression, including interest differentials, central parity deviations, inventory 
imperatives, and FDI flow variables. 
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Table 4.3 Bivariate Probit Model Results for Basic, Domestic Market, and Foreign Exchange Market Determinants 
	 Basic	Determinants	 Domestic	Market	Determinants	 Foreign	Exchange	Market	Determinants	
	 Purchase	 Sale	 Purchase	 Sale	 Purchase	 Sale	
Constant	(α")	 -0.512***	(0.191)	 -0.757***	(0.206)	 -1.068***	(0.137)	 -0.735***	(0.142)	 0.040	(0.246)	 -0.015	(0.253)	
Medium	deviation	(MED&)	 90.041**	(38.673)	 -95.339**	(39.829)	 77.965**	(39.142)	 -127.267***	(40.226)	 93.660**	(42.173)	 -79.687*	(43.331)	
Short	deviation	(SED&)	 -112.310	(74.500)	 143.695*	(79.436)	 -113.566	(73.814)	 135.368*	(81.047)	 -123.318	(75.204)	 110.277	(82.258)	
Volatility	(CV&)	 0.155	(0.162)	 0.152**	(0.067)	 	 	 	 	
Lag	(Int-,/01)	 0.400***	(0.078)	 0.449***	(0.089)	 0.449***	(0.078)	 0.450***	(0.090)	 0.368***	(0.079)	 0.391***	(0.090)	
Volatility	(CV&)(4566/)(4789:/)	 	 	 0.105***	(0.357)	 -0.169***	(0.0344)	 0.153***	(0.038)	 -0.172***	(0.036)	
Volatility	(CV&)(4;:6/)(4789:/)	 	 	 -0.180***	(0.036)	 0.083*	(0.047)	 -0.133***	(0.039)	 0.079	(0.050)	
Economy	(SI&)	 	 	 0.001	(0.003)	 -0.011***	(0.003)	 0.007**	(0.003)	 -0.009***	(0.003)	
Interest	rate	differentials	(ID&)	 	 	 	 	 0.079***	(0.019)	 0.031	(0.020)	
Central	parity	deviations	(CP&)	 	 	 	 	 0.156	(1.638)	 -6.603***	(1.873)	
Inventory	imperatives	(RR&)	 	 	 	 	 -0.069***	(0.012)	 -0.043***	(0.012)	
FDI	flows	(FDI&)	 	 	 	 	 -0.005***	(0.002)	 -0.001	(0.002)	
log-likelihood	 -1713.253	 	 -1680.471	 	 -1641.209	 	
Observations	 2086	 	 2086	 	 2086	 	
Notes:	 Figures in parentheses are Standard Errors. ***means the coefficient is significant at 99% level; **means significant at 95%; *means the 90% 
significance level.
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Results from Basic Determinants Model 
 
For the basic determinants model, our analysis of the results begins by explaining 
the influence of exchange rate deviations. We find evidence that the medium-term 
deviations are positively and significantly related with purchase intervention, and 
are significantly negatively related with sale intervention, while coefficients on the 
medium-term deviations α1 are positively and negatively significant for purchase 
and sale interventions respectively. This suggests that a current appreciation 
(depreciation) of the RMB exchange rate could induce a higher probability of 
purchase (sale) intervention by the PBOC, giving empirical evidence for the leaning-
against-the-wind hypothesis. In addition, the coefficient on the short-term deviation 
α2 is positively marginally significant only for the sale intervention at 10% level, 
implying that a short-term appreciation of the RMB exchange rate leads to a higher 
probability of sale intervention. Therefore, evidence for the short-term deviations 
proves that the PBOC applies leaning-with-the-wind interventions in short-term 
intervention decisions. 
 
The coefficient on conditional volatility α3 is positively significant, suggesting that 
the conditional volatility has a significant and positive influence on the sale 
intervention in the whole period. This indicates that a higher volatility of exchange 
rate changes is associated with a higher probability of sale intervention. Given that 
a major policy objective of the PBOC is to stabilize the RMB exchange rate, it is 
conceivable that a higher degree of exchange rate conditional volatility boosts the 
probability of the Chinese central bank increasing the supply of foreign exchange to 
the market, hence the increased sale intervention. However, similar to the results 
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from Kim and Sheen (2002), growing conditional volatility has no significant effect 
on triggering purchase intervention, presumably because withdrawal of liquidity 
from the foreign exchange market would only serve to intensify volatility of the 
exchange rate. As such, the signs for the variable of conditional volatility suggest 
that the PBOC does not worry about market turbulence when the yuan is perceived 
to be strong. 
 
The lagged intervention shows a statistically significant positive impact for both 
purchase and sale interventions, since the coefficients on the lagged intervention α4 
are positive and significant for purchase and sale intervention at 1% level. This 
indicates that, if a purchase (sale) intervention happened on the previous day, the 
likelihood of another purchase (sale) intervention appearing in the following days is 
high. 
 
  Results from Domestic Market Determinants Model 
 
The results for exchange rate deviations and lagged intervention variables in the 
domestic market determinants model are similar to the results from the basic 
determinants model. The positively and negatively significant coefficients on 
medium-term deviations α1 for purchase and sale interventions show that 
appreciation (depreciation) of the RMB exchange rate leads to China’s purchase 
(sale) intervention, supporting the leaning-against-the-wind hypothesis. Moreover, 
empirical evidence indicates that the PBOC uses lean-with-the-wind intervention in 
the short term, since the short-term deviations are shown to have marginally 
significant impacts for sale intervention and no significant impact for purchase 
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intervention. Furthermore, the coefficients on lagged intervention α4 are positively 
and statistically significant for both purchase and sale interventions. This suggests 
that intervention is a sequential process; that is, the probability of intervention 
following previous day intervention is high. 
 
Conditional volatility on days with larger than sample average conditional volatility 
has positively significant effects on purchase intervention when the yuan is 
appreciating, and for sale intervention when the yuan is depreciating. The 
coefficients on volatility dummy variables α5 and α6 are significantly positive and 
negative for the purchase intervention, while the signs of coefficients α5 and α6 for 
sale intervention are opposite to the signs for purchase intervention. Therefore, we 
can obtain evidence that a further rise in volatility associated with an appreciation 
(depreciation) induces the purchase (sale) of US dollars, which is conditioned by the 
PBOC’s policy objective not to allow big swings of the RMB rate. Compared with 
the results of the volatility variable in the basic determinants model, we can obtain 
more insights from the volatility dummy variables: when the yuan appreciates, 
China’s purchase intervention would be caused by larger than sample average 
conditional volatility, but not by normal magnitude of volatility. 
 
As can be seen from Table 4.3, the result for the coefficient on national economic 
conditions α7 shows that state of the national economy has only negative and 
significant effect on sale intervention probability over the whole sample period. 
When China’s economy is performing badly, the USD/CNY exchange rate tends to 
depreciate. To promote growth through importing, sale intervention is used as a tool 
to combat exchange rate depreciation. 
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  Results from Foreign Exchange Market Determinants Model 
 
Results for the domestic market determinants in the foreign exchange market 
determinants model are similar to those in the domestic market model. Two 
exceptions are that in sale intervention estimations, the marginally significant effects 
of short-term deviations and the volatility associated with depreciation disappear. 
The reason is likely to be that the Chinese monetary authorities use the setting of the 
central parity as a substitute for sale intervention. Given that the PBOC aims to 
stabilize the exchange rate movements around the central parity rate, it could control 
the exchange rate volatility by maintaining the exchange rate level at the short-term 
target level (the daily central parity rate). 
 
The other difference is that in purchase intervention estimations, the national 
economic condition variable has a significant influence. It is plausible that the 
national economy variable is associated with international reserves and FDI flows 
(Table 4.4). Polterovich and Popov (2002) and Lin (2011) prove that countries with 
growing foreign reserves exhibit higher rates of GDP growth. In addition, Alfaro et 
al. (2004) and Azman-Saini et al. (2010) obtain empirical evidence that FDI has a 
positive impact on growth. As such, the PBOC would take into account all these 
factors in purchase intervention decisions. 
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Table 4.4 Correlation between FDI, International Reserves and National Economy 
 FDI International reserves National Economy 
FDI 1   
International reserves -0.208*** 1  
National Economy 0.405*** 0.227*** 1 
Notes: ***means the coefficient is significant at the 99% level; **means significant 
at 95%, and * means significant at the 90% level. 
 
The positively significant coefficient on interest rate differential α8 for purchase 
intervention indicates that when the spread between China’s interest rate and the US 
interest rate becomes wider, the probability of the Chinese authorities engaging in 
purchase intervention is higher. This implies that when interbank liquidity becomes 
tighter, hence the interest rate differentials between China and the US become 
greater, the Chinese authorities tend to purchase the foreign currency to mitigate the 
pressure for the RMB to appreciate against foreign currencies. 
 
The central parity deviations have only a negative effect on sale intervention 
estimations, meaning that when the spot RMB exchange rate is less than the central 
parity rate (depreciation), the likelihood of sale intervention is higher. In order to get 
more detail about the effects of central parity deviations, we add two dummy 
variables into exchange rate deviations: !"#$%& and '"#$%&. 9 As indicated in Table 
4.5, the purchase intervention decision is influenced by consideration of the central 
parity deviations when they are greater than the average deviation level, and sale 
																																								 																				
9	!"#$%&is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the size of central parity deviations exceeds 
the average level, and zero otherwise; and '"#$%&	is a dummy variable that takes the value of unity if 
the size of central parity deviations is less than the average level, and zero otherwise. 
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intervention is associated with the central parity deviations being below the average 
level of deviations. 
 
Table 4.5 Results for Effects of Central Parity Deviations 
	 Foreign	exchange	market	model	
	 Purchase	 Sale	
Constant	(α,)	 -0.132	(0.252)	 -0.088	(0.257)	
Medium	deviation	(MED0)	 46.863	(42.301)	 -83.321**	(42.534)	
Short	deviation	(SED0)	 -86.416	(75.393)	 110.526	(81.988)	
Lag	(Int5,&78)	 0.333***	(0.080)	 0.373***	(0.091)	
Volatility	(CV0)(=>??&)(="#$%&)	 0.169***	(0.038)	 -0.177***	(0.036)	
Volatility	(CV0)(=@%?&)(="#$%&)	 -0.111***	(0.038)	 0.070	(0.050)	
Economy	(SI0)	 0.008***	(0.003)	 -0.010***	(0.003)	
Interest	rate	differentials	(ID0)	 0.063***	(0.020)	 0.014	(0.201)	
Central	parity	deviations	(CP0)(	!"#$%&)	 15.695***	(3.326)	 	
Central	parity	deviations	(CP0)(	'"#$%&)	 	 -10.730***	(2.188)	
Inventory	imperatives	(RR0)	 -0.064***	(0.012)	 -0.039***	(0.013)	
FDI	flows	(FDI0)	 -0.004**	(0.002)	 -0.0002	(-0.002)	
log-likelihood	 -1627.005	 	
Observations	 2086	 	
Notes:	Figures in parentheses are Standard Errors. ***means the coefficient is significant 
at the 99% level; **means significant at 95% and * means significant at 90% level. 
 
The inventory constraint has negative and statistically significant effects on both 
purchase and sale interventions. That is, the greater the size of international reserves, 
the lower the probability of intervention. An increase in the international reserves 
implies an increase in the country’s macro-prudent position, hence relatively less 
need to worry about exchange rate movements. 
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FDI flows also have a negatively significant effect on purchase intervention. The 
reason may be the same as that for the inventory constraint. Increased FDI inflows 
strengthen China’s balance of payments position and are generally healthy and 
beneficial. This would reduce the PBOC’s impetus to intervene to ‘get the exchange 
rate right’. 
 
4.6.2 Results from the Financial Crisis Period 
 
Table 4.6 presents the results from estimating the financial crisis period (15 July, 
2008 to 23 June, 2010) with the bivariate probit model. The results provide evidence 
that during the global financial crisis, the main objective of the PBOC was to 
stabilize the Chinese foreign exchange market volatility. Because of the regime shift 
during this crisis period, the Chinese central parity rates were pegged to the US 
dollar. In order to keep the RMB exchange rate around the central parity rate, 
China’s intervention operation was largely influenced by the exchange rate deviation 
factor.  The coefficients on exchange rate deviations α9 are positively and negatively 
significant for purchase and sale interventions, respectively, suggesting that if the 
spot exchange rate exceeds (or is below) the central parity, the probability of 
purchase (sale) intervention is higher. This also provides supportive evidence that 
the PBOC relies more on central parity deviations than on conditional volatility as a 
determining factor, and hence the volatility variables become insignificant in 
decisions on both purchase and sale intervention. 
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The national economy variable has a positive and significant effect on purchase 
intervention probability. The empirical evidence on this variable proves that during 
the financial crisis, the Chinese monetary authority was focused on maintaining 
GDP growth. To promote GDP growth, the PBOC applied purchase intervention to 
preserve and promote the volume of exports. 
 
The short-term deviations and lagged intervention are positively related to sale 
intervention. This outcome indicates that the PBOC is significantly influenced by 
these two factors when making the sale intervention decision. 
	
Table 4.6 Results for the Financial Crisis Period 
	 Foreign	exchange	market	model	
	 Purchase	 Sale	
Constant	(α,)	 -2.725**	(1.174)	 0.132	(1.565)	
Medium	deviation	(MED0)	 43.172	(168.157)	 117.034	(183.445)	
Short	deviation	(SED0)	 -40.666	(228.735)	 511.776*	(277.917)	
Lag	(Int5,&78)	 0.330	(0.223)	 0.548*	(0.293)	
Volatility	(CV0)(=>??&)(="#$%&)	 -0.064	(0.132)	 -0.177	(0.146)	
Volatility	(CV0)(=@%?&)(="#$%&)	 -0.243*	(0.130)	 -0.031	(0.172)	
Economy	(SI0)	 0.025**	(0.012)	 -0.020	(0.014)	
Interest	rate	differentials	(ID0)	 0.168	(0.188)	 -0.148	(0.242)	
Central	parity	deviations	(CP0)	 35.973***	(13.783)	 -39.255**	(16.791)	
Inventory	imperatives	(RR0)	 -0.011	(0.030)	 -0.025	(0.036)	
FDI	flows	(FDI0)	 -0.004	(0.004)	 0.003	(0.004)	
log-likelihood	 -252.993	 	
Observations	 507	 	
Notes: Figures in parentheses are Standard Errors. ***means the coefficient is significant 
at the 99% level; **means significant at 95% and  * means significant at 90% level.
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4.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has examined the forces that drive China’s central bank intervention in 
the foreign exchange market from a binary variable approach. The empirical 
evidence unearthed by this chapter suggests that exchange rate deviations, 
conditional volatility, lagged intervention, national economic conditions, interest 
rate differentials, deviations from the central parity, inventory needs and foreign 
direct investment have significant influence on China’s intervention decision. The 
PBOC conducts intervention in a leaning-against-the-wind fashion in the medium 
term, while leaning-with-the-wind intervention is used in the short term. Evidence 
also shows that China intervenes through the conduit of buying or selling foreign 
exchange to constrain exchange rate volatility, with a view to ensuring that there are 
no big swings in the RMB exchange rate. A related interesting finding is that 
deviations of the exchange rate from the central parity would prompt the PBOC to 
intervene, highlighting the central role of the parity in China’s management of 
exchange rate policy. In addition, large central parity deviations could trigger 
purchase intervention, and the sale intervention decision is usually taken when 
deviations from the central parity are of moderate scale.  
 
While on some occasions the central bank may decide to intervene in consideration 
of an array of factors, it may sometimes be prompted by one single factor.  In making 
purchase intervention decisions, the PBOC may consider national economy 
conditions, inventory imperatives, and FDI flows. However, in sale intervention 
decisions, the main driving forces are exchange rate volatility and short-term 
deviations. 
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We also find that, in response to the global financial crisis, the PBOC gave 
prominent consideration to stabilization of the exchange rate, which sheds light on 
how China used intervention to deal with great economic and financial turmoil. 
 
 
  
106	
	
Chapter 5 
 
China’s Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market: 
The Case of the Central Parity 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Among the countries whose monetary authorities apply daily intervention, that is, 
intervention on most trading days, researchers have identified Germany 
(Almekinders and Eijffinger, 1994 and 1996), Russia (Tullio and Natarov, 1999) and 
Pakistan (Shah et al., 2009). To that list can be added China, where official daily 
intervention in the foreign exchange market has been a distinctive feature of 
exchange rate policy. As in other emerging market economies, the primary 
motivation of China’s daily intervention is to align the exchange rate to 
fundamentals, as suggested in the 1985 Plaza Accord (Baille and Osterberg, 1997), 
and to stabilize a disorderly foreign exchange market (Szakmary and Mathur, 1997; 
Disyatat and Galati, 2007; Pointines and Rajan, 2011). However, despite its critical 
importance, little is understood about the country’s intervention operation, and 
hence it is difficult to gain a useful perspective on China’s exchange rate policy and 
its global repercussions. This calls for research attention.  
 
In the new managed float regime, the central parity rate (CPR) plays a key role. On 
every business day, this rate is published by the authorities before the market 
107	
	
opening. It then remains valid for the day and all market transactions are based upon 
it. As well as providing an anchor for the system, the CPR is a policy indicator. In 
the process of setting the parity rate, the central bank takes into account current and 
expected economic conditions. Through setting the CPR at different levels, the 
central bank may affect the benchmark for transactions in the marketplace, 
anchoring stability of the Chinese foreign exchange market and transmitting policy 
signals to market participants.  
 
This chapter is motivated to examine China’s intervention in the central parity rate 
(the daily price intervention) because of its primary importance in the nation’s 
intervention nexus; such research will help to achieve a better understanding of 
China’s exchange rate policy, which is increasingly exhibiting global influences. To 
this end, the first important dimension concerns the determinants of such 
intervention. The first challenge is to model a reaction function based on a non-linear 
relationship, because intervention in the CPR does not increase or decrease by 
approximately the same magnitude. Previous studies have shown that Tobit models 
are appropriate when the research interest lies in the magnitude of intervention rather 
than the probability (Humpage, 1999; Brandner and Grech, 2005). However, 
because thresholds vary depending on individual characteristics (Omori and 
Miyawaki, 2010; Nakayama et al., 2010), we combine the Tobit analysis with 
covariate dependent thresholds. The chapter begins by using the Bayes Tobit model 
as the reaction function. 
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The research described in this chapter contributes to a better understanding of the 
Chinese exchange rate policy in several ways. First, we structure a daily price 
intervention index by comparing the central parity rate to the daily fair value 
USD/CNY exchange rate estimated according to the IFV approach. Second, the 
finding of significant effect of three determinants underlying the process of China’s 
setting of the CPR contributes to the debate on the true nature of the Chinese 
exchange rate regime. The determining factors are evaluation of the RMB (proxied 
by the market makers’ offer rate), international currency movements (proxied by the 
Broad Dollar Index compiled by the US Federal Reserve), and macro conditions of 
the Chinese economy (proxied by the yield curve spread between short and long 
bond yields).  
 
The results from the Bayes Tobit models show that, in general, these factors have 
significant effects on China’s daily price intervention in the whole sample. Results 
for the whole sample suggest that China follows a leaning-against-the-wind policy, 
and conditions of domestic economy and foreign market can impact daily price 
intervention. Furthermore, coefficients on the determinants are found to be time-
varying across different sub-samples, and between high and low intervention. The 
evidence indicates that China’s daily price intervention is multi-faceted. With regard 
to high intervention, the policy objective during all the sub-sample time periods 
relates to market exchange rate condition. For low intervention, the policy objective 
ranges from restraining the domestic economy from overheating before the financial 
crisis, to a focus on market exchange rate conditions during and after the financial 
crisis. 
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents a review of 
related literature. Section 5.3 describes measurement of China’s daily price 
intervention and the data deployed in the study. Section 5.4 estimates the Tobit and 
the Bayes Tobit models. Section 5.5 reports the estimation results. Section 5.6 
presents the main findings of the chapter. 
 
5.2 Related Literature 
 
The process of setting the central parity rate in China is quite similar to that of the 
London Gold Fix and the central parity rate in the European foreign exchange 
market. According to Harvey (2008), the Gold Fix is generally accepted as a true 
indication of conditions on the international market; for example, Aggarwal and 
Lucey (2007) argue that it provides a benchmark for gold bullion. The function of 
the London Gold Fix is to attain ‘equilibrium between buyers and sellers’ (Harvey, 
2008); that is, it is determined by the gold market conditions. In theory, in order to 
ensure a stable economic environment, the central parity rate in the European foreign 
exchange market should be set close to the equilibrium exchange rate (Horvath and 
Komarek, 2006). 
 
The first wave of literature on the intervention reaction function is limited to certain 
developed markets. For instance, in order to identify the determinants of the 
intervention behaviour of the Reserve Bank of Australia from 1983 to 1997, Kim 
and Sheen (2002) test five factors: exchange rate deviations, conditional volatility 
of the exchange rate changes, the overnight interest rate differentials between the 
US and Australia, profitability of foreign exchange intervention, and inventory 
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consideration of foreign currency reserves. Jun (2008) finds that the friction model 
does not outperform a linear model as reaction function for the Deutsche mark-US 
dollar market, because the friction model is found to have lower MAE but higher 
RMSE both in and out of sample. The most developed country studied with 
intervention reaction function is Japan, especially after the publication of 
intervention data by the Japanese monetary authorities (Ito, 2003 and 2005; Frenkel 
et al., 2004; Ito and Yabu, 2007; Beine et al., 2009). 
 
Because of the nonlinearity in the intervention data, OLS estimates of central banks’ 
intervention are inconsistent (Jun, 2008; Hall and Kim, 2009; Chen et al., 2012). In 
order to overcome this problem, researchers apply the Tobit models in their 
intervention studies. Using daily exchange and intervention data from 1993 to 1998, 
Brandner and Grech (2005) estimate a Tobit model to analyse central bank 
interventions in ERM Imembers, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain. Their results show that the exchange rate position in the band (deviation from 
DEM central parity) significantly leads to intervention operation. However, there is 
less evidence that a change in market conditions (the volatility variables) induces 
foreign exchange intervention. Herrera and Ozbay (2005) test the determinants of 
foreign exchange intervention in Turkey from 1993 to 2003 using a Tobit model and 
Powell’s CLAD estimator. Results show that although the degree of persistence in 
interventions decreased after the change from managed float to free float, lags of 
intervention variables in both purchase and sale equations are statistically significant 
in both periods. Using Japanese intervention data from 1991 to 2004, Chen et al. 
(2012) find empirical evidence to prove that the Tobit-GARCH model is a better 
central bank intervention function than other conventional models. Through 
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applying a Tobit-GARCH reaction function, Echavarria et al. (2013) prove that the 
transparent and pre-announced daily interventions applied by Colombia in 2008-
2012 have much larger effects than secret interventions applied in 2004-2007. 
 
Among recent studies on intervention in emerging market economies, Loiseau-
Aslanidi (2011) considers the Georgian foreign exchange market by using squared 
changes in the exchange rate as a measurement of volatility. The study finds that 
volatility can trigger intervention. Jackman (2012) tests the Barbadian foreign 
exchange market and gets evidence that higher interest rate spreads may reduce sale 
intervention, but do not trigger purchase intervention. Similar research has been 
conducted for other emerging or developing economies such as Turkey (Akinci et 
al., 2006; Herrera and Ozbay, 2005), Argentina (Brause, 2008) and Pakistan (Mehdi 
et al., 2012). Research focusing directly on the Chinese official intervention has 
started to emerge only recently. The main contributors to this sparse literature are 
Chinese economists in domestic forums, with an overwhelming focus on the effects 
of official intervention (Lu, 1999; He, 2007; Xie et al., 2008; Liang and Mo, 2013; 
Wang, 2013).  
 
5.3 Data Description 
 
5.3.1 Measures of Central Parity Rate Intervention 
 
Development of the Central Parity Rate 
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This chapter concentrates on the daily price, or CPR, intervention. Table 1 shows 
the process of the development of the central parity rate. According to a PBOC 
announcement, the managed float system started on 21 July, 2005 (PBOC, 2005). 
From that date the RMB exchange rate was not simply pegged to the US dollar, and 
so could better reflect market conditions. On 29 December, 2005, the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) authorized 13 banks to launch the 
market maker service (SAFE, 2005). Today there are 34 market makers (SAFE, 
2014). Before 4 January, 2006, the central parity rate was set by the closing price 
exchange rate of the previous day. However, with the introduction of the over-the-
counter (OTC) transaction, the PBOC changed the formation of the CPR (PBOC, 
2006). In the new system, the China Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS) asks 
the exchange rate prices from the market makers before the opening time of the 
foreign exchange market, and these prices are used as the calculation sample of the 
central parity rate. Then, after deleting the highest and the lowest price, the weighted 
average of these exchange rate prices is calculated. The weighted average price is 
the central parity rate. The weights are based on the trading volume of market 
makers and the conditions of exchange rate prices. From Table 5.1, we can see that 
the PBOC has gradually increased the width of the exchange rate band, making 
changes on 21 May, 2007 (PBOC, 2007), 16 April, 2012 (PBOC, 2012), and 17 
March, 2014 (PBOC, 2014). This serves the PBOC’s purpose, which is to increase 
the elasticity of the RMB exchange rate. 
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Table 5.1 Developments of China’s Central Parity Rate Policy 
Date Event 
21/07/2005 Launch of the managed float system with reference to a basket of 
currencies 
29/12/2005 13 banks become the market makers 
04/01/2006 Central parity rate combines OTC transactions and negotiation 
21/05/2007 Exchange rate band changes from 0.3% to 0.5% 
16/04/2012 Exchange rate band changes from 0.5% to 1% 
17/03/2014 Exchange rate band changes from 1% to 2% 
 
The daily central parity is published by the CFETS at 9:15; this is fifteen minutes 
before the start of the foreign exchange opening hours, which run from 9:30 to 15:30 
Beijing time. The price-setting process for the central parity considers three 
functions (CFETS, 2013): the prices of central parity of all foreign exchange market 
makers asked by CFETS before the opening time; the changes in foreign exchange 
market conditions; and China’s macro economy condition. As proxies for these three 
functions we use USD/CNY exchange rate prices from foreign exchange market 
makers, broad currency index, and the yield curve spread, respectively. Therefore, 
this research tests whether or not USD/CNY exchange rate prices, broad currency 
index and the yield curve spread are determinant factors of daily price intervention. 
 
Some Chinese studies argue that the PBOC controls the RMB exchange rate through 
the central parity rate. For example, Zhao et al. (2012) indicate that if the PBOC 
never loses control of the central parity rate, then the RMB exchange rate must 
follow the will of the PBOC. Similarly, Zhao et al. (2013) and Shen (2013) argue 
that the RMB exchange rate is controlled by the PBOC, as the PBOC decides the 
central parity rate. News reports might provide proof that the central parity rate can 
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indeed influence RMB exchange rate movement. For example, according to reports 
in The Wall Street Journal, the RMB exchange rate followed the guidance of the 
central parity rate on 12/09/2014, 16/09/2014, and 08/10/2014. However, the 
literature in English includes very little on daily price intervention. This chapter tries 
to fill this critical void. 
 
Measuring China’s Daily Price Intervention 
 
In this chapter we construct a daily price intervention ratio by comparing the CPR 
with the fair value USD/CNY exchange rate estimated by the indirect fair value (IFV) 
approach. From the fair value exchange rate, we can find out at what level the 
exchange rate should be. 
 
Over the years, a number of models of currency fair value have been developed. 
Financial markets have developed formulas and models to derive fair values for 
futures, bonds, options, swaps and other securities (Aries et al., 2006). Empirical 
estimations make extensive use of purchasing power parity (PPP) (Officer, 1976), 
Penn effect (Summers and Heston, 1991), fundamental equilibrium exchange rate 
(FEER) (Williamson, 1983 and 1994), behavioural equilibrium exchange rate 
(BEER) (Clark and MacDonald, 1999) and indirect fair value (IFV) (Cenedese and 
Stolper, 2012) to measure exchange rate misalignment. In comparison with PPP, 
Penn effect, FEER and BEER, the IFV has some advantages: First, only IFV can 
focus on daily financial and macro data, while the other models have to use quarterly 
or yearly data (Zhang, 2012). Second, the fair value does not require restrictive 
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assumptions on financial market equilibrium to be operational (Clarida, 2013). Third, 
the IFV model benefits from ease of operability. Like the BEER model, IFV is 
estimated using co-integration techniques. To our knowledge, this IFV approach has 
not previously been formalized in the academic literature. 
 
The IFV approach is based on the assumption that misaligned exchange rates are 
caused by speculative activity (Lyons, 2001). Risk reversals and international money 
market (IMM) positioning are two measures of speculative positioning often 
employed in this approach (Mogford and Pain, 2006). The first measure is the 
implied volatility differentials between comparable out-of-the-money call and put 
options. Compared with the demand for puts, demand for call options will greatly 
increase, leading to a rise in the price of call options. The second measure is 
dependent on the weekly Commitments of Traders (COT) report, which includes 
information about the positioning size of so-called non-commercial traders on the 
IMM futures exchange, part of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). 10 
Speculative positioning measures tend to be stationary and highly correlated with 
spot exchange rate (Campa et al., 1998; Mogford and Pain, 2006). In this research, 
because we use daily data, risk reversals are used to measure speculative positioning. 
 
The following equation can express the relation between the exchange rate level and 
the speculative positioning: 
 
 %& = EFG& + IF'& + J&                                                                                        (5.1) 
																																								 																				
10	For	details	on	the	COT	reports,	see:	www.cftc.gov/marketreports/commitmentsoftraders/index.htm.	
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where %& is the spot exchange rate observed in the FX market, G& is a vector of 
broadly defined fundamentals, '& is speculative activity variables, J& is a residual 
error, and E and I are vectors of coefficients. 
 
From equation (5.1), it is possible to use the parameter estimates to calculate fair 
value in the following equation: 
 
%& = EFG& + IF'                                                                                                   (5.2) 
 
with the overbar denoting the value of S, that is neutral speculative positioning. In 
most cases the choice of neutral speculative positioning is the sample mean. 
 
If the CPR is contrary to the prediction of the market, and is 1% (Table 5.2 shows 
0.3% during the period 22 July, 2005 to 21 May, 2007; 0.5% before 16 April, 2012), 
that is, 100% of the horizontal band, above/below the benchmark, it is marked as 
daily price intervention. The ratio of daily price intervention is estimated as follows: 
 
 K& = LMNOPQO                                                                                                   (5.3) 
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Table 5.2 Composition of Daily Price Intervention Index 
Date Percentage of horizontal band 
22/07/2005—21/05/2007 0.3% 
22/05/2007—15/04/2012 0.5% 
16/04/2012—22/07/2013 1% 
 
where K& is the daily price intervention index, RST& is the present central parity rate, 
and UV&78 is the fair value RMB exchange rate estimated by the IFV approach at 
day t. High intervention (depreciates the Chinese yuan) means the CPR is 100% 
higher than the benchmark, but if the daily price intervention ratio is 100% lower 
than the benchmark, it is termed low intervention (appreciates the Chinese yuan); 
otherwise there is no intervention. This means high intervention is larger than 1, and 
low intervention is smaller than 1. 
 
For example, on 30/04/2009, the fair value exchange rate was 6.98, but the CPR was 
6.83; this is interpreted as an appreciation of the RMB with intervention by the 
PBOC. Therefore, this date is marked as low intervention. On 03/02/2011, the 
markets considered the RMB fair value exchange rate should be 6.51, but the PBOC 
set the CPR at 6.59, indicating a depreciation of the RMB. Accordingly, this date is 
marked as high intervention. 
  
5.3.2 Data Description and Statistics 
 
The Dataset 
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The dataset analysed in this study contains daily intervention over an 8-year period 
starting on 22 July, 2005 and ending on 22 July, 2013, which represents a total of 
2087 trading days excluding official holidays. To further understand the 
determinants of China’s intervention, we additionally divide the whole sample into 
two sub-samples: 15 July, 2008 to 23 June, 2010, and the rest of the time, which is 
classified as the normal period. From Figure 5.1, it can be seen that the movements 
of the RMB exchange rate were flat during the period from 15 July, 2008 to 23 June, 
2010, when, in response to the global financial crisis, China re-pegged its currency. 
We also use the supZ(F(γ)) test (Andrews, 1993) to confirm that the structural break 
dates are 15 July, 2008 and 23 June, 2010. Based on Andrews (1993), the variable 
contained in the supZ(F(γ)) test should not contain unit root. Table 5.3 shows that 
there is no unit root in RMB exchange rate based on the ADF and PP tests. The F-
statistic at each break candidate (γ) can be obtained by the standard Chow test. From 
Figure 5.2 we find that the largest (4.86) F-statistic is in July 2008. While the second 
largest (3.63) F-statistic is in September 2010, we still choose June 2010 (2.73), 
because it was in that month that the PBOC announced the change of China’s 
exchange rate regime from a peg to a managed float. We reject the null hypothesis, 
which is that there is no break, at 5% significance. Therefore, 15 July, 2008 and 23 
June, 2010 are the structural break dates. 
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Figure 5.1 Movements of USD/CNY Exchange Rate 
 
Table 5.3 ADF and PP Tests 
Methods t-Statistic 
ADF -3.423*** 
PP -4.574*** 
Notes: *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% level; the null hypotheses for ADF 
and PP tests is that the variable follows a unit root process.  
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Figure 5.2 Regime Breaks in the RMB Exchange Rate (2005-2013) 
 
Determining Factors 
 
USD/CNY exchange rate prices. Similar to the London Gold Fix and European 
Currency Unit (ECU) concertation procedure, the RMB exchange rate central parity 
process involves USD/CNY exchange rate prices from foreign exchange market 
makers. Because the price of central parity provided by different makers is 
confidential, the makers’ RMB exchange rate price is the best proxy for central 
parity price. Data on exchange rate prices are available for only six banks, and we 
cannot know the weights. In addition, we use the USD/CNY exchange rate in the 
US market to be the proxy for foreign banks’ offers. The offers from foreign banks 
are less subject to control by the Chinese government and should follow the 
exchange rate in the US foreign exchange market. Moreover, although we do not 
know the weights, we know that the Bank of China occupies the greatest weight, as 
Critical value 5%
Max QLR = 4.86
0
1
2
3
4
5
QL
R 
sta
tis
tic
2004m1
2006m1
2008m1
2010m1
2012m1
2014m1
Time
Testing for breaks in RMB exchange rate (2005-2013)
121	
	
the majority of foreign reserves are in the Bank of China. Therefore, this research 
first uses the average mean of the five banks’ exchange rate prices and exchange rate 
in the US market, and then sums the exchange rate price from the Bank of China to 
be the price of central parity from foreign exchange market makers. The equation 
for USD/CNY exchange rate prices is as follows: 
 \T] = 60%\T]!R + 40%\T]b   
b\T] = \T − \T]                                                                                             (5.4) 
 
where ERO is the USD/CNY exchange rate prices, EROBC is the exchange rate 
price from the Bank of China, and EROM is the average mean of the five banks’ 
exchange rate prices and exchange rate in the US market. In addition, MERO is the 
exchange rate prices deviation, equal to RMB exchange rate minus exchange rate 
prices.  
 
Broad currency index. Unlike the London Gold Fix and the ECU concertation 
procedure, China’s central parity also considers the changes in foreign exchange 
market conditions. We use broad currency index as the proxy for foreign exchange 
market condition. The broad currency index is a weighted average of the foreign 
exchange values of the US dollar against the currencies of a large group of major 
US trading partners, including China. It is an appropriate measure for the foreign 
exchange market condition, as we can use it to get the situations of the basket 
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currencies relevant to the RMB exchange rate movement.11 The change of broad 
currency index is estimated as follows: 
 !RK& = Kd@%e& − Kd@%e&78                                                                                (5.5) 
 
where !RK& is the change of broad currency index, which is calculated by broad 
currency index on day t minus index on day t-1. Poor foreign exchange market 
condition would trigger daily price intervention by the PBOC. Therefore, we assume 
that the relation between the daily price intervention and the change of broad 
currency index should be negative. 
 
The yield curve spread. The PBOC also needs to consider the condition of China’s 
macro economy. The yield curve spread is a proxy for China’s macroeconomic 
condition. Based on studies by Harvey (1988), Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), and 
Rudebusch and Williams (2009), it can play a useful role in macroeconomic 
prediction. The yield curve spread used in this research is the 10-year government 
bond yield minus the 12-month government bond yield, gained through the 
following equation: 
 fR& = 10fh!& − 1fh!&                                                                                     (5.6) 
 
																																								 																				
11	On	28th	January	2011,	PBOC	Governor	Zhou	Xiaochuan	stated	that	the	RMB	exchange	rate	refers	to	
a	basket	of	almost	20	currencies	(PBOC,	2011).	
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where fR& is the yield curve spread, 10fh!& is the 10-year government bond yield, 
and 1fh!& is the 12-month government bond yield. The relation between the yield 
curve and the economy should be positive (Estrella and Mishkin, 1998). From 
Figure 5.3, we can see that the yield curve has co-movement with the GDP growth. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 China’s GDP and Yield Curve 
 
Data Statistics 
 
Table 5.4 presents the summary statistics and the correlation matrix for the variables. 
The low kurtosis12 of high and low intervention shows that these data might not 
follow the normal distribution. The Tobit model with covariate dependent thresholds 
is to account for possible effects of outliers. From the correlation matrix, we can see 
																																								 																				
12	Kurtosis	is	a	measure	of	whether	the	data	are	peaked	or	flat	relative	to	a	normal	distribution.	That	
is,	datasets	with	high	kurtosis	tend	to	have	a	distinct	peak	near	the	mean	(von	Hippel,	2005).	
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that the bank RMB exchange rate and the broad currency index have significant 
relation with daily price intervention. However, the interaction among these 
variables may be more complex than a simple correlation can capture. It will 
therefore be interesting and informative to further investigate the extent to which 
these key variables interact in subsequent sections. Figure 5.4 presents the time 
series of daily intervention index. 
 
The index of CPR intervention is a new measure that this thesis builds to get the 
CPR intervention data. This also contributes to the literature in a critical way. Based 
on the process of China’s setting of the central parity rate, we set up three 
determinants to investigate China’s intervention decision. Identification of these 
determinants is novel in that these factors are China specific and are not reported in 
the literature. Late empirical examination further validates the employment of these 
determining factors. For the limitations, because of the lack of official intervention 
information for comparison we cannot gauge the precision of these intervention data. 
In addition, these three determinants are of monthly instead of daily frequency, 
which means we need to further develop the proxies for the model of daily frequent 
data. 
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Table 5.4 Summary Statistics 
 \T]b& !RK& fR& K&i K&j K& 
Summary statistics  ]k". 2087 2087 2087 1205 874 2079 b%>d 0.003 2.011 1.138 0.441 0.310 1.001 'l@. @%m. 0.015 0.021 0.694 0.502 0.457 0.013 'n%od%"" 22.60 0.285 0.154 0.261 0.795 -0.58 \ep%""	qrslt"#" 684.5 2.068 1.819 1.068 1.632 2.537 
Correlation matrix      b\T]& 1.000       !RK& 0.020 1.000      fR& -0.009 0.675* 1.000     K&i -0.07* -0.23* -0.14* 1.000    K&j 0.092* 0.236* 0.104* -0.60* 1.000   K&	 -0.08* -0.26* -0.12* 0.750* -0.85* 1.000  
Notes: The significance levels are displayed as * for 1%. b\T]& is the bank RMB 
exchange rate prices, !RK& is the broad currency index, fR& is the yield curve spread, K&i and K&j are the high and low interventions, and K& is the daily price intervention.  
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Figure 5.4 Daily CPR Intervention Index in Chinese Foreign Exchange Market 
during 2005-2013 
Notes: High intervention is larger than 1; low intervention is smaller than 1. 
 
5.4 Modelling China’s Intervention Reaction Function 
 
5.4.1 Tobit Regression 
 
This section describes a censored regression model, that is, the Tobit model. The 
majority of Tobit models can be divided into five common types, according to the 
likelihood function (Amemiya, 1984). Table 5.5 shows each type of model 
characterized by the likelihood function, where u8, uv and uw are all assumed to be 
distributed as x(ey,Ey, zyv) , { = 1,2,3 , and S  is a probability or a density or a 
combination thereof.  
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Table 5.5 Types of Tobit Model Classified by the Likelihood Function 
Type 1 S(u8 < 0) ∙ S(u8) 
 2 S(u8 < 0) ∙ S(u8 > 0, uv) 
 3 S(u8 < 0) ∙ S(u8, uv) 
 4 S(u8 < 0, uw) ∙ S(u8, uv) 
 5 S(u8 < 0, uw) ∙ S(u8 > 0, uv) 
Source: Amemiya (1984). 
 
In the Tobit model, the dependent variable is called censored when the response 
cannot take values below (left censored) or above (right censored) a certain 
threshold value. In a censored sample, some values of interventions will be zero, 
which implies that the response of the dependent variable to the explanatory 
variables is nonlinear in the regression of intervention function (Chen et al., 2012). 
Therefore, OLS estimates of the foreign exchange intervention function will be 
inconsistent; that is, the residuals of the reaction functions are related with the 
explanatory variables. Tobit models overcome the problem whereby the dependent 
variable takes some zero values (see, e.g., Alkeminders and Eijffinger, 1994; 
Humpage, 1999; Brandner and Grech, 2005). 
 
In this study, we use the Tobit model estimated by Herrera and Ozbay (2005) to 
estimate the intervention reaction function in China. The high intervention reaction 
function is written as follows: 
 K&∗ = e&FÇ + J&,				J&~#. #. @	x(0, Ñv) 
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K&i = K&∗		#Ö	K&∗ > 0, K&i = 0			#Ö	K&∗ ≤ 0, oℎ%s%	e&FÇ = Ç, + Ç8b\T]& + Çv!RK& + ÇwfR&                                             (5.7) 
 
where K&∗is the latent variable, K&i is the observed censored value of high intervention, e&F is the vector of exogenous explanatory variables at time t, k is the vector of 
unknown coefficients, b\T]&  is the USD/CNY exchange rate prices 
deviation,	!RK& means the broad currency index, fR& is the yield curve between the 
10-year and the 12-month China government bond yields, and J& is assumed to be 
normally distributed with variance zv.	 
 
Similar to the equations of high intervention, the low intervention reaction function 
is formularized as follows: 
 K&∗ = e&Fk + J&, K&j = K&∗		#Ö	K&∗ < 0, K&j = 0			#Ö	K&∗ ≥ 0, oℎ%s%	e&FÇ = Ç, + Ç8b\T]& + Çv!RK& + ÇwfR&                                             (5.8) 
 
where K&j is the observed censored value of low intervention. 
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In Tobit analysis, named after its pioneer Tobin (1958), when estimating the 
parameters in model (5.8) maximum likelihood procedures are consistently applied. 
The scaled Tobit log likelihood function, â&(k), is given by: 
 
â& k = K u& > 0 âtä z78∅ åO7çOéèê + K u& = 0 âtä ë 7çOéèê                 (5.9) 
 
De Jong and Herrera (2004) estimate that maximizing the log likelihood function 
(5.9) over the set of possible parameter values k ∈ ! produces consistent estimates, Eì , of the dynamic Tobit model. Because Eì has an asymptotic standard normal 
distribution, we can obtain standard errors using the computed Hessian of the log 
likelihood, or the quasi maximum likelihood estimate of the variance. 
 
5.4.2 Tobit Model with Covariate Dependent Thresholds 
 
The Tobit model with covariate dependent thresholds is a development of the 
standard Tobit model. Although Tobit models can overcome the problem whereby 
the dependent variable takes a value of zero most of the time, the coefficients cannot 
be estimated when the deterministic thresholds can vary with individuals depending 
on their characteristics (Omori and Miyawaki, 2010; Nakayama, 2010). There are 
two reasons for justifying the use of the Bayes Tobit model. First, the CPR 
intervention data set has the exact number rather than probability, which is different 
from the CB intervention data. In this case, the Tobit model is more fitting. Second, 
because China’s exchange rate system has changed several times during recent years, 
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the thresholds of the exchange rate in the estimation vary depending on 
characteristics of the new regime. Therefore, Tobit analysis with covariate 
dependent thresholds, which is a Bayes Tobit model, is used. In such a model with 
covariate dependent thresholds, the i th response variable yñ  is observed if it is 
greater than or equal to a threshold @ó = oóFò where oóF and ò are a ô×1 covariate 
vector and a corresponding coefficient vector, respectively. The vector oóF consists 
of the covariates that impact the decision whether to engage in daily price 
intervention. Using a Bayesian approach, we describe a Gibbs sampler algorithm to 
estimate parameters. 
 
First, we describe a Gibbs sampler for a Tobit (standard Tobit type 1) model (Chib, 
1995). The prior distributions of ( Ç, Ñv ) are assumed to be a conditionally 
multivariate normal distribution and an inverse gamma distribution, respectively: 
 
Ç Ñv~x Ç,, Ñvõ, , Ñv~ lg ûüv , †üv ,	                                                                (5.10) 
where Ç, is a q×1 known constant vector, õ, is a q×q known constant matrix, 
and d,, ', are known positive constants. To implement a Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo method, we use a data augmentation method by sampling an unobserved latent 
response variable uó∗. Using u∗, model (5.7) reduces to an ordinary linear regression 
model, u∗ = °Ç + ¢ , where u∗ = (u8∗, uv∗, … , uû∗)F, °F = (e8, ev, … , eû)  and ¢ =(¢8, ¢v, … , ¢û)F~x(0, ÑvKû) . Given u∗ , the conditional posterior distributions of (Ç, Ñv) are: 
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Ç Ñv, u∗~x >8, Ñvõ8 ,				Ñv~ lg û§v , †§v ,	                                                          (5.11) 
 
where õ878 = õ,78 + °F°, >8 = õ8 õ,78>, + °Fu∗ , d8 = d, + d , and '8 =u∗éu∗ + >,F õ,78>, + ', − >8F õ878>8 . Let u, = (u,,8, u,,v, … , u,,•)F  and u¶∗ =(u¶,8∗ , u¶,v∗ , … , u¶,û7•∗ )F  denote ß×1  and (d − ß)×1  vectors of observed 
(uncensored) and censored dependent variables, respectively. Then, we can sample 
from the posterior distribution using a Gibbs sampler: 
(1) Initialize Ç and Ñv. 
(2) Sample u¶∗ Ç, Ñv~®x 7©,™ eóFÇ, Ñv , # = 1,2, … , d − ß , for censored 
observations, where ®x ´,è (¨, zv)  denotes a normal distribution x(¨, zv) 
truncated on the interval (>, k). 
(3) Sample Ç, Ñv u¶∗, u, 
(a) Sample Ñv u¶∗, u,~lg	(d8 2 , '8 2), 
(b) Sample Ç Ñv, u¶∗, u,~x(>8, Ñvõ8). 
(4) Go to 2. 
 
Next, we extend the above sampler by adding another step, whereby we can derive 
the Gibbs sampler for the Tobit model with covariate dependent thresholds. In the 
standard Tobit model (5.7), the threshold @ is assumed to be known and a constant. 
However, it is usually unknown and may vary with the individual characteristics. 
Thus we extend it to allow unknown but covariate dependent thresholds as follows: 
 u&∗ = e&Fk + J& 
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u& = u&∗ = e&Fk + J&		#Ö	u&∗ ≥ oóFò, u& = 0						#Ö	u&∗ < oóFò.	                                                                                     (5.12) 
 
where (oó, eó)  are ô×1  and q×1  covariate vectors and (ò, Ç)  are corresponding ô×1 and q×1 regression coefficient vectors. The known constant threshold @ in 
(5.7) and (5.8) is replaced by the unknown but covariate dependent threshold, oóFò. 
 
To conduct a Bayesian analysis of the proposed Tobit model (5.12), we assume that 
prior distributions of (Ç, Ñv) are given by (5.11). A prior distribution of ò is assumed 
to be ò Ñv~x(@,, Ñv=,), since we often use independent variables for oó’s similar 
to those for eó’s, and the magnitude of the dispersion is expected to be similar. If 
there is little prior information with respect to ò , we take large values for the 
diagonal elements of =,, which will result in a fairly flat prior for ò. 
 
Ç ò, Ñv, u∗~x >8, Ñvõ8 ,				Ñv ò, Ç, u∗~ lg d82 , '82 , ò Ç, Ñv, u∗~®xNü N≠ @,, Ñv=, ,                                                                       (5.13) 
 
where d8 = d, + d + ô, '8 = u∗éu∗ + >,F õ,78>, − >8F õ878>8 + ', + ò −@, F=,78 ò − @, , õ878 = õ,78 + °F°, >8 = õ8 õ,78>, + °Fu∗ , T, =ò oóFò ≤ uó	Öts	rdp%d"ts%@	# , T¶ = ò oóFò ≤ uó	Öts	p%d"ts%@	# . The Gibbs 
sampler is implemented in three blocks as follows: 
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(1) Initialize ò, Ç	>d@	Ñv where ò ∈ T,. 
(2) Sample u¶∗ Ç, Ñv, ò, u, . Generate u¶,ó∗ ò, Ç, Ñv~®x 7©,ÆØé∞ eóFÇ, Ñv , # =1,2, … , d − ß, for censored observations. 
(3) Sample Ç, Ñv ò, u¶∗, u, 
(a) Sample Ñv ò, u¶∗, u,~lg	(d8 2 , '8 2), 
(b) Sample Ç Ñv, ò, u¶∗, u,~x(>8, Ñvõ8). 
(4) Sample ò Ç, Ñv, u∗~®xNü N≠(@,, Ñv=,). 
(5) Go to 2. 
 
Steps 2 and 3 are similar to those in the simple Tobit model. To sample from the 
conditional posterior distribution of ò in Step 4, we generate one component òy of ò = (ò8, òv, … , òy)F  at a time, given other components ò7y =(ò8, … , òy78, òy±8 … , ò≤)F. Since ò should lie in the region T, T¶, the òy is subject 
to the constant ≥y ≤ òy ≤ ¥y where oó,7y = (oó8, … , oóy78, oóy±8, … , oó≤)F, 
≥y = maxó ≥óy ,				≥óy = oóy78 uó − oó,7yF ò7y 			#Ö	oóy < 0	Öts	rdp%d"ts%@	#,oóy78 uó∗ − oó,7yF ò7y 			#Ö	oóy > 0	Öts	p%d"ts%@	#,−∞,				tlℎ%so#"%,  
≥y = minó ¥óy ,				¥óy = oóy78 uó − oó,7yF ò7y 			#Ö	oóy < 0	Öts	rdp%d"ts%@	#,oóy78 uó∗ − oó,7yF ò7y 			#Ö	oóy > 0	Öts	p%d"ts%@	#,−∞,				tlℎ%so#"%, (5.14) 
 
Let @,,7y = (@,8, … , @,,y78, @,,y±8, … , @,≤)F  and let =,,y,y , =,,y,7y  and =,,7y,7y 
denote a prior variance of òy , for { = 1,2, … , ô , using the conditional truncated 
normal posterior distribution, 
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òy ò7y, Ç, Ñv, u∗~®x(π∫,ª∫) ßy, "yvÑv , 
ßy = @,y + =,,y,7y=,,7y,7y78 ò7y − @,,7y , "yv = =,,y,y − =,,y,7y=,,7y,7y78 =,,y,7yF .                                                                   (5.15) 
Note that this reduces to ®x π∫,ª∫ (@,y, Ñv=,,y,y) for a diagonal =,. 
 
We estimate a Tobit model with covariate dependent thresholds to test whether the 
three factors (USD/CNY exchange rate bank offers, broad currency index and the 
yield curve) could be the determinants of China’s daily price intervention: 
 
K&∗ = e&Fk + J&, K&i = K&∗			#Ö	K&∗ > oóFò, >d@	K&i = 0		#Ö	K&∗ ≤ oóFò, 
Or 
K&∗ = e&Fk + J&, K&j = K&∗			#Ö	K&∗ < oóFò, >d@	K&j = 0		#Ö	K&∗ ≥ oóFò, oℎ%s%	e&Fk = k, + k8\T]b& + kv!RK& + kwfR& J& Ω&78~x 0, z&v ,	                                                                                            (5.16) 
 
5.5 Empirical Results 
 
5.5.1 The Fair Value RMB Exchange Rate 
 
Following the IFV approach, we estimate the fair value for the RMB exchange rate. 
We try to get the exchange rate of the Chinese yuan against the US dollar from 22 
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July, 2005 to 22 July, 2013. The G& is the difference between US and Chinese 2-year 
swap rates, as well as linear, quadratic and cubic time trends. We use 1-month 25-
delta risk reversals as a measure of speculative positioning in the regression (5.1). 
Before cointegration analysis, it is necessary to test unit roots in the time series in 
order to avoid spurious regression (Wang et al., 2007). Table 5.6 shows the results 
of Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. We find evidence that risk reversals are stationary, 
while the exchange rate and interest rate differential show a unit root. The ADF tests 
for risk reversals reject the null hypothesis that there is a unit root at 1% significance 
level. In fact, Figure 5.5 shows that risk reversals behave as a stationary time series 
with a sample mean, which is very close, but not equal, to zero. 
 
Table 5.6 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests for the IFV Model 
ADF test \T G ' 
t-Statistic -0.524 -2.540 -4.148*** 
Notes: *significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% 
level. 
 
 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
risk reversals
136	
	
Figure 5.5 China’s Risk Reversals 
 
Figure 5.6 illustrates the results. The green line is the observed daily RMB exchange 
rate. The red line represents the fitted value of the regression using the raw data of 
all variables. Finally, the blue line displays the fair value exchange rate, which the 
exchange rate would have been without the impact of speculative activity. We use 
equation (5.2) to get the fair value, that is, as the fitted exchange rate but using the 
sample mean of the risk reversals instead of the observed values. 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Movements of Renminbi’s Fair, Fitted Value and Realized Value 
 
5.5.2 Results for the Whole Sample Period 
 
Table 5.7 presents the results for the whole sample period tested using the Tobit 
model with covariate dependent thresholds. In the models for the sub-sample periods, 
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the initial 1,000 variates are discarded as the burn-in period and the subsequent 
30,000 values are recorded to conduct an inference. The number of daily price 
interventions in the whole sample is 1515, among which 43.6% of high interventions 
and 29% of low interventions are censored. Like daily intervention by the 
Bundesbank and Federal Reserve (Almekinders and Eijffinger, 1994 and 1996), 
China’s daily price intervention occurred on more than half of all trading days. 
 
The estimates do not reject the hypothesis that the PBOC followed a leaning-
against-the-wind policy by reverting to its bank exchange rate prices. The 95% 
intervals for bank exchange rate price variables do not include zero, which means 
coefficients are significant at 5% level. The coefficient on bank exchange rate prices k8 is negative (positive) and significant for high (low) intervention in the Tobit 
model with covariate dependent thresholds, which means that when the exchange 
rate prices appreciate (depreciate), the PBOC sets a higher (lower) central parity rate 
to reverse this appreciation (depreciation). This gives empirical evidence for the 
leaning-against-the-wind hypothesis. 
 
The coefficients on broad currency index kv are negative and significant for high 
intervention, and are positive and significant for low intervention at 5% level in the 
Tobit model with covariate dependent thresholds, as the 95% intervals for broad 
currency index variables do not include zero. The broad currency index reflects the 
foreign exchange market conditions. Evidence shows that poor (good) foreign 
exchange market conditions would trigger daily price high (low) intervention by the 
PBOC. Through the use of daily price intervention, the PBOC makes efforts to 
improve foreign exchange market conditions. 
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Results in the Bayes Tobit model indicate that China’s macro economy has 
negatively significant effect on low intervention, but has no effect on high 
intervention. The yield curve spread is the proxy for China’s macro economy 
condition. Based on studies by Harvey (1988), Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), and 
Rudebusch and Williams (2009), the relation between the yield curve and the 
economy should be positive. The coefficients on the yield curve kw are negatively 
significant for low intervention at 5% level. The low yield curve spread means that 
China’s macro economy condition is bad. Then, the RMB exchange rate depreciates, 
reflecting the poor economic condition. Low intervention is used to offset the 
depreciation of the RMB exchange rate. Therefore, the low yield curve spread 
triggers intervention. 
 
Referring to the magnitude of determinant coefficients in Table 5.8, the smallest 
numbers are those for the yield curve spread for both high (0.017) and low (-0.017) 
interventions. The difference between numbers for the yield curve spread variables 
and other variables shows that the yield curve spread represents the least important 
factor in the PBOC’s intervention decision. The broad currency index is the most 
important factor. 
 
Table 5.7 Tobit Model Results with Covariate Dependent Thresholds for the Whole 
Period 
Full sample: 22/07/2005-22/07/2013 
 High intervention Low intervention 
 Mean Stdev 95% Interval Mean Stdev 95% Interval 
Cons 26.92 3.298 (20.50,33.36) -40.65 4.082 (-48.7,-32.72) 
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b\T]& -12.85 3.636 (-20.12,-5.79) 6.242 1.781 (2.755,9.727) !RK& -13.40 1.660 (-16.6,-10.16) 20.092 2.047 (16.12,24.14) fR& 0.017 0.048 (-0.078,0.11) -0.225 0.060 (-0.34,-0.11) Ñv  0.981 0.054 (0.882,1.091) 1.320 0.089 (1.16,1.51) 
Notes: b\T]& is the bank RMB exchange rate prices, !RK& is the broad currency 
index, fR& is the yield curve spread. 
 
 
Table 5.8 Marginal Effects for the Whole Time Period 
Full sample: 22/07/2005-22/07/2013 
 High intervention Low intervention b\T]& -13.099*** 
(-3.534) 
4.729*** 
(3.505) !RK& -13.660*** 
(-8.072) 
15.221*** 
(9.815) fR& 0.017 
(0.354) 
-0.170*** 
(-3.750) 
Notes: The significance levels are displayed as *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 
10%. b\T]& is the bank RMB exchange rate prices, !RK& is the broad currency 
index, fR& is the yield curve spread. 
 
5.5.3 Results for Sub-samples: Before, During and After the Global Financial 
Crisis 
 
The results for the three sub-samples from the Tobit model with covariate dependent 
thresholds are reported in Table 5.9. In the sub-sample models, as in the model for 
the whole sample, the initial 1,000 variates are discarded as the burn-in period and 
the subsequent 30,000 values are recorded to conduct an inference. The number of 
daily price interventions in sub-sample 1 is 606, among which 51.7% of high 
interventions and 26.3% of low interventions are censored. There are 367 
observations for daily price intervention in sub-sample 2, of which 27.2% of high 
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interventions and 52.8% of low interventions are censored. In sub-sample 3, the 
number of interventions is 594, of which 68.4% of high interventions and 23.4% of 
low interventions are censored. 
 
In sub-sample 1, 22 July, 2005 to 14 July, 2008, only the broad currency index 
factors have significant impacts on high and low intervention, as the 95% credible 
intervals do not include zero. The broad currency index variables are negative and 
significant for both high and low intervention. These results indicate that when 
making intervention decisions the PBOC considers the foreign exchange market 
conditions; that is, the PBOC tries to improve poor foreign exchange market 
conditions. For the yield curve spread, the coefficient kw is positive and significant 
for low intervention only. This suggests that the PBOC tries to cool down the 
overheating of economic growth by using low intervention. 
 
In the financial crisis period, which is sub-sample 2, the aim of daily price 
intervention is to keep the RMB following the US dollar. The exchange rate regime 
during the financial crisis was a pegging regime, and hence the main objective of 
daily price intervention was to stabilize the exchange rate movements. Therefore, 
the coefficients on broad currency index kv are significant on both high and low 
intervention. The bank exchange rate prices variable influences high intervention 
only. The coefficient on the bank exchange rate prices k8  is negative for high 
intervention. As with the result for sub-sample 1, the PBOC did use leaning-against-
the-wind intervention. With regard to the yield curve spread, the coefficient on the 
yield curve spread kw is negative and significant for low intervention. This suggests 
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that in order to turn the economy from bad to good, the Chinese monetary authorities 
use low intervention, because low intervention can boost the import volume. 
 
For sub-sample 3, all determinant factors, except yield curve spread, have significant 
impact on high and low intervention, as the 95% credible intervals do not include 
zero. The coefficient on exchange rate prices k8  is negatively and positively 
significant for high and low intervention respectively. Similar to the result for the 
whole sample, this suggests that the PBOC uses leaning-against-the-wind 
intervention, and wants the RMB exchange rate to be impacted more by market 
conditions. Both high and low intervention decisions consider the foreign exchange 
market condition. The coefficients on the broad currency index kv are negatively 
significant for low intervention and positively significant for high intervention, both 
at 5% level. For the yield curve spread, the coefficients kw  are positive and 
significant for high intervention, but not significant for low intervention. This means 
that the PBOC tries to boost economic growth through high intervention, because 
high intervention can boost the export volume. 
 
According to the significance and magnitude of variables (Table 5.10) in these three 
sub-samples we find that the main objective of the daily price intervention is 
different in each case. For high intervention, the main objective across the sub-
samples is to focus on the market exchange rate condition. For low intervention, the 
main objective before the financial crisis is to prevent the domestic economy 
overheating, while during and after the financial crisis the focus is upon market 
exchange rate condition.
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Table 5.9 (1) Results of Tobit Model with Covariate Dependent Thresholds for Sub-sample 1 (22/07/2005-14/07/2008) 
 High Intervention Low Intervention 
 Mean Stdev 95% Interval Mean Stdev 95% Interval 
Cons 17.785 5.491 (7.115,28.661) 30.600 11.279 (9.272,53.335) !"#$% -2.893 5.096 (-12.963,7.005) 8.067 9.452 (-10.514,26.745) &'(% -8.638 2.753 (-14.093,-3.293) -16.006 5.683 (-27.456,-5.262) )'% -0.087 0.070 (-0.224,0.052) 0.747 0.164 (0.439,1.088) *+  0.763 0.064 (0.649,0.897) 1.685 0.209 (1.321,2.137) 
Notes: !"#$% is the bank RMB exchange rate prices, &'(% is the broad currency index, )'% is the yield curve spread. 
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Table 5.9 (2) Results Tobit Model with Covariate Dependent Thresholds for Sub-sample 2 (15/07/2008-22/06/2010) 
 High Intervention Low Intervention 
 Mean Stdev 95% Interval Mean Stdev 95% Interval 
Cons 53.625 13.808 (27.883,82.054) -52.492 4.156 (-60.895,-44.528) !"#$% -40.742 21.409 (-84.215,-0.390) 9.110 6.023 (-2.616,21.037) &'(% -27.208 6.915 (-41.483,-14.366) 26.440 2.070 (22.485,30.632) )'% 0.079 0.170 (-0.249,0.419) -0.457 0.052 (-0.561,-0.356) *+  2.264 0.414 (1.580,3.195) 0.469 0.047 (0.386,0.569) 
Notes: !"#$% is the bank RMB exchange rate prices, &'(% is the broad currency index, )'% is the yield curve spread. 
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Table 5.9 (3) Results of Tobit Model with Covariate Dependent Thresholds for Sub-sample 3 (23/06/2010-22/07/2013) 
 High Intervention Low Intervention 
 Mean Stdev 95% Interval Mean Stdev 95% Interval 
Cons 53.954 6.527 (41.343,67.018) -69.18 14.984 (-99.684,-40.761) !"#$% -7.844 3.783 (-15.884,-1.405) 5.423 2.234 (1.075,9.817) &'(% -27.193 3.281 (-33.767,-20.851) 34.15 7.504 (19.896,49.428) )'% 0.665 0.104 (0.465,0.873) -0.0002 0.216 (-0.422,0.422) *+  0.731 0.60 (0.625,0.858) 1.853 0.245 (1.432,2.393) 
Notes: !"#$% is the bank RMB exchange rate prices, &'(% is the broad currency index, )'% is the yield curve spread. 
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Table 5.10 Marginal Effects for Sub-samples 
 Subsample 1 (22/07/2005-14/07/2008) Subsample 2 (15/07/2008-22/06/2010) Subsample 3 (23/06/2010-22/07/2013) 
 High intervention Low intervention High intervention Low intervention High intervention Low intervention !"#$% -3.792 
(-0.568) 
4.788 
(0.853) 
-21.163** 
(-1.903) 
19.424 
(1.513) 
-10.731** 
(-2.073) 
2.927** 
(2.427) &'(% -11.321*** 
(-3.138) 
-9.499*** 
(-2.816) 
-12.018*** 
(-3.935) 
56.375*** 
(12.773) 
-37.200*** 
(-8.288) 
18.430*** 
(4.551) )'% -0.114 
(-1.243) 
0.443*** 
(4.555) 
0.035 
(0.465) 
-0.974*** 
(-8.788) 
0.910*** 
(6.394) 
-0.0001 
(-0.0009) 
Notes: The significance levels are displayed as *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%.  !"#$% is the bank RMB exchange rate prices, &'(% is 
the broad currency index, )'% is the yield curve spread. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has employed a Bayes Tobit approach to evaluate the influences that 
drive China’s central parity rate intervention. In order to estimate a proxy for daily 
price intervention data, we use the present central parity rate and daily fair value 
USD/CNY exchange rate estimated following the IFV approach.  
 
In general, the results show that the bank RMB exchange rate prices, the broad 
currency index and the yield curve spread have significant effects on daily price 
intervention. The PBOC follows a leaning-against-the-wind policy by reverting to 
its bank exchange rate prices. In addition, bad (good) foreign exchange market and 
macro economy conditions can trigger high (low) intervention. 
 
With regard to the time-varying determinants of daily price intervention, results 
show that determinant factors vary not only between different sub-samples, but also 
between the high and low interventions. We find evidence that across the different 
sub-samples the main objective for high intervention is to affect market exchange 
rate condition, while the main objective for low intervention ranges from restraining 
the domestic economy from overheating before the financial crisis, to a focus on 
market exchange rate condition during and after the crisis. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Central Bank Intervention, Intervention Frequency and 
Threshold Effects: Evidence from the Chinese Yuan-US 
Dollar Foreign Exchange Market 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Major central banks, including the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), apply central 
bank intervention as an important policy instrument to influence the foreign 
exchange market. Too much appreciation (depreciation) of exchange rate would 
negatively impact exporters (importers) and the confidence of the financial market. 
Therefore, the two main objectives of intervention are changing the level of the 
exchange rate in its intended direction, and calming excessive volatility, in terms of 
both the level and the speed of fluctuation (Utsunomiya, 2013). 
 
There is an extensive body of economic literature that discusses whether foreign 
exchange interventions are effective. For instance, Kearns and Rigobon (2005) 
suggest that central bank interventions by the Reserve Bank of Australia and the 
Bank of Japan have economically and statistically significant effects to stabilize the 
exchange rate. However, several empirical studies find contrary results; that is, they 
find that central bank interventions move the exchange rate in the wrong direction 
(Baillie and Osterberg, 1997; Galati et al., 2005), or increase exchange rate volatility 
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(Dominguez, 1998; Baillie et al., 2000; Nagayasu, 2004; Beine et al. 2009). 
According to Neely’s (2001) survey, among 22 central banks a majority relied on 
intervention to impact the foreign exchange market. Why do central banks continue 
to intervene if it is indeed ineffective? One possible explanation is the different 
exchange rate data used (Suardi, 2008), while another is that models used in the 
empirical studies do not correctly capture the exchange rate dynamics and the effects 
of intervention (Utsunomiya, 2013). 
 
Recent research has shown that when analysing foreign exchange volatility, it is very 
important to consider asymmetric volatility in the foreign exchange markets (Brooks, 
2001; Basci and Caner, 2005; Wang and Yang, 2009; Park, 2011). Based on 
empirical evidence of nonlinearities in the exchange rate time series, Brooks (2001) 
proves that a linear model of the exchange rate may produce invalid inferences when 
used to assess the effects of central bank intervention. Despite this disadvantage of 
linear models, there has been very little application of nonlinear models in the 
analysis of central bank intervention. There is still room for improvement of the 
nonlinear models, and therefore we consider them in this chapter. 
 
The threshold autoregressive model is one of the nonlinear time series models 
capable of yielding asymmetric limit cycles. For example, Tong and Lim (1980) find 
that the threshold model can produce asymmetric and periodic behaviour exhibited 
in the annual Wolf’s sunspot and Canadian lynx data. Because parameters of 
monetary models change with different economic policies, Wu and Chen (2001) 
suggest that the use of a regime-switching model, which could allow for economic 
policy to differ in times of strong depreciation and appreciation, may play a part in 
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better determining the effects of intervention. Moreover, the threshold model owns 
another attractive advantage. The objectives of China’s central bank may differ 
before and after the 2008 financial crisis; that is, the effects of China’s intervention 
may be different on yuan appreciation or depreciation. The threshold autoregressive 
model can capture this kind of change. Therefore, our application of the model here 
represents a contribution to the literature. 
 
In this chapter, we first use Hansen’s model-based bootstrap procedure (Hansen, 
1999) to determine the number of regimes in the whole sample and three sub-
samples. Then, Tsay’s (1989) arranged autoregression method is used to get the 
order of the lag structure (p) for the AP model and the optimal delay parameter, and 
Chan’s (1993) test is applied to obtain the threshold value and the smallest residual 
sum of squares (RSS). Because there are three regimes in the whole time period, two 
regimes in the first and third sub-samples, and one regime in the second sub-sample, 
we estimate the triple-threshold GARCH model, following Chen et al. (2010), the 
double threshold GARCH model introduced by Suardi (2008) and Utunomiya 
(2013), and the linear GARCH model (Hoshikawa, 2008), to test whether or not 
China’s intervention (and its frequency) can move the USD/CNY exchange rate in 
the desired direction and reduce the exchange rate volatility in the whole sample and 
three sub-samples. This research is the first to use the triple-threshold GARCH 
model to test the effects of intervention (and its frequency) on the foreign exchange 
market. This is another main contribution of this chapter. 
 
In recent years, there has been growing interest among researchers regarding the 
effects of central bank intervention on the emerging market economies (Agcaer, 
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2003; Domac and Mendoza, 2004; Guimaraes and Karacadag, 2004; Herrera and 
Ozbay, 2005; Akinci et al., 2006). Among the emerging economies China has 
potentially huge global impact, and as such has been the focus of great international 
concern. However, despite China maintaining an active intervention policy and 
being closely watched from around the globe, there is a surprising absence of studies 
of the country’s central bank intervention. This research aims to fill that critical void. 
 
This chapter aims to achieve a better understanding of China’s intervention by 
investigating the effects of intervention and intervention frequency on exchange rate 
movements and volatility. It concentrates on the central parity rate (CPR) 
intervention and central bank (CB) intervention, the results of which are obtained 
from Chapters 4 and 5, and on the frequency of CPR and CB intervention, calculated 
by dividing the number of intervention days by one calendar year. Previous studies 
on central bank intervention have paid scant attention to the effect of intervention 
frequency,13 and there are no studies on intervention frequency in the emerging 
markets. This research extends the literature on intervention frequency to consider 
the case of China. 
 
The target sample period covers 8 years, from 22 July, 2005 to 22 July, 2013. During 
this period, the Chinese exchange rate regime changed twice: on 14 July, 2008 it 
shifted from being managed ‘with reference to a basket of currencies’ to being 
pegged to the USD, while on 23 June, 2010 it reverted to the managed float system. 
In both cases, the changes can be explained as resulting from the 2008 financial 
																																								 																				
13	Fatum	(2002),	Hoshikawa	(2008)	and	Utsunomiya	(2013)	are	exceptions.	
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crisis. Hence, the sample period offers a good opportunity window for us to observe 
changes of effects of intervention and intervention frequency following financial 
crisis and regime changes. 
 
Through applying the triple-threshold GARCH model in the whole sample, this 
thesis finds that both CPR and CB interventions support the leaning-against-the-
wind hypothesis, but effects of CPR intervention on the exchange rate level happen 
when the yuan appreciates, and effects of CB intervention happen when the yuan 
depreciates. Compared with the results of Hoshikawa (2008), this chapter further 
finds that low-frequency CPR intervention has effects on the exchange rate level and 
high-frequency intervention reduces exchange rate volatility only when the yuan 
appreciates. In addition, the empirical results suggest that China’s intervention 
increases the exchange rate volatility. Furthermore, based on the numbers of 
intervention and intervention frequency coefficients, we suggest that CPR 
intervention and CPR intervention frequency have stronger effects on the RMB 
exchange rate level than do CB intervention and frequency, and that the effects of 
CPR intervention on the exchange rate volatility are larger than the effects of CB 
intervention, but the effects of CPR intervention frequency are less than those of CB 
intervention frequency. 
 
With regard to the time-varying effects of China’s intervention before, during and 
after the 2008 financial crisis, the empirical evidence suggests that the objectives of 
intervention are different before and after the financial crisis. More specifically, 
before the financial crisis the objective of the PBOC was to offset the effects of 
exchange rate appreciations, but after the crisis interventions have a large influence 
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on the foreign exchange market when the RMB exchange rate depreciates. 
According to the results for during the financial crisis period, only CB intervention 
could impact the exchange rate return, and only high-frequency of CB intervention 
could impact volatility in the desired way. The results for CPR intervention 
frequency are contrary to the hypotheses, which assume negative signs of frequency 
variables. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents a review of 
related literature. Section 6.3 discusses the data used in the study. Section 6.4 
determines the number of regimes, and estimates threshold models for the effects of 
China’s intervention. Section 6.5 reports the effects of China’s intervention (and its 
frequency) derived from these threshold models. Section 6.6 presents a discussion 
of the findings.  
 
6.2 Related Literature 
 
Amid the growing literature on the efficacy of foreign exchange intervention, some 
studies test the influence of central bank intervention on the level and volatility of 
exchange rates based on transmission channels (Dominguez, 1987; Ghosh, 1992; 
Lewis, 1995; Catte et al., 1994; Huang, 2007). Other researches investigate the 
intervention effects without considering any transmission channel. From the late 
1980s, the direct approaches, such as multi-variate GARCH frameworks, became 
the most popular to test the effects of intervention on the level and volatility of 
exchange rates. Using official data from April 1991 to March 2001, Ito (2002) 
studies Japanese intervention effects on the level of the exchange rate, but does not 
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consider the volatility effect. Using the structural approach to determining the effects 
of intervention, Disyatat and Galati (2007) apply the instrumental variable (IV) 
method to show that in the context of the Czech economy, intervention has weakly 
significant impacts on the spot rate and the risk reversal. The work reveals that the 
Czech monetary authorities will intervene when the speed of koruna appreciation 
accelerates. Kearns and Rigobon (2005) calculate that a US $100 million purchase 
of Australian dollars by the Reserve Bank of Australia would be related with an 
appreciation of 1.3 - 1.8%, while the same size of purchase of yen by the Bank of 
Japan would appreciate the yen by only 0.2%. Through estimating a simultaneous 
equations model, i.e. the GMM approach, Hillebrand et al. (2009) obtain the result 
that Japanese intervention was unsuccessful during the period 1991-1995. From 
1995 to 1998, Japanese intervention could move the yen/dollar exchange rate in the 
desired direction, but the authors do not find evidence of successful influence on 
volatility. For the period 1998-2004, there is strong evidence of a decrease in 
volatility, while the return to the yen/dollar exchange rate is not influenced by 
Japan’s official intervention. Unlike previous studies, Kurihara (2013) considers 
both market communication and sterilized intervention. The results from the OLS 
and GMM models show that the Bank of Japan uses intervention to prevent 
excessive appreciation of the yen, and to promote export and expansion of the 
economy. 
 
Some research considers frequency and asymmetric volatility when testing the 
effects of interventions. Hoshikawa (2008) examines the effects of central bank 
intervention frequency on the foreign exchange market. He suggests that 
intervention frequency has two different effects. First, high frequency intervention 
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stabilizes the exchange rate by decreasing exchange rate volatility. Second, 
compared to high frequency intervention, low frequency intervention has a larger 
effect on the exchange rate level.  Utsunomiya (2013) considers periods of 
nonlinearity, which cannot be captured by standard volatility models such as the 
GARCH model. He finds that high-frequency interventions reduce volatility more 
strongly during periods of yen appreciation. Suardi (2008) also uses the DTGARCH 
model to study the effects of Japanese and US interventions from 1991 to 2003. He 
finds that interventions by the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve are more 
effective in changing the direction of the exchange rate movements and in reducing 
volatility in a regime when the exchange rates are severely misaligned. There is also 
evidence that in such a regime a negative return of exchange rate elicits higher levels 
of volatility than a positive return of equal magnitude. In addition, the presence of 
asymmetric volatility in exchange rate returns may be a result of active central bank 
intervention. 
 
There is a lack of quantitative analysis in the literature on the effects of China’s 
interventions. The studies to date focus on monthly data and simple VAR and 
GARCH approaches (Liu, 2010; Tian et al., 2012; Gao et al., 2013). 
 
6.3 Data Descriptions 
 
6.3.1 Measures of Foreign Exchange Intervention 
 
In this chapter, we focus on CB intervention and CPR intervention. The effects of 
oral intervention are tested in the next chapter. Because the PBOC does not publish 
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the intervention data directly, we need to find proxies of the data. As explained in 
Chapter 4, we collect the CB intervention data from the newswire reports supplied 
by Factiva and Reuters China. With regard to the CPR intervention data, as 
explained in Chapter 5 we use as our proxy the CPR intervention ratio, which 
compares the central parity with the equilibrium USD/CNY exchange rate estimated 
by the IFV approach.  
 
6.3.2 Data Description and Statistics 
 
This section describes the dataset used in the empirical part of this research. First, 
we describe how to glean the data on intervention, USD/CNY exchange rates in 
domestic foreign exchange markets, interest rate spread, and stock price index, and 
how to calculate returns and realized volatility of RMB exchange rate. Then, we 
describe the summary statistics of the dataset and check the correlation between 
exchange rate return, realized volatility, the CB intervention and the CPR 
intervention.  
 
The Dataset 
 
The main time series used in this research are daily USD/CNY exchange rate and 
daily intervention time series. The sample period covers 8 years, from 22 July, 2005 
to 22 July, 2013, with a total 2087 transaction days excluding official holidays. The 
reason for choosing this target sample period is that 22 July, 2005 was the first day 
of the new managed floating exchange rate regime implemented by the PBOC. From 
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that date, the RMB exchange rate value became increasingly based on ‘market 
supply and demand’ (Goldstein and Lardy, 2009); however, at the same time, the 
PBOC guided the rate towards the equilibrium level, and therefore was still actively 
managing the RMB currency. In this chapter, we analyse three sub-sample periods: 
22 July, 2005 to 14 July, 2008; 15 July, 2008 to 22 June, 2010, and 23 June, 2010 
to 22 July, 2013. On 15 July, 2008, in response to the global financial crisis, the 
managed float ‘with reference to a basket of currencies’ was suspended and the 
exchange rate changed to a USD peg, while on 23 June, 2010 it reverted to a 
managed float system. An additional reason for this choice of sub-samples is that 
the returns and volatility movements of the RMB exchange rate are in three stages 
(details in the next section). By testing these three sub-sample periods, we can 
identify whether the effects of China’s intervention over this eight-year period are 
time-varying. 
 
The original data were collected from four major sources. First, the CB intervention 
information was obtained from newswire reports supplied by Factiva14 and Reuters 
China.15 Second, the USD/CNY exchange rate in the domestic foreign exchange 
market, MSCI China index, China Shibor overnight interest rate, and US Federal 
Funds rate were gleaned from Bloomberg. This chapter uses the closing-price of 
RMB exchange rate on every working day, and calculates returns and volatility of 
RMB exchange rate using these data (details of calculation for returns and volatility 
are in the next section). Third, we downloaded the data of central parity of RMB 
exchange rate from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) official 
																																								 																				
14		Factiva belongs to the Dow Jones Reuters Business Interactive LLC, formerly the Dow Jones 
interactive. Website: http://www.dowjones.com/factiva/, last accessed on 28th November 2013.	
15	Reuters China: http://cn.reuters.com/, last accessed on 28th November 2013.	
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website.16 Finally, the USD/CNY exchange rate in the US market, which is needed 
to calculate the CPR intervention index, was downloaded from the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System website. 17  All of the CPR and CB 
intervention data, central parity data, the RMB exchange rate data, MSCI China 
index data, and interest rate spread data are daily data. 
 
Following Hoshikawa (2008), we use a calendar year moving average measure of 
intervention frequency, !", calculated by dividing the number of intervention days 
by one calendar year. Table 6.1 reports variables !"#$%  and !"#& . Numbers of 
frequency variables during the financial crisis (2008 to 2010) are smaller than in 
other periods. In addition, there are far more CPR intervention days than CB 
intervention days, indicating that the PBOC uses CPR intervention as the main 
intervention tool. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
16 State Administration of Foreign Exchange: http://www.safe.gov.cn/, last accessed on 30th November 
2013. 
17 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System:   
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/summary/indexb_b.htm, last accessed on 14th January 
2014.  
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Table 6.1 Number of Intervention Days per Year 
Year Business 
days 
CPR 
intervention 
days 
CB 
intervention 
days 
!"#$% !"#& 
2005 116 116 63 0.7155 0.5431 
2006 260 259 82 0.5615 0.3154 
2007 261 260 82 0.6782 0.3142 
2008 262 261 71 0.7176 0.2710 
2009 261 260 29 0.2184 0.1111 
2010 261 260 53 0.4061 0.2031 
2011 260 260 96 0.6692 0.3692 
2012 261 260 110 0.4291 0.4215 
2013 145 143 75 0.2345 0.5172 
Notes: !" is the number of intervention days divided by the number of business days 
(!"#$% is for CPR intervention and !"#& is for CB intervention). Business days in 
2005 are calculated for the period from July 22 to December 30, and business days 
in 2013 are calculated for the period from January 01 to July 22. 
 
RMB Exchange Rate Returns and Volatility 
 
Compared to the nominal exchange rate of the RMB in relation to the US dollar, 
return on the exchange rate is more attractive to researchers, because the return is 
used to decide whether interventions push the exchange rate in the desired direction. 
There are two definitions of exchange rate return in mathematics. The arithmetic 
return rate is defined as follows: 
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'(," = +,-+,./+,./ 					                                                                                                   (6.1) 
 
The geometric approach to calculate the return on exchange rate is defined as 
follows: 
 
'1," = 234 +,+,./ 			                                                                                              (6.2) 
 
where '(," and '1," are returns on exchange rate, and 5" and 5"-( are the nominal 
spot exchange rate and lagged exchange rate respectively. This research employs the 
geometric approach, as it is the most used approach in the relevant literature. In 
addition, the geometric return allows for linking time-discrete models and time-
continued models. 
 
GARCH type models, such as GARCH (p,q) (Kim,1998; Akinci et al., 2006), 
GARCH-M (p,q) (Engle, Lilien and Robins, 1987), and EGARCH (p,q) 
(Nelson,1991; Hoshikawa, 2008), are helpful to estimate the conditional volatility 
of daily exchange rate changes. In this research, we use the asymmetric GARCH 
modelling strategy (Glosten et al., 1993; Suardi, 2008) to obtain the conditional 
volatility. The equation for the conditional volatility is defined as follows: 
 
6" = 78 + :;6"-; + <8 =" − ="∗ + <(5@" + A8 + A(!"#$% BC'" + D8 +E;F(D(!"#& BG" + H"  
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ℎ" = J8 + J(ℎ"-( + J1K"-(1 + L8 BC'" + L( BG" + M8!"#$% + M(!"#& +NO"-(1 																																																																																																																																			(6.3) 
 
where 6" denotes the log daily returns on RMB exchange rate at time t; =" − ="∗  
means the spread between the domestic and US interest rate; 5@" is the MSCI China 
index, which denotes the returns on the Chinese stock market; BC'" and BG" are 
intervention variables; !" is the intervention frequency variable; K" is the residual of 
the mean equation; ℎ" is the conditional variance of the exchange rate, and NPO"-(1  
is the asymmetric component. The results for the asymmetric GARCH (1,1) model 
are given in Table B in the Appendix. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Log Daily Conditional Volatility and Log Daily Returns on RMB 
Exchange Rate 
 
The movements of log daily conditional volatility (dotted line) and log daily returns 
(solid line) on RMB exchange rate are shown in Figure 6.1 above. As can be seen 
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from the figure, conditional volatility and returns movements have similar 
characteristics. The figure reveals three stages. Based on these stages, the total data 
sample is divided into three sub-samples. In addition, economic sense tells us that 
changes in exchange rate returns have important effects in terms of changing central 
bank intervention behaviour (Krager and Kugler, 1993). First, from July 2005 to 
July 2008, the fluctuation of RMB exchange rate returns is highly volatile, and log 
volatility is also high. The large fluctuation is explained by the fact that, prior to the 
2005 exchange rate regime change, there had been a long period during which the 
Chinese government had depressed the exchange rate level; therefore, large 
fluctuation was needed in order to achieve the equilibrium level. Second, from July 
2008 to June 2010 fluctuation of the RMB exchange rate was relatively small. 
During this stage, because of the effects of global financial crisis, the RMB currency 
was fixed to the US dollar; that is, the exchange rate regime was a pegging system. 
Therefore, the fluctuation of exchange rate returns and volatility are around zero; in 
other words, exchange rate level and volatility movements are stable. Finally, 
because the PBOC began to implement a new ‘managed floating’ exchange rate 
policy on 23 June, 2010 (PBOC, 2010),18 the RMB exchange rate started to fluctuate 
more widely. Both returns and realized volatility returned to large fluctuation in the 
final period. 
 
Data Statistics 
 
Table 6.2 Summary Statistics 
																																								 																				
18	On	19	June,	2010	(Saturday),	the	PBOC	announced	that	the	RMB	exchange	rate	fluctuation	would	
follow	a	‘managed	floating’	regime	with	reference	to	a	basket	of	currencies	(PBOC,	2010).	
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 Obs. Mean Std. dev. Skewness Excess 
Kurtosis 
Summary statistics     ∆R" 2087 -0.0058 0.0407 -0.1360 8.2275 BC'" 1077 0.00008 0.0078 4.6395 115.6611 BG" 661 0.03881 0.5616 0.0116 3.1557 !"#$% 2087 0.9924 0.0617 -15.9985 257.5933 !"#& 2087 0.3167 0.1205 0.0480 2.4616 
 ∆R" BC'" BG" !"#$% !"#& 
Cross-correlation     ∆R" 1.0000     BC'" 0.0206 1.0000    BG" 0.2226 0.0193 1.0000   !"#$% -0.0062 0.0142 0.0302 1.0000  !"#& 0.0029 0.0244 0.1067 -0.0013 1.0000 
Notes: ∆R" is 100 times log exchange rate return, BC'" is the CPR intervention, BG" 
is the CB intervention, !"#$% is the CPR intervention frequency, and !"#& is the CB 
intervention frequency. 
 
Table 6.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the RMB exchange rate, CPR 
intervention, CB intervention, CPR intervention frequency and CB intervention 
frequency of the China foreign exchange market. The mean of exchange rate returns 
for the overall sample is negative, indicating that the yuan appreciates against the 
USD in these years. The kurtosis of ∆R" is 8.228, which is larger than 3 using normal 
distribution; that is, the distribution is fat-tailed. The changes in daily exchange rate 
volatility may have this kind of distribution. The generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model is generally used in the case of 
volatility change. Moreover, we find evidence of negative skewness (-0.136) in the 
USD/CNY exchange rate in the overall sample period. Table 6.2 also shows that 
both types of intervention and CB intervention frequency are positively correlated 
with log exchange rate changes, but CPR intervention frequency has a negative 
correlation. 
 
163	
	
6.4 Modelling Effects of FX Intervention in China 
 
In this section, we estimate and explain the threshold autoregressive models, which 
are double threshold GARCH (DTGARCH) (Suardi, 2008; Utunomiya, 2013) and 
triple threshold GARCH models (Chen et al., 2010). In order to determine the 
number of regimes in threshold autoregressive models, we use Hansen’s model-
based bootstrap procedure (Hansen, 1999). Then, Tsay’s (1989) arranged 
autoregression method is helpful to get the order of the lag structure (p) for the AR 
model and the optimal delay parameter S∗. Finally, the threshold value (T) and the 
smallest residual sum of squares (RSS) are obtained by Chan’s (1993) test. 
 
6.4.1 Determining the Number of Regimes 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Similar to Strikholm and Terasvirta (2006) and Utsunomiya (2013), the 
Autoregressive (AR) model is written as: 
 
6" = 7 + :;6"-;E;F( + H"																	                                                                   (6.4) 
 
where 6" is the log return of the USD/CNY exchange rate at time t. Hansen’s (2000) 
m-regime threshold model allows the parameter vector : in the AR model (model 
6.4) to change m times based on the value of the threshold variable U". A two-regime 
threshold model can be formulated as follows: 
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6" = 7(8 + :;(1()6"-;E;F( X 6"-Y∗ ≤ T + 718 + :;(11)6"-;E;F( X 6"-Y∗ >T + H"																	                                                                                                  (6.5) 
 
where X(∙)  denotes the indicator function, which takes the value one when the 
condition in the brackets is satisfied and zero otherwise, and T is the threshold value. 
In addition, a triple-threshold model can be formulated as follows: 
 
6" = 7(8 + :;(]()6"-;E;F( X 6"-Y∗ ≤ T( + 718 + :;(]1)6"-;E;F( X T( <6"-Y∗ ≤ T1 + 7]8 + :;(]])6"-;E;F( X 6"-Y∗ > T1 + H"                               (6.6) 
 
If the independent variables consist only of lags of dependent variable, the model is 
named a threshold autoregressive (TAR) model. If the threshold variable (6"-Y∗) is 
one of the lagged dependent variables, the model becomes a self-exciting threshold 
autoregressive (SETAR) model. Therefore, the models (6.5) and (6.6) are SETAR 
models. 
 
Hansen’s model-based bootstrap procedure is a sequential procedure, in which 
sequential testing is carried out by a likelihood ratio (LR) statistic whose distribution 
is bootstrapped. The procedure is implemented as follows. First, considering the 
linear and two-regime threshold models, testing the one-regime model against the 
two-regime model is equivalent to testing the null hypothesis: 
 
_8:	:; = :;(1() = :;(11)																					                                                                  (6.7) 
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Hansen (1999) estimates a test statistic of: 
 
a(1 = @ +/-+b+b 																											                                                                                (6.8) 
 
where 5( is the sum of squared residuals from linear square (LS) estimation of the 
linear model (6.4), 51 is the sum of squared residuals from the two-regime model 
(6.5), and @ is the sample size. If the a(1 is significant, it rejects the null hypothesis. 
That is, the nonlinear model is a better specification than the linear model. If not, 
the linear model is better.  
 
Second, similar to step one, testing the one-regime model against the three-regime 
model is equivalent to testing the null hypothesis: 
 
_8:	:; = :;(]() = :;(]1) = :;(]])									                                                              (6.9) 
 
The test statistic is: 
 
a(] = @ +/-+c+c 										                                                                                             (6.10) 
 
Finally, testing the two-regime model against the three-regime model is equivalent 
to testing the null hypothesis: 
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_8:	:;(1() = :;(11) = :;(]() = :;(]1) = :;(]])										                                      (6.11) 
 
The test statistic is: 
 
a1] = @ +b-+c+c 																                                                                                       (6.12) 
 
When the thresholds are known, F is asymptotically equivalent to the usual F 
statistic. However, because the thresholds are unknown and not identified under the 
null hypotheses, F follows an unknown asymptotic distribution. Bootstrapping 
methods are relied on to compute the p-values with and without the conditional 
heteroscedasticity assumption. 
 
Under the homoscedastic error assumption, a set of bootstrap errors H =H"⃓	e = 1,⋯⋯ , @  is gained by randomly drawing T times with replacement from 
the OLS residuals H = H"⃓	e = 1,⋯⋯ , @  of the linear model (6.4). A set of data 
on the dependent variable is then generated by: 
 
6" = 7 + :;6"-;E;F( + H"										                                                                       (6.13) 
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where 7, :(,⋯⋯ , :;  are OLS estimates of model (6.4). Substituting 6" for 6", all 
the m-regime (m=1,2,3) models are re-estimated to provide one value of a defined 
as: 
 
a(1 = @ +/-+b+b 									                                                                                              (6.14) 
a(] = @ +/-+c+c 											                                                                                            (6.15) 
a1] = @ +b-+c+c 												                                                                                           (6.16) 
 
where 5 is the sum of squared residuals from the linear and nonlinear models with 
bootstrapped data. Out of 1,000 replications, the proportion of a greater than a is 
the approximate p-value. 
 
Under the heteroscedastic error assumption, the procedure is a little more 
complicated because we have to impose heteroscedasticity on the bootstrap errors H . First, each element of H is divided by an estimate of the conditional standard 
deviation ℎ" to gain a set of homoscedastic errors: 
 
H = H"⃓	H" = h,i, , e = 1,⋯⋯ , @ 																                                                    (6.17) 
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The conditional variance estimate ℎ" is obtained as a fitted value from an auxiliary 
regression of H"1 on j" = 1, 6"6",, 6"-(1 ,⋯⋯ , 6"-;1 . Let k denote that OLS estimates 
obtained from such a regression. 
 
Now we draw randomly from H. The t-th heteroscedastic bootstrap error is: 
 
H" = H ℎ"												                                                                                               (6.18) 
 
where ℎ" = j"k and j" = 1, 6"6",, 6"-(1 ,⋯⋯ , 6"-;1 . Once the value of H" is gained, 
the value of 6" is calculated using model (6.7). It is important to note that ℎ" ≠ ℎ" 
and j" ≠ j". The rest of the bootstrap procedure is the same as in the homoscedastic 
case. 
 
Table 6.3 Hansen’s Model-Based Bootstrapping Test 
   p-value 
  F-statistic Homoscedastic Heteroscedastic 
Whole sample 
2005:07:22-
2013:07:22 
a(1 61.711 0.000 0.067 a(] 101.708 0.000 0.060 a1] 38.842 0.011 0.061 
First sub-sample 
2005:07:22-
2008:07:14 
a(1 62.920 0.000 0.041 a(] 103.210 0.000 0.036 a1] 37.232 0.024 0.178 
Second sub-sample 
2008:07:15-
2010:06:22 
a(1 49.023 0.000 0.424 a(] 72.984 0.279 0.515 a1] 21.802 0.517 0.731 
Third sub-sample 
2010:06:23-
2013:07:22 
a(1 74.288 0.000 0.066 a(] 103.401 0.005 0.065 a1] 26.002 0.747 0.897 
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Table 6.3 presents the results of applying Hansen’s model-based bootstrapping 
approach for the total sample and three sub-samples. For the total sample, the test 
statistic a(1 for testing the linear model versus the two-regime model is 61.711. The 
bootstrap p-values are calculated as the proportion of those bootstrap simulations 
out of 1000 replications that have F-statistic larger than 61.711. Under the 
assumption of homoscedastic errors, the p-value is zero. Therefore, we reject (fail 
to accept) the null hypothesis of linearity in favour of a two-regime threshold 
nonlinearity at 1% level. In addition, under the assumption of heteroscedastic errors, 
the p-value is 0.067 and we still reject the null of the linear model. With regard to 
the three-regime alternative, the a(] is 101.708. As with the a(1, the p-value is zero 
under the homoscedasticity and heteroscedasticity assumptions. Therefore we reject 
the null of linearity. The a1]  is econometrically significant with both the 
homoscedasticity assumption and the heteroscedasticity assumption. Therefore, we 
reject the null of linearity with both assumptions. 
 
For the first sub-sample, a(1  and a(]  are clearly significant under both 
homoscedasticity and heteroscedasticity assumptions. a1] is not significant under 
the heteroscedasticity assumption. Since heteroscedasticity seems quite likely in this 
data (Hansen, 1999), we conclude that we cannot reject the hypothesis of linearity. 
For the second sub-sample, with the exception of the a(1 under the homoscedasticity 
assumption, all the F statistics are not significant. The third sub-sample follows the 
same pattern as the first sub-sample. That is, a(1 and a(] are significant under both 
homoscedasticity and heteroscedasticity assumptions. However, a1]  is not 
significant under either assumption. 
 
170	
	
In summary, we should estimate the three-regime threshold model in the total sample, 
the two-regime model in the first sub-sample, the linear model in the second sub-
sample, and the two-regime model in the third sub-sample. The results of the number 
of regimes are the same as the results in the figure of log RMB exchange rate return. 
That is, the second sub-sample is so stable that there is just one regime. 
 
6.4.2 The AR Order, Optimal Delay Parameter, Threshold Value and RSS 
 
Tsay’s (1989) arranged autoregression method is applied to determine the existence 
of threshold nonlinearity in the mean of USD/CNY exchange rate return. This also 
tests the robustness of the results of Hansen’s model-based bootstrap method. A core 
part of Tsay’s (1989) test procedure is choice of an appropriate AR order followed 
by the delay parameter S. As the null of a linear model could be wrongly rejected 
owing to the omission of serial correlation, it is important to fit the appropriate AR 
model in the preliminary stage (Kilian and Taylor, 2003). The procedure for Tsay’s 
(1989) test is as follows: 
 
First, before running the arranged autoregression, we apply the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) to determine the order of lag structure (p) for the AR model (6.4). 
Breusch (1978) and Godfrey (1978) have confirmed the absence of serial correlation 
in the residuals for lag orders up to order 12. Therefore, we use order 12 (k=12) in 
the AIC step. 
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Then, we arrange variables based on the value of 6"-(,⋯⋯ , 6"-;. For instance, we 
place the smallest 6"-( first and the largest 6"-( last. An arranged autoregression is 
estimated: 
 
6"∗ = 7∗ + :∗;6∗"-;E;F( + H∗"														                                                            (6.19) 
 
Then, we use the arranged autoregression to calculate the standardized predictive 
residuals: 
 
mn = j8 + j;6n-; + KnE;F( 								                                                                     (6.20) 
where R = o + 1,⋯⋯ , @ − S − ℎ + 1 , T is the sample size, o = p(8 + q  and ℎ = ors 1, q − S + 1 . For a given lag structure of AR model, the optimal delay 
parameter S∗ can be obtained by computing: 
 
a q, S∗ = maxY∈x a q, S 												                                                                          (6.21) 
 
where y = 1,2,⋯⋯ , q − 1   and a  is the calculated F-statistic given by a =
( {,b- |,b) (E}()|,b (p-Y-~-E-i). Here, m" is the standardized predictive residuals from the model 
(6.20), and K" is the resulting residuals from regressing the model (6.21). The test 
statistic follows an F-distribution with (p+1) and (T-d-m-p-h) degrees of freedom. 
This step can select the value of the delay parameter which gives the most significant 
result in testing for nonlinearity. 
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After choosing the lag structure and the delay parameter, we use Chan’s (1993) 
method to estimate the threshold value (T , T( , and T1 ) by using ordinary least 
squares to run the regressions (6.4) and (6.5). In the previous section, we have 
established that there are three regimes in the total sample, two regimes in the first 
and third sub-samples, and one regime in the second sub-sample, which means we 
need to get T(, and T1 in the total sample and T in the first and third sub-samples. 
 
In order to ensure the threshold value is meaningful, the exchange rate return series 
have to actually cross the threshold. In other words, T, T(, and T1 must lie within the 
maximum and minimum range of USD/CNY exchange rate return series. Following 
Chan (1993), we exclude the highest and lowest 15% (M) values to ensure there are 
an adequate number of observations on each side of the threshold. For the overall 
sample of 2087 observations, we exclude the highest and lowest 15% of the 
observations. The evidence for these threshold effects is stronger with M = 15% as 
reported in Table 6.4. The 15% M  has the most significant a -test. For the sub-
samples, we exclude the highest and lowest 20% of the observations. The consistent 
estimate of the threshold is the threshold value used in equations (6.3) and (6.4) that 
produces the smallest residual sum of squares (RSS). The minimum RSS can locate 
the threshold value. 
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Table 6.4 P-Values for Different Restrictions on Minimum Sample Size 
 a(1 a(] a1] 
5% 88.057(0.000) 145.334(0.000) 61.808(0.015) 
10% 108.856(0.000) 145.334(0.000) 33.987(0.075) 
15% 61.711(0.000) 101.708(0.000) 38.842(0.011) 
20% 147.492(0.000) 180.237(0.000) 40.607(0.190) 
Notes: aÅ,Ç  is the test statistic for i-regimes against j-regimes. q -values are in 
parentheses.
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Table 6.5 Threshold Test and Parameter Estimates 
 AIC-based !∗ Tsay’s threshold test # Min RSS 
 p lag     
Total sample 
22/07/2005-22/07/2013 
1 7 $ %,'()* = 534.891 
               (0.000) 
#3 = −0.04157 
 #' = 0.02345 
8993 = 0.00151 899' = 0.0176 
First sub-sample 
22/07/2005-14/07/2008 
2 1 $ ',;;3 = 250.419 
              (0.000) 
-0.01826 0.003 
Second sub-sample 
15/07/2008-22/06/2010 
1 1 $ ',<%) = 564.140 
              (2.701) 
N.A. N.A. 
Third sub-sample 
23/06/2010-22/07/2013 
1 1 $ ',;== = 432.841 
              (0.000) 
0.000698 0.00499 
Notes: The value p estimated by AIC is the best lag length for the exchange rate return series; d∗ is the threshold delay parameter; Tsay’s (1989) threshold 
test has a null of an AR model against the alternative of a threshold AR model. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. Chan’s (1993) test gives the threshold 
value (γ) and the minimum RSS.
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Table 6.5 reports the results for Tsay’s (1989) threshold nonlinearity test and the 
parameter estimates comprising the lag length for the AR model, the delay parameter 
and the threshold estimate with its corresponding minimum RSS for the whole 
sample and three sub-samples. Value 1 of p for the total sample, second sub-sample 
and third sub-sample is chosen the AIC, and value 2 for the first sub-sample. The 
value p is the best lag length for the exchange rate return series. The overall sample 
chooses a threshold delay parameter (!∗) of 7, all of sub samples choose 1. From 
Tsay’s threshold test, we obtain that the second sub-sample possesses linearity 
because the F for the second sub-sample accepts the null hypothesis of linearity. This 
provides robustness for the results of Hansen’s model-based bootstrap method. The 
estimated threshold values for the overall sample are -0.042 and 0.023, with the 
minimum RSS 0.0015 and 0.018. In addition, the first and third sub-samples have 
threshold values -0.009 and 0.003, with the minimum RSS 0.003 and 0.005 
respectively. The positive threshold values suggest that when the magnitude of 
Chinese yuan depreciation against the US dollar exceeds these positive values, there 
would be a change in process governing the exchange rate return dynamics. 
Similarly, the negative threshold values indicate that when appreciation of 
USD/CNY exchange rate exceeds these negative values there would also be a 
change in the process governing the exchange rate return dynamics. 
 
After choosing the threshold in the conditional mean of USD/CNY exchange rate 
return dynamics, we then explore the location of the threshold in the conditional 
variance. Although the variance equation might have different threshold values 
compared with the threshold found for the conditional mean, with the exception of 
the double-threshold ARCH model, threshold estimation techniques have been 
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developed only for the conditional mean. Li and Li (1996) apply the iteratively 
weighted least squares method to model a double-threshold ARCH model. However, 
the generalization to a GARCH process is not straightforward and has never been 
shown in the literature. Therefore, we do not pursue the determination of a different 
threshold in the conditional variance for our models. Following Suardi (2008) and 
Utsunomiya (2013), we consider that the threshold in the mean of RMB exchange 
rate return governs the dynamics in its conditional variance. The estimation of the 
double threshold GARCH model is formulated as follows: 
 
#$ = &'( + *'+#$,+-+.' + /$				12		#$,3∗ ≤ 5&6( + *6+#$,+-+.' + /$				12		#$,3∗ > 5  
/$~9 0, ℎ$ 					ℎ$ = ='( + =''ℎ$,' + ='6>$,'6 						12			#$,3∗ ≤ 5=6( + =6'ℎ$,' + =66>$,'6 						12			#$,3∗ > 5													      (6.22) 
 
Model (6.23) below is the triple-threshold GARCH model, specified as: 
 
#$ = &'( + *'+#$,+-+.' + /$				12		#$,3∗ ≤ 5'	&6( + *6+#$,+-+.' + /$				12		5' < #$,3∗ ≤ 56&@( + *@+#$,+-+.' + /$				12		#$,3∗ > 56   /$~9 0, ℎ$ 					ℎ$ =='( + =''ℎ$,' + ='6>$,'6 						12				#$,3∗ ≤ 5'=6( + =6'ℎ$,' + =66>$,'6 						12			5' < #$,3∗ ≤ 56=@( + =@'ℎ$,' + =@6>$,'6 						12				#$,3∗ > 56 																																            (6.23) 
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Table 6.6 Unit Root Tests for Threshold Variables 
Level     First-difference 
Entire period: 2005:07:22—2013:07:22 
ADF -0.501 PP -0.514 ADF -48.583*** PP -48.567*** 
Subsample1: 2005:07:22—2008:07:14 
ADF -0.150 PP -0.144 ADF -23.059*** PP -30.259*** 
Subsample2: 2008:07:15—2010:06:22 
ADF -0.173 PP -0.096 ADF -25.432*** PP -25.831*** 
Subsample3: 2010:06:23—2013:07:22 
ADF -1.949 PP -2.185 ADF -12.161*** PP -30.658*** 
Notes: *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% level. 
 
Table 6.6 presents the stationarity property of the RMB exchange rate level and first 
difference of logarithm of the exchange rate in different periods. We perform the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. One critical 
requirement of the threshold model is that the threshold variable should be strictly 
stationary. If the threshold variable is non-stationary, hence there is no tendency for 
mean-reverting, the idea of switching over a limited number of regimes depending 
on the value of the threshold variable does not make much sense.19 From the results 
of the unit root tests, the null hypothesis of unit root for first difference of logarithm 
of the exchange rate is rejected in all periods. 
 
																																								 																				
19	For	example,	it	is	required	to	have	some	observations	with	rB,C∗ ≤ γ	and	other	observations	with	rB,C∗ > 5.	If	rB,C∗ 	is	a	unit-root	time	series,	it	may	be	the	case	that	rB,C∗ > 5	always	after	some	time	
point,	hence	no	more	observations	for	regime	1.	
178	
	
6.4.3 Modelling China’s Intervention 
 
The threshold GARCH models have advantages in two main areas. First, recent 
studies prove that asymmetric volatility is present in the foreign exchange markets 
and show the importance of considering the asymmetry when analysing foreign 
exchange volatility (Brooks, 2001; Yang, 2006; Wang and Yang, 2009; Park, 2011). 
Results from Table 6.7 show that there is asymmetric volatility in China’s foreign 
exchange market. The null hypothesis of equal variances of the RMB exchange rate 
returns on days of purchase versus days of sale CB interventions and high versus 
low CPR interventions is rejected. In addition, results from section 6.4.1 have given 
evidence of threshold nonlinearity in RMB exchange rate returns for the overall 
sample, and the first and third sub-samples. Compared to the linear model or 
GARCH model, the DTGARCH process estimated by Liu, Li and Li (1997) can 
capture both sign and size asymmetries in the average return, volatility level, mean 
reversion and volatility persistence, and can model the impact of intervention on the 
exchange rate level and volatility in each regime (Chen et al., 2010). In order to test 
the volatility asymmetry, we apply the asymmetric GARCH modelling strategy 
developed by Glosten et al. (1993). Second, the threshold autoregressive model can 
capture the changes of intervention effects when the yuan is appreciating or 
depreciating before and after the 2008 financial crisis. Considering these conditions, 
we estimate the triple-threshold GARCH model as follows: 
 
#$ =&'( + *'+#$,+-+.' + E'( 1$ − 1$∗ + E''GH$ + I'( + I''J$ KLM$ + /$				12		#$,3∗ ≤ 5'	&6( + *6+#$,+ + E6( 1$ − 1$∗ + E6'GH$ + I6( + I6'J$ KLM$-+.' + /$				12		5' < #$,3∗ ≤ 56&@( + *@+#$,+-+.' + E@( 1$ − 1$∗ + E@'GH$ + I@( + I@'J$ KLM$ + /$				12		#$,3∗ > 56   
179	
	
	ℎ$ = ='( + =''ℎ$,' + ='6>$,'6 + N'( KLM$ + O'(J$ + P'Q$,'6 						12				#$,3∗ ≤ 5'=6( + =6'ℎ$,' + =66>$,'6 + N6( KLM$ + O6(J$ + P6Q$,'6 						12			5' < #$,3∗ ≤ 56=@( + =@'ℎ$,' + =@6>$,'6 + N@( KLM$ + O@(J$ + P@Q$,'6 						12				#$,3∗ > 56 				  (6.24) 
 
where KLM$  is the intervention variables for CPR or CB, πB  is the intervention 
frequency variables for CPR or CB, S /$ = 0, /$ = ℎ$T$ , and T$  follows a 
Student’s t-distribution with v degrees of freedom. The values for p and 5 have been 
determined in section 6.4.2, above. 
 
Table 6.7 Variance Equality Tests on the Exchange Rate Returns 
 CPR intervention CB intervention 
 Levene Brown-
Forsythe 
Levene Brown-
Forsythe 
Degrees of 
freedom 
(4,2082) (4,2082) (3,2083) (3,2083) 
UVW$  43.825(0.000) 33.809(0.000) 11.923(0.000) 7.627(0.000) 
Notes: the null hypothesis is that the variance of currency return 1 on the days of 
intervention through purchases or high intervention is equal to the variance of 
currency return 1 on the days of intervention through sales or low intervention. The 
tests are conducted for the whole period from July 22, 2005 to July 22, 2013. X-
values are in parentheses. 
 
The interest rate differential, which is calculated by the spread between the China 
Shibor overnight rate (1$) and the US Federal Funds rate (1$∗), is used to capture the 
possible effects of the monetary policy action and local money market conditions on 
the RMB exchange rate (Kim and Sheen, 2002; Hassan, 2009). There are two 
hypotheses of correlation between interest rate differential and the exchange rate: a 
traditional view and a revisionist view. The traditional view claims that tight 
monetary policies may lead exchange rates to appreciate; that is, E( < 0 . High 
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interest rates that provide a higher rate of return for foreign investors may reduce 
capital flight and discourage speculative trends (Dekle et al., 2001). On the other 
hand, according to the revisionist view, an increase in interest rates has an adverse 
impact on exchange rates; that is, E( > 0. For the advocates of this view (Furman 
and Stiglitz, 1998; Radelet and Sachs, 1998), contractionary monetary policies and 
high interest rates may result in capital outflows and exchange rate depreciation due 
to a financial crisis. The high interest rates are the cause of both financial crisis and 
a default probability that may weaken a national currency. GH$ denotes the returns 
on the MSCI China stock index. Similar to Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996), we use 
the stock index as control variable to reflect the influence of economic or political 
events on the foreign exchange market. There are two contrasting hypotheses 
whereby exchange rate is expected to react to stock prices. In one, a rise in stock 
price leads to domestic currency depreciation (Ajayi and Mougoue, 1996). An 
increasing stock market is an indicator of an expanding economy, which is 
accompanied by higher inflation expectations. If higher inflation happens, foreign 
investors’ demand for domestic currency drops and the currency depreciates, which 
is E' > 0. The other hypothesis claims that if the stock market declines, the currency 
will depreciate. In markets with high capital mobility, it is capital flows, and not the 
trade flows, that determine the daily demand for currency. A decline in stock prices 
leads foreign investors to sell the financial assets they hold. This means the sign of E' will reverse. In the next section, the results from the models will decide which 
hypotheses of interest rate spread and stock price are suitable for China. Figures 6.2 
and 6.3 show the movements of interest rate spread and stock price with RMB 
exchange rate in the whole period. 
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Figure 6.2 Movements of Interest Rate Differentials and the RMB Exchange Rate 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Movements of Stock Price Index and the RMB Exchange Rate 
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CPRB means CPR intervention (CPRB > 0: high CPR intervention [depreciates the 
yuan], CPRB < 0: low CPR intervention [appreciates the yuan], and CPRB = 0: no 
intervention) on day t. CBB  is CB intervention ( CBB = 1:  purchase US dollar 
[depreciates the yuan], CBB = −1: sell US dollar [appreciates the yuan], and CBB =0: no intervention). The lean-against-the-wind hypothesis is that purchase 
intervention (sale intervention) or high CPR intervention (low CPR intervention) by 
the monetary authorities is intended to depreciate (appreciate) the exchange rate 
(Sarno and Taylor, 2001). Therefore, in model (6.20), purchase of US dollars by the 
PBOC should increase returns #$; the opposite should hold for sale of US dollars. 
Both β( and ω( should be positive, meaning that interventions tend to move the 
exchange rate in the desired direction. One concept of ‘success’ of interventions 
discussed in Hillebrand et al. (2009) is the reduction of exchange rate volatility. The 
relation between the exchange rate volatility and interventions should be negative 
(N < 0). Both types of interventions enter in absolute value. 
 
Following Hoshikawa (2008), Hassan (2009) and Utsunomiya (2013), the frequency 
of intervention is expected to impact the exchange rate movements and volatility. πBabc and πBad are variables to test effects of CPR intervention frequency and CB 
intervention frequency respectively. Because infrequent intervention is considered 
as a surprise to market agents and should have an effective impact on the exchange 
rate level, the signs of β' and ω' are expected to be negative (Hassan, 2009). In 
addition, because volatility will be small when πBabc  and πBad  are large, the 
coefficients τ( and τ' in the variance equation are expected to have negative signs. 
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Each regime in the conditional variance equation includes the asymmetric 
component given by the term PQ$,'6  where Q$ = min	(0, /$) . McKenzie (2002), 
amongst others, proves that the uncertainty of foreign exchange intervention is not 
symmetric in the presence of positive and negative shocks to exchange rates. This 
asymmetric component allows us to test whether or not asymmetric exchange rate 
return volatility is prevalent in both regimes. 
 
Then, because there are two regimes in the first and third sub-samples, we estimate 
a DTGARCH model as follows:  
 
#$ = &'( + *'+#$,+ + E'( 1$ − 1$∗ + E''GH$ + I'( + I''J$ KLM$ + /$-+.' 				12		#$,3∗ ≤ 5&6( + *6+#$,+-+.' + E6 1$ − 1$∗ + E6'GH$ + I6( + I6'J$ KLM$ + /$				12		#$,3∗ > 5   
ℎ$ = ='( + =''ℎ$,' + ='6>$,'6 + N'( KLM$ + O'(J$ + P'Q$,'6 					12			#$,3∗ ≤ 5=6( + =6'ℎ$,' + =66>$,'6 + N6( KLM$ + O6(J$ + P6Q$,'6 						12			#$,3∗ > 5							           (6.25) 
 
where S /$ = 0, /$ = ℎ$T$ , and T$  follows a Student’s t-distribution with v 
degrees of freedom. The values for p and 5 have been determined in section 6.4.2. 
 
Finally, for the second sub-sample, given the absence of nonlinearities in the RMB 
exchange rate returns, the linear model is estimated: 
 
#$ = &( + *+#$,+ + E( 1$ − 1$∗ + E'GH$ + I( + I'JM KLM$ + /$-+.'   ℎ$ = =( + ='ℎ$,' + =6>$,'6 + N( KLM$ + O(JM + PQ$,'6 											                       (6.26) 
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where /$ = 0, /$ = ℎ$T$ , and T$  follows a Student’s t-distribution with v 
degrees of freedom. Based on the AIC, X = 1. 
 
Table 6.8 Total Sample Result from Three-Regime Threshold Model 
Total sample: 2005/07/22-2013/07/22 
 Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
Conditional Mean &( 0.0175 
(0.406) 
0.0528*** 
(5.464) 
0.0756** 
(2.032) *' 0.0027 
(0.058) 
0.0118 
(0.407) 
-0.0634 
(-1.196) E( 0.0008* 
(1.705) 
0.0020*** 
(5.896) 
0.0006 
(0.599) E' -0.0134 
(-0.618) 
-0.0305*** 
(-5.826) 
-0.0421** 
(-2.144) I( 8.8693*** 
(3.683) 
3.6414*** 
(5.560) 
1.0864 
(0.758) k( 0.0292 
(1.531) 
0.0177*** 
(3.101) 
0.0628*** 
(4.643) I' -11.2226*** 
(-3.040) 
-2.9733*** 
(-2.828) 
1.4705 
(0.600) k' -0.0769 
(-1.481) 
-0.0239* 
(-1.808) 
-0.1363 
(-3.657) 
Conditional Variance =( 0.0024* 
(1.914) 
0.0005*** 
(7.258) 
-0.0005*** 
(-3.792) =' 0.3403*** 
(2.860) 
0.3739*** 
(8.412) 
-0.0194 
(-0.202) =6 -0.0206 
(-0.272) 
0.2286*** 
(4.916) 
0.0290 
(0.325) N( 0.1705*** 
(3.361) 
0.0591*** 
(11.505) 
0.1453*** 
(2.837) N' 0.0009** 
(2.449) 
0.0001*** 
(4.523) 
0.0003 
(1.090) O( -0.0019* 
(-1.891) 
-0.0001*** 
(-3.491) 
0.0002*** 
(3.383) O' -0.0033* 
(-1.680) 
-0.0007*** 
(-6.369) 
0.0005 
(1.591) P 0.0745 
(0.750) 
0.0368 
(0.595) 
0.0728 
(0.614) l(20) 32.54 (0.3932)  l6(20) 16.374 (0.2641)  ln o 6114.36   
Observations 2087   
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6.5 Empirical Results 
 
In order to illustrate the intervention effects on the Chinese foreign exchange market, 
we now analyse the empirical evidence unearthed. The three-regime threshold 
model introduced by Chen et al. (2010), the double threshold GARCH model 
estimated by Suardi (2008) and Utsunomiya (2013), and the linear GARCH model 
followed by Hoshikawa (2008) are used to get the empirical evidence for the whole 
sample and three different sub-samples, respectively.  
 
6.5.1 Results for the Whole Sample Period 
 
Table 6.8 reports the estimated coefficients of model (6.24) on the daily total time 
period data: 22 July, 2005 to 22 July, 2013. The effects of CPR intervention and CB 
intervention on the RMB exchange rate movement are captured by coefficients I( and k(, respectively. The coefficients I( for pqU$ are positive and significant at the 1% 
level in regime 1 and regime 2, while the coefficients k( are significant at the 1% level 
in regime 2 and regime 3. These estimated results of I( and k( suggest that when the 
RMB exchange rate appreciates, CPR intervention has effects on the level of the 
exchange rate, but when the RMB depreciates against the USD, only CB intervention 
impacts on the exchange rate movement. In addition, both CPR and CB interventions 
are effective in moving the exchange rate in the desired direction when there is not 
large depreciation or large appreciation in the RMB currency. The leaning-against-the-
wind hypothesis assumes that the purchase intervention (low CPR intervention) can 
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depreciate the currency and the opposite should hold for sale intervention (high CPR 
intervention) (Sarno and Taylor, 2001). Thus, I( and k( are expected to have positive 
signs.  
 
Assumed by Hoshikawa (2008) and Utsunomiya (2013), if intervention happens as a 
surprise, that is the intervention frequency variable is small, it could have a large effect 
on the exchange rate level. The relation between the intervention frequency and the 
exchange rate movement should be negative. Referring to results from Table 6.8, the 
coefficients I' for CPR intervention are negative and significant in regimes 1 and 2. 
The coefficient r' for CB intervention is negative and just significant at the week 
level in regime 2. Therefore, negative signs of significant coefficients I' and k' prove 
the assumption introduced by Hoshikawa (2008) and Utsunomiya (2013). 
 
For the control variables, the coefficients E( for interest rate differentials are positive 
and significant in regimes 1 and 2. The positive signs of interest rate spread support 
the findings of Gumus (2002) that a higher interest rate differential depreciates the 
domestic currency. The coefficients E' for stock index are negative and significant in 
regimes 2 and 3. These results of coefficient E' support the second hypothesis that if 
the stock market declines, the currency will depreciate. 
 
Focusing on the conditional variance equation, the results suggest that both of CPR 
intervention and CB intervention increase the volatility of the daily RMB exchange 
rate returns. Except the coefficient N' for CB in regime 3, all of coefficients N( are 
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positive and statistically significant for all specifications. This is consistent with the 
result obtained by Dominguez (1998), Nagayasu (2004), Hoshikawa (2008) and 
Utsunomiya (2013)—intervention increases exchange rate volatility. An uncertain or 
non-credible intervention policy leads to increase volatility (Macedo et al., 2003). 
 
The significance condition of coefficients O( for CPR intervention frequency and O' 
for CB intervention frequency are negatively significant at regimes 1 and 2. 
Hoshikawa (2008) and Utsunomiya (2013) find that because high-frequency 
intervention reduces exchange rate volatility, the coefficients of the intervention 
frequencies are expected to have negative signs. However, compare to regime 3, the O( for CPR intervention frequency is negatively significant in regime 1. Therefore, we 
find that high-frequency intervention reduces exchange rate volatility more strongly 
when the yuan appreciates. 
 
The coefficients P are non-significant in all regimes, indicating there is no evidence 
of asymmetric volatility in RMB exchange rate return in these three regimes. 
 
Diagnostics for standardized residuals indicate that correlation between residuals 
and heteroscedasticity does not exist in the three-regime threshold model. Ljung-
Box test statistics indicate that there are no serial correlations in the residuals up to 
order of 20 (l 20 = 32.54, no significance). In addition, there is no evidence for 
heteroscedasticity (l6 20 = 16.37).                                    
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Table 6.9 Sub-Sample Results from DTGARCH and Linear GARCH models 
 Sub-sample 1: 2005/07/22-2008/07/14 Sub-sample 2:2008/07/15-2010/06/21 Sub-sample 3:2010/06/22-2013/07/22 
 Regime 1 Regime 2  Regime 1 Regime 2 
Conditional Mean !" 0.0353** 
(2.476) 
0.0520 
(1.147) 
-0.0044 
(-0.476) 
0.3236 
(1.533) 
0.0894 
(1.449) #$ -0.0294 
(-0.745) 
0.0106 
(0.096) 
-0.2094*** 
(-4.618) 
-0.0103 
(-0.121) 
0.0077 
(0.263) #% -0.0751** 
(-1.951) 
0.0009*** 
(2.847) 
- - - &" -0.0002 
(-0.264) 
0.0009 
(0.354) 
0.0003 
(0.256) 
0.0024 
(0.587) 
0.0008 
(0.802) &$ -0.0242*** 
(-3.170) 
-0.0345 
(-1.432) 
0.0020 
(0.396) 
-0.1693* 
(-1.695) 
-0.0485 
(-1.561) '" 6.6848** 
(2.094) 
-0.3517 
(0.039) 
1.1629 
(1.245) 
0.4354 
(0.130) 
2.7118** 
(2.3894) (" 0.0244*** 
(4.235) 
0.0735 
(0.836) 
0.0087** 
(1.966) 
0.0242 
(0.813) 
0.0204* 
(1.733) '$ -7.6804* 
(-1.682) 
1.9480 
(-0.148) 
6.8340** 
(2.362) 
6.0296 
(1.064) 
-0.1985 
(0.093) ($ -0.0326*** 
(-2.685) 
-0.1631 
(-0.574) 
-0.0334 
(-1.193) 
-0.0479 
(-0.623) 
-0.0305 
(-1.170) 
Conditional Variance )" 0.0013*** 
(2.691) 
-0.0034 
(-0.436) 
0.00005*** 
(6.097) 
0.0015 
(0.771) 
0.0020*** 
(3.280) )$ 0.4437*** 
(43.870) 
-0.0911 
(-0.530) 
0.4921*** 
(6.842) 
0.2683 
(0.819) 
0.1491* 
(1.686) )% 0.1356** 
(2.32) 
0.1574 
(0.636) 
0.1988* 
(1.820) 
0.2486 
(1.006) 
-0.0364 
(-0.977) *" 0.0234*** 
(3.286) 
0.1398 
(1.488) 
0.0410*** 
(3.016) 
0.1711** 
(2.282) 
0.1740*** 
(5.067) *$ -0.0005*** 
(-6.921) 
-0.0005 
(-1.252) 
0.00005** 
(2.476) 
-0.0005 
(-1.106) 
0.0004*** 
(2.958) +" -0.0004 
(-0.533) 
0.0066 
(1.357) 
0.0029*** 
(27.648) 
-0.0017 
(-0.977) 
-0.0006 
(-1.292) +$ -0.0009*** 
(-3.502) 
0.0102 
(0.058) 
-0.0059*** 
(-31.715) 
0.0051 
(0.172) 
-0.0030*** 
(-3.014) , 0.0083 
(0.112) 
0.3712 
(1.079) 
-0.1509 
(-1.107) 
-0.2784 
(-1.049) 
-0.0029 
(-0.977) -(20) 22.508 (0.433) 21.782   (0.382) 21.373 (0.267) -%(20) 14.573 (0.743) 13.369   (0.238) 12.566 (0.480) ln 4 1487.24  1351.48 1328.65  
Observations 891  391 805  
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6.5.2. Results for the Sub-Sample Estimation: Before, During and After the Crisis 
 
Before the Financial Crisis 
 
The estimation results for the first sub-sample are presented in Table 6.9. The results 
of the conditional mean equation of the DTGARCH model for this sub-sample 
suggest that interventions and intervention frequency can impact the exchange rate 
movements only when the yuan appreciates. The coefficients of !"  and #"  are 
positive and significant at 5% level and 1% level respectively in regime 1. Thus, 
both CPR intervention and CB intervention are successfully used for the leaning-
against-the-wind policy before the 2008 financial crisis. With regard to intervention 
frequency, the significant coefficients !$  and #$  appear only in regime 1. The 
negative signs of coefficients !$ and #$ prove that the low-frequency interventions 
have large effects on the exchange rate level, similar to the findings for the whole 
time period. Among the control variables, only stock price has negative and 
significant relation with the exchange rate movement in regime 1. This result also 
supports the second hypothesis, that the depreciation of domestic currency follows 
the decline of the stock market. 
 
Turning to the conditional variance, again, interventions and frequency influence the 
volatility of exchange rate returns only when the yuan appreciates. The coefficients %" and %$ are significant at 1% level in regime 1, but own opposite signs: the 
coefficient %" is positive (0.023) and the coefficient %$ is negative (-0.0005). Based 
on these results, we find that CPR intervention increases the volatility of the daily 
RMB exchange rate returns, while CB intervention can reduce the volatility when 
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there is appreciation of RMB exchange rate before the financial crisis. Considering 
the intervention frequency, only the coefficient &$  is negative and statistically 
significant in regime 1. This indicates that in sub-sample 1, the CB intervention 
frequency can reduce the exchange rate volatility when the yuan appreciates. 
 
During the Financial Crisis 
 
Because according to Hansen’s model-based bootstrap procedure there is only one 
regime in sub-sample 2, the effects of interventions on the exchange rate movement 
and volatility during the 2008 financial crisis are tested by a linear GARCH model. 
The coefficient in the mean equation (6.26), #", is positive and significant at the 5% 
level in sub-sample 2. This suggests that only the CB intervention has an effect on 
the exchange rate level during the financial crisis. Referring to the results of the 
variance equation, the CPR and CB interventions increase the volatility of RMB 
exchange rate returns. Both the coefficients %" and %$ are positive and statistically 
significant in sub-sample 2. Then, because the coefficient &$  is negative and 
significant at the 1% level, we find that high-frequency CB intervention can reduce 
the exchange rate volatility. We need to pay particular attention to the signs of 
coefficients !$ and &". In the hypotheses, because the volatility of the exchange rate 
decreases with high frequency intervention and low frequency intervention has a 
large effect on the exchange rate level, the signs of coefficients !$  and &"  are 
expected to be negative. However, the signs of both !$ and &" are positive (6.83 and 
0.003). These results, which suggest that high frequency CPR intervention has large 
effects on the RMB exchange rate movement and increases the RMB exchange rate 
volatility, are contrary to the hypotheses. The pegging exchange rate regime applied 
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during the financial crisis meant that only high frequency intervention could affect 
the movement of RMB exchange rate level and volatility. 
 
After the Financial Crisis 
 
According to the results of the DTGARCH model in sub-sample 3, the CB 
intervention and CPR intervention have effects on the exchange rate movement only 
when the yuan depreciates. The coefficients !" and #" are positive and significant 
in regime 2. Based on these results, we find that the CB and CPR interventions are 
successfully used for the leaning-against-the-wind policy after the financial crisis. 
The results for the control variables in sub-sample 3 are similar to those for sub-
sample 1. That is, only stock price has negative and significant relation with the 
exchange rate movement when the yuan appreciates. This result supports the second 
hypothesis, that the depreciation of domestic currency follows the decline of the 
stock market. 
 
The coefficients %" in the variance equation are positive and significant in both 
regime 1 and regime 2. Only the coefficient %$ is significant at 1 % level in regime 
2. These results prove that interventions increase the RMB exchange rate volatility. 
Considering the intervention frequency, only the coefficient &$  is negative and 
statistically significant in regime 2. This indicates that in sub-sample 3, the CB 
intervention frequency can reduce the exchange rate volatility when the yuan 
depreciates. 
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Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that before the financial crisis interventions 
in the foreign exchange market were more effective when the exchange rate was 
appreciating, and that after the financial crisis interventions have large effects on the 
foreign exchange market when the exchange rate depreciates. It can be concluded 
that between July 2005 and July 2008 the objective of the monetary authority was 
to offset the effects of exchange rate appreciations through interventions. In contrast, 
between June 2010 and July 2013 the authority used intervention in order to 
influence the exchange rate movement and volatility when the exchange rate was 
depreciating. This indicates that the objectives of intervention are different before 
and after the financial crisis. 
 
The empirical evidence for the asymmetric component proves that asymmetric 
volatility in the RMB exchange rate return does not exist in these three sub-samples. 
The coefficients ' are non-significant in all sub-samples. 
 
The results for coefficients !" , #" , !$ , #$ , %" , %$ , &" , and &$  follow the same 
pattern in the whole sample. The coefficients !" and !$ are larger than #" and #$ 
(6.68 versus 0.02, 7.68 versus 0.03 and so on) in all the mean equations. In addition, 
for all variance equations, the coefficients %" are larger than the %$ (0.023 versus 
0.0005 and so on). However, the magnitudes of coefficients &" are smaller than the 
numbers of &$ (0.0004 and 0.0009). These results suggest that CPR intervention and 
CPR intervention frequency have stronger effects on the RMB exchange rate level 
than do CB intervention and frequency, and that the effects of CPR intervention on 
the exchange rate volatility are larger than the effects of CB intervention, but the 
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effects of CPR intervention frequency are less than those of CB intervention 
frequency. 
 
The results from the diagnostics for standardized residuals prove that there is no 
relation between residuals and no heteroscedasticity for all specifications. All of ( 20  and (+ 20  are non-significant in all models. 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has attempted to discover the effects of China’s intervention on the 
foreign exchange market. Despite the growing awareness in international policy 
circles and academia that intervention is a central feature of China’s exchange rate 
policy, there is a lack of research on the relation between China’s foreign exchange 
intervention and its consequences. Through its consideration of CPR intervention 
and CB intervention in China, which may be the most watched emerging market in 
the field of foreign exchange rate policy, this research contributes to the previous 
literature on central bank intervention. This chapter uses the data of CPR 
intervention and CB intervention from Chapters 4 and 5, and calculates the CPR and 
CB intervention frequencies to analyse the effects of China’s intervention and 
frequency on the foreign exchange market using threshold GARCH approaches. We 
first use Hansen’s model-based bootstrap procedure to determine the number of 
regimes in the whole sample and three sub-samples. Then, Tsay’s arranged 
autoregression method is used to get the order of the lag structure (p) for the AP 
model and the optimal delay parameter, and Chan’s test is applied to obtain the 
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threshold value and the RSS. Because there are three regimes in the whole time 
period, two regimes in the first and third sub-samples, and one in the second sub-
sample, we estimate the triple-threshold GARCH model, double threshold GARCH 
model, and linear GARCH model to test whether or not China’s intervention and 
intervention frequency can move the USD/CNY exchange rate in the desired 
direction and reduce the exchange rate volatility in the whole sample and three sub-
samples. 
 
Using the triple-threshold GARCH model, we get evidence of the effects of China’s 
intervention and intervention frequency on the foreign exchange market in the whole 
sample (22 July, 2005 to 22 July, 2013). For the exchange rate level, results show 
that when the RMB exchange rate appreciates, CPR intervention has effects on the 
level of the exchange rate, but when the RMB depreciates against the USD, only CB 
intervention impacts on the exchange rate movements. In addition, both CPR and 
CB interventions can effectively move the exchange rate in the desired direction 
when there is neither large depreciation nor large appreciation in the RMB currency. 
Furthermore, because all the coefficients !" and #" have positive signs in the three 
regimes, we find that with regard to CB and CPR interventions, the PBOC has been 
successful in using them for the leaning-against-the-wind policy. Then, comparing 
the results of CPR intervention frequency and CB intervention frequency, we find 
that the effects of low-frequency CPR intervention on the exchange rate level are 
stronger than the effects of low-frequency CB intervention not only in the yuan 
appreciation period, but also in the period without large appreciation or large 
depreciation in the RMB currency. For the exchange rate volatility, the results 
suggest that both CPR intervention and CB intervention increase the volatility of the 
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daily RMB exchange rate returns. Comparing the coefficients of CPR and CB 
intervention frequency variables between regime 1 and regime 3, we find that high-
frequency intervention reduces exchange rate volatility more strongly when the yuan 
appreciates. 
 
With regard to the effects of China’s intervention on the foreign exchange market 
before, during and after the 2008 financial crisis, this chapter applies linear and 
double threshold GARCH models to analyse the time-varying effects of China’s 
intervention. The empirical evidence suggests that before the financial crisis 
interventions were more effective when the exchange rate was appreciating, and that 
after the crisis interventions have large effects on the foreign exchange market when 
the exchange rate depreciates. It can be concluded that between July 2005 and July 
2008 the objective of the monetary authority was to use interventions to offset the 
effects of exchange rate appreciation. In contrast, from June 2010 to July 2013 the 
authority used interventions in order to influence the exchange rate movement and 
volatility when the exchange rate depreciated. This indicates that the objectives of 
intervention are different before and after the financial crisis. According to the 
results for the period during the financial crisis, only CB intervention could impact 
the exchange rate return, and only high-frequency CB intervention had the desired 
effects on volatility. Although high-frequency CPR intervention also had effects on 
the RMB exchange rate movements and volatility, the signs of CPR intervention 
frequency variables are opposite to the hypotheses, which assume negative signs of 
frequency variables. The reason may be that, during the financial crisis, only high 
frequency intervention could affect the foreign exchange market. 
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This research also sheds light on the relation between interest rate spreads and stock 
price index and the RMB exchange rate movement. Interest rate differentials are 
positively related with the RMB exchange rate movement, indicating that a higher 
interest rate differential depreciates the domestic currency. The negative relation 
between stock price index and RMB exchange rate movement reflects the fact that 
if the stock market declines, the currency will depreciate. Based on the numbers of 
intervention and intervention frequency coefficients, we suggest that CPR 
intervention and CPR intervention frequency have stronger effects on the RMB 
exchange rate level than do CB intervention and frequency, and that the effects of 
CPR intervention on the exchange rate volatility are greater than the effects of CB 
intervention, but the effects of CPR intervention frequency are less than those of CB 
intervention frequency. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Oral Intervention in China: Efficacy of Chinese Exchange 
Rate Communications 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Traditionally, monetary authorities have intervened directly in foreign exchange 
markets, impacting exchange rate levels and their fluctuations by actually trading 
currencies. In recent years, however, actual intervention has been supplemented or 
supplanted by oral intervention, i.e., official communications via policy 
announcements or other means such as informal meetings with market participants 
intended to mitigate exchange rate trends by influencing market expectations 
(Fratzscher, 2006, 2008a, 2008b; Beine et al., 2009; Sakata and Takeda, 2013). For 
major economies like the US and EU member nations, there has been almost no 
direct market intervention by the authorities since the mid-1990s; however, the 
frequency of oral interventions has increased. 
 
In China, the monetary authorities engage in both actual and oral interventions. 
Although this intervention is not publicly acknowledged, we do know when the 
People’s Bank of China (PBOC) makes statements directly to the foreign exchange 
market or talks to the state-owned banks. In recent years, the PBOC has announced 
that it will gradually reduce direct or ‘regular’ interventions in the Chinese exchange 
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market. However, given the PBOC’s long history of extensive intervention, this 
change is likely to be one of form rather than substance.  
 
China has been internationally noted for the extent and sophistication of its foreign 
exchange interventions. As stated in previous chapters, generally, we can identify 
three major forms of Chinese intervention: (1) Direct sales or purchases of foreign 
currencies by the PBOC in the marketplace; (2) Setting and adjusting of the official 
central parity rate and the range around which the daily trading prices are allowed 
to fluctuate; and (3) PBOC oral intervention in the form of policy briefing, moral 
persuasion, formal and informal meetings, and telephone conversations. The first 
two are regularly operated by the PBOC, and the central bank’s indication of a 
gradual reduction in regular interventions is likely to mean a move towards engaging 
more in oral intervention. 
 
Although many researchers have studied China’s exchange rate policy and have 
recognized intervention as a central feature of that policy, to date there has been very 
little research attention directed toward China’s oral intervention. The first 
contribution is to fill the gap in the foreign exchange intervention literature by 
considering the Chinese case. 
 
The existing literature on oral intervention as a policy tool has found mixed results. 
Recent studies have shown some progress in mitigating the problems in previous 
research. For example, intervention studies have applied the event study 
methodology, which is considered to be better at capturing the clustered property of 
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interventions compared to time-series analysis (Fratzcher 2008a; Gnabo and 
Teiletche, 2009). 
 
This chapter follows the event study approach to explore China’s oral intervention 
in the foreign exchange market in order to better our understanding of China’s 
exchange rate. We consider both domestic and international aspects of China’s 
exchange rate communication, including China’s response to international calls for 
exchange rate adjustment, which is the second contribution, particularly those from 
the USA.  
 
We analyse the effects of oral intervention on the US dollar/Chinese yuan 
(USD/CNY) rate from 22 July, 2005 to 22 July, 2013. Four event window lengths - 
of 2, 5, 10 and 15 days - are deployed to check when the effects of oral intervention 
occur. Four dimensions - event, direction, reversal and smoothing - are investigated 
to test for the impacts of the events. We also employ more extensive tests in the 
empirical investigation. The event study approach that is commonly used in other 
similar research is based almost exclusively on the sign tests. In this research we 
extend the literature by employing the rank tests along with the sign tests, to check 
to what extent the communications may have the desired effects. The third 
contribution is to compare the results of parametric and nonparametric tests, as the 
nonparametric tests may yield additional insights in the context of the event studies.  
 
We find that exchange rate communications can help the Chinese central bank move 
RMB exchange rate levels in the desired direction. Based on the whole sample 
results, although against the event criterion exchange rate communications are not 
200	
	
successful, in the reversal dimension all the event window lengths under 
examination are significant. Finally, the longer the event window length is, the more 
significant the effects are in the four dimensions. We also test the effects of the 
international aspects of China’s exchange rate communications, particularly in the 
case of the US calling for appreciation of the RMB exchange rate.  As the events are 
significant in all dimensions, the results suggest that such calls can influence 
movements of the Chinese exchange rate, and hence by and large the Chinese 
authorities are responsive to American pressure for RMB appreciation. Finally, 
using the range-based variance model to get volatility, we find confirmative 
evidence of the effect of successive exchange rate communications on calming the 
exchange rate movement in terms of excess volatility.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 comprises a review of 
the literature on oral intervention. Section 7.3 introduces the forms of intervention 
in China with a focus on China’s oral intervention. Section 7.4 explains the event 
study methodology; it defines the events, event windows and criteria, and describes 
the parametric and nonparametric tests. Section 7.5 discusses the estimation results. 
Section 7.6 offers concluding remarks. 
 
7.2 Related Literature 
 
In recent decades, exchange rate communication has become an increasingly 
important policy tool for monetary authorities (Fratzscher, 2006). Using reports 
issued by the newswire service Reuters News, Fratzscher (2006) analyses exchange 
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rate communication on the basis of two sets of search criteria. These are used to 
extract all statements in which policy makers express a view about the domestic 
exchange rate. The search terms are the phrase ‘exchange rate’ or the name of the 
exchange rate, such as the US dollar for the United States, and the title or name of 
relevant policy makers. Then, Fratzscher (2006) classifies the contents of the 
statements according to whether they support a stronger domestic currency or a 
weaker one, or are neutral: 
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Using the above classification process, Fratzscher (2006) identifies exchange rate 
communication in the Group of Three (G3), comprising the USA, Japan and the euro 
area, from 1990 to 2003. The findings show that from the mid-1990s the United 
States and the euro area had practically abandoned the use of actual purchase and 
sale in FX markets, and shifted to almost exclusive use of communication to affect 
exchange rate developments. The Japanese authorities, however, had intensified 
both actual intervention and exchange rate communication. The empirical results 
based on an EGARCH framework indicate that communication not only exhibits a 
significant contemporaneous effect on exchange rates, but also moves forward 
exchange rates in the desired direction up to a horizon of 6 months. Moreover, 
communication is found to reduce exchange rate volatility and uncertainty, whereas 
actual interventions tend to have the opposite effect. Overall, communication tends 
to be a fairly effective policy tool over the medium term. 
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In a subsequent study, Fratzscher (2008) investigates the channels through which 
communication works. Using the same data and search classification process as in 
his 2006 research, Fratzscher (2008) employs a standard asset-pricing framework. 
The research provides two key findings: first, G3 communication policies have 
constituted an effective policy tool in influencing exchange rates in the desired 
direction; second, communication has been effective independently of the stance 
and direction of the monetary policy and the occurrence of actual interventions. 
Meanwhile, the effects of communication are strongly related to the degree of 
uncertainty and the positioning of participants in FX markets. Taken together, the 
results provide support for micro-based approaches to exchange rate modelling and 
are consistent with the argument that oral and actual interventions function through 
a coordination channel rather than a signalling channel. 
 
One key question for Fratzscher (2008) is whether communication is successful in 
inducing a long-term effect on exchange rates. Still using the same data as in his 
2006 research, Fratzscher (2008) employs an event study methodology based on 
four criteria - ‘event’, ‘direction’, ‘reversal’, and ‘smoothing’ - and nonparametric 
sign tests. The empirical findings for the success of interventions based on these 
criteria provide strong evidence for the medium- to long-term effectiveness of both 
oral interventions and actual interventions by G3 authorities since 1990. Then, 
Fratzscher (2008) attempts to gauge the channels through which these two types of 
intervention function. He tests hypotheses for the channels: if the portfolio balance 
channel is dominant, one would expect that oral interventions should have little or 
no effect on exchange rates; if the signalling channel is working, a close relationship 
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between monetary policy and the effectiveness of interventions would be expected; 
if the coordination channel is relevant, interventions may be most effective in times 
of large market uncertainty or when exchange rates strongly deviate from 
fundamentals (Taylor, 2004).  
 
In order to test the coordination channel, Fratzscher (2008) applies a formal test 
using odds ratios in a logit-model framework. The findings show that both oral and 
actual interventions are effective under large market uncertainty and when exchange 
rates deviate substantially from fundamentals. Fratzscher (2008) also finds that the 
success of communication and actual interventions is largely unrelated to monetary 
policy, thus suggesting that interventions function primarily through a coordination 
channel. 
 
Using Dow Jones and Reuters press reports to identify oral interventions during 
1989-2003 for the USD/DEM (the EUR/USD after 1999), and during 1991-2003 for 
the YEN/USD, Beine et al. (2009) assess how communication influences exchange 
rate levels and exchange rate volatility. They consider two types of communication: 
ex post communication includes all the official statements detected by market 
participants that are issued after direct interventions, while ex ante communication 
comprises statements issued at G7 meetings or potential future interventions issued 
by monetary authorities. The results indicate that oral intervention has effects on 
both exchange rate level and exchange rate volatility. Moreover, statements by 
monetary authorities on exchange rate policy can be a valuable complementary tool 
to actual exchange rate operations. The authors also conduct robustness checks for 
a range of factors: change in intervention regime, size of the intervention, the 
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coordination channel, official statements as separate policy instruments, and the 
distinction between announced and unannounced interventions. 
 
Sakata and Takeda (2013) attempt to complement Fratzscher’s (2008) study, which 
examines only the effect of announcements made by main monetary authorities and 
does not exclude the possibility that other speakers may also influence the market. 
Using Reuters Japanese News, Sakata and Takeda (2013) collect statements by 
Japanese monetary authorities from 1 January 1995 to 31 May 2011. Then, 
following Fratzscher (2008), they regard oral intervention as an event, and define 
the success or failure of oral intervention by measuring whether it meets certain 
criteria. They use ‘direction’ as the criterion to analyse whether oral interventions 
can influence the exchange rate as the monetary authorities’ hope. In their study, 
Sakata and Takeda (2013) construct dummy variables based on 14 points (direction, 
specific rate, IA-announcement, suggestion, non-comment, watching, attitude, 
coordination, vice-minister, minister, MoF-member, BoJ, Japanese, International), 
and apply logit analysis to investigate what forms of oral intervention are most 
effective. Results from this event study suggest that the market only responds to the 
statements made by main monetary authorities. In addition, Sakata and Takeda 
(2013) find that market participants give high credence to announcements that strike 
a decidedly positive or negative tone about the current exchange rate. Moreover, 
their results indicate that the effects of oral interventions depend on the speaker and 
the content; consequently, they provide policy implications. 
 
Using Japanese data from April 1991 to September 2004, Bernal and Gnabo (2009) 
classify three types of intervention: actual intervention, oral intervention and 
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confirmed intervention. Confirmed intervention is an actual intervention 
accompanied by an announcement either confirming its occurrence or clarifying its 
purpose. Bernal and Gnabo (2009) collect the oral and confirmed intervention 
information from the Factiva online database. They estimate an ordered probit 
model to test determinants of different types of interventions, and then use an event 
study approach to examine the effectiveness of the interventions. Their results 
indicate that the Japanese authorities tend to adopt stronger measures when the 
behaviour of the exchange rate becomes more unfavourable. This suggests that 
words and deeds are coordinated only in extreme cases. Overall, interventions are 
found to be moderately successful in correcting undesirable exchange rate 
developments, especially volatility of the exchange rate movements. 
 
Fratzscher (2004) discusses three elements of foreign exchange interventions: 
exchange rate developments, monetary policy and the coordination of interventions. 
First, with regard to exchange rate developments, intervention focuses on arriving 
at a particular exchange rate level, decreasing deviations of the exchange rate from 
the desired level, or reducing volatility. Second, through the signalling channel, 
intervention seems closely associated with monetary policy. Third, in the 
international arena, monetary authorities have frequently coordinated their 
interventions across countries to increase the effectiveness on exchange rates 
(Bonser-Neal and Tanner, 1996; Beine et al., 2002). Fratzscher (2004) conducts a 
logit analysis to test these three characteristics of actual and oral interventions in the 
Japanese context. The results show that both actual and oral interventions follow a 
leaning-against-the-wind pattern, and are more frequent when exchange rate 
deviation and volatility are high. In addition, both actual and oral interventions are 
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mostly consistent with and supportive of monetary policy changes. Furthermore, 
they are coordinated domestically and internationally. 
 
The literature on China’s intervention has not covered the oral type of intervention; 
nor has it used an event study approach. This chapter aims to fill that critical void. 
 
7.3 Measures of Oral Intervention 
 
Differing from the US, Japan and other mature economies, China operates foreign 
exchange intervention according to its own unique fashion. The Chinese monetary 
authorities intervene in the foreign exchange market secretly and the intervention 
takes a variety of forms. Specifically, quantity intervention takes place via purchase 
or sale of foreign currencies, price intervention is accomplished via setting the 
central parity rate for market trading and its allowed fluctuation band, while the 
authorities also engage in oral intervention through issuing government statements 
or other means of communication. 
 
In this chapter, we focus on the oral intervention, whereby in order to influence the 
RMB exchange rate against the dollar, the monetary authorities communicate with 
the foreign exchange market.  
 
In China’s foreign exchange market, oral intervention may be in the form of 
exchange rate communications by the domestic monetary authorities, but it may also 
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have an international dimension when the intervention takes place as a result of 
outside pressure, such as US calls for appreciation of the RMB.  
 
With regard to domestic communication, because the purpose of this chapter is to 
measure the extent to which exchange rate communication might affect the foreign 
exchange market in the intended way, we choose to focus on statements by the 
relevant Chinese monetary authorities, including the PBOC, Ministry of Finance and 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), and exchange rate speeches by 
Chinese political and economic leaders such as China’s President, Premier, and the 
PBOC governor. With regard to the exchange rate pressure coming from outside 
China, which is often calling for appreciation of the Chinese currency, we look at 
statements made during US-China presidential visits and Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue, and official statements on exchange rates by the US President, Secretary 
of the Treasury and senators.  
 
To collect the data on domestic and foreign exchange rate communications we 
extract headline statements and speeches from newswire service Reuters News, as 
this is the most likely source of information for market participants (Fratzscher, 2006 
and 2008; Beine et al., 2009; Sakata and Takeda, 2013). Because this chapter intends 
to analyse the market reaction to communication that actually becomes available to 
market participants, it is important to use a news provider with a good professional 
reputation for the quality of its services. One advantage of using the newswire 
service is that statements and official speeches are interpreted by experienced 
professionals.  
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Reuters US News is used for data on outside appreciation pressure, and Reuters 
Chinese News for information on domestic communication. In most cases, media 
reports from such sources are published within minutes of a policymaker’s statement 
or speech, which allows us to conduct the empirical analysis using the data at daily 
frequency.  For news about developments regarding China’s foreign exchange 
market, we additionally use information from the official websites of the PBOC and 
SAFE.20 Reports from these sources can be regarded as information released by the 
Chinese monetary authorities. In addition, we use the newswire service of 
China.org.cn21 as the official source of information from China’s National People’s 
Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC).  
 
In seeking information about outside appreciation pressure we employ two search 
criteria: The first comprises the phrase ‘exchange rate’ or the name of the currency 
- renminbi (RMB) or the Chinese yuan for the People’s Republic of China - and the 
title or name of the US President, Treasury Secretary or senators. As shown in Table 
7.1, during the sample period there was a change of US President, so we use both 
Bush and Obama as search terms, and there were four US Treasury Secretaries, so 
we use the names Snow, Paulson, Geithner and Lew in the search. Based on the first 
criterion, we discover indications of calls from the American side regarding the 
RMB exchange rate. The second criterion relates to the reports, news briefings or 
statements regarding high level US-China bilateral meetings. This criterion 
																																								 																				
20	The	People’s	Bank	of	China	(PBOC)	website	is	http://www.pbc.gov.cn/,	last accessed on 18 March 
2015. 
  The State	 Administration	 of	 Foreign	 Exchange	 (SAFE)	 website	 is	 http://www.safe.gov.cn/,	 last 
accessed on 18 March 2015.	
21	China.org.cn	website	is	http://www.china.org.cn/,	last accessed on 18 March 2015.	
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comprises the name of the exchange rate, along with the name of the bilateral 
meeting, such as presidential visits to and from the USA and the US-China Strategic 
and Economic Dialogue, which has taken place once every year since 2009. 
 
Table 7.1 Names and Periods of Tenure for US Presidents and Treasury Secretaries 
US President 
Name: George W. Bush Barack Obama 
Time: Before 20/01/2009 After 21/01/2009 
US Treasury Secretary 
Name: John Snow Henry Paulson Timothy Geithner Jack Lew 
Time: Before 
30/06/2006 
10/07/2006—
20/01/2009 
20/01/2009—
25/01/2013 
After 
28/02/2013 
 
For domestic communication, we choose Reuters Chinese News, the PBOC and 
SAFE websites, and China.org.cn as sources. As with Reuters US News, we use two 
search criteria for Reuters Chinese News. The first comprises the name of the 
Chinese exchange rate and the name of the Chinese President, Premier, or PBOC 
governor (see Table 7.2). The main purpose is to find speeches on the RMB 
exchange rate made by relevant authorities in China. The second criterion comprises 
the name of the exchange rate along with a phrase connoting a major economic or 
financial event in China, such as ‘National Financial Work Conference’, or ‘Central 
Economic Work Conference’, which issue statements about the Chinese exchange 
rate policy. Then, we use the PBOC and SAFE websites as sources for the China 
Monetary Policy Report and the Annual Report of the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange, respectively.  These documents report the evolution of China’s 
exchange rate policy in a particular year and indicate official intentions for the future 
development of the policy. Finally, we use the newswire service China.org.cn to 
collect NPC and CPPCC statements relevant to the Chinese foreign exchange market. 
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Table 7.2 Names and Periods of Tenure for Chinese President, Premier, and 
Governor of the PBOC 
 Chinese President Premier Governor of the 
PBOC 
Name Hu Jintao Xi Jinping Wen 
Jiabao 
Li Keqiang Zhou Xiaochuan 
Tenure Before 
14/03/2013 
After 
14/03/2013 
Before 
15/03/2013 
After 
15/03/2013 
22/07/2005- 
22/07/2013 
 
Then, in order to provide a systematic classification of the meaning of statements 
and official speeches, we use the content analysis technique to extract relevant 
information (Holsti, 1969; Kassarjian, 1977).  Given the high research interest in the 
extent to which communication of the views of domestic or US governments about 
the Chinese currency would affect the RMB exchange rate, we have a classification 
of the media of the communication as follows: 
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where ,-. is the oral communication at time t. There are five channels through 
which oral intervention may take place. Domestic oral intervention occurs when a 
statement or speech is issued by the relevant authorities in China, usually at the 
PBOC or SAFE. Speeches by certain domestic officials, such as China’s President, 
Premier or Central Bank Governor, may also constitute intervention, since they are 
in a position to change the formulation of the Chinese exchange rate policy. Their 
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speeches may send messages regarding their judgement on the current status of the 
RMB exchange rate or about possible changes they intend to make to the RMB 
exchange rate in the future. Domestic meeting intervention occurs when the content 
of meetings, such as those of the NPC or CPPCC, and the two central work 
conferences specified above, concerns the exchange rate. When statements issued 
during US-China presidential visits and Strategic and Economic Dialogue call for 
appreciation of the RMB exchange rate, this is defined as US-China meeting 
intervention. Finally, when the US speaks to China seeking appreciation of the yuan 
we term this	US speech intervention, as China may respond to the call by changing 
the RMB exchange rate, albeit after some delay. While all US-China meetings and 
US speech interventions are concerned only with appreciating the RMB exchange 
rate, the other oral intervention types may have the tone of either appreciation or 
depreciation (±1). 
 
For example, according to media reports on 05/04/2006, before the US visit by the 
then Chinese President Hu Jintao, the then American Treasury Secretary John Snow 
claimed that, while appreciation of the Chinese yuan could not be achieved 
immediately, the RMB should increase in that year. In another example, on 
28/06/2010, President Obama expressed the hope that the Chinese yuan could 
appreciate more quickly. According to our classification, these two dates can be 
categorized as types 5 and 4 of oral intervention, respectively.  
 
On 06/10/2006, the governor of the PBOC, Zhou Xiaochuan, indicated opposition 
to RMB appreciation, stating the necessity to keep the RMB stable. Therefore, we 
mark that date as type 2 oral intervention. On 14/11/2006, the PBOC’s Monetary 
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Policy Report stated that the flexibility of the RMB exchange rate regime was 
increasing, and reform of the exchange rate regime was well underway. These 
developments would increase public anticipation that appreciation would be more 
likely to occur. Thus, we mark that date as type 1 of oral intervention. 
 
Table 7.3 shows the occurrence of the five types of oral intervention since 2005. 
There are some prominent features. Most importantly, we can identify distinct 
regimes of oral intervention over time. For instance, oral intervention happened less 
under the pegged exchange rate system: among the whole sample, the sub-period 
15/07/2008-22/06/2010 saw the lowest number of oral interventions. This is because 
during that period central parity intervention was the main tool used by the central 
bank to influence the RMB exchange rate. With regard to types of domestic oral 
interventions and oral communications from the US, we find that the largest 
numbers are for domestic and US speeches. This means that the main form of oral 
intervention is simply talking to the foreign exchange market. 
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Table 7.3 Number of Exchange Rate Communications, 2005-2013 
 Total Domestic report Domestic speech 
2005/07/22-
2013/07/22 
362 
(91&-271) 
55 
(18&-37) 
138 
(92&-46) 
2005/07/22-
2008/07/14 
150 
(33&-117) 
20 
(4&-16) 
51 
(27&-14) 
2008/07/15-
2010/06/22 
84 
(47&-37) 
14 
(11&-3) 
37 
(31&-6) 
2010/06/23-
2013/07/22 
128 
(40&-88) 
21 
(3&-18) 
50 
(34&-16) 
 
 Domestic meeting US-China 
meeting 
US speech 
2005/07/22-
2013/07/22 
18 
(10&-8) 
22 
(-22) 
129 
(-129) 
2005/07/22-
2008/07/14 
4 
(2&-2) 
17 
(-17) 
58 
(-58) 
2008/07/15-
2010/06/22 
5 
(5) 
3 
(-3) 
25 
(-25) 
2010/06/23-
2013/07/22 
9 
(3&-6) 
2 
(-2) 
46 
(-46) 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses refer to the oral interventions for appreciation (with a 
negative sign -) and depreciation (with a positive sign +). 
 
7.4 The Event Study Methodology 
 
7.4.1 History of Event Study Methodology 
 
Fama et al. (1969) were among the first to use the event study approach to finance 
research. Subsequently, Brow and Warner (1980 and 1985) elaborated the basics of 
the methodology (Binder, 1998).  The approach starts with the identification of the 
event. Then, pre-event and post-event periods can be defined (Gnabo and Teiletche, 
2009). Based on Fatum and Hutchinson (2006) and Morel and Teiletche (2008), the 
approach deployed in the foreign exchange field uses Equation (7.3) below to test 
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two null hypotheses regarding changes in the exchange rate returns in the pre- and 
post-event periods: 
 
S"$: U ∆WXYZ[. = 0  S"+: U ∆WXYZ[. − ∆WXY\] = 0                                                                             (7.3) 
	
These two hypotheses were tested by Fatum and Hutchinson (2006) for exchange 
rate returns. ∆WXYZ[. and ∆WXY\] are changes in the exchange rate movement of the 
pre- and post-event periods, respectively. The first null hypothesis (S"$) is used to 
test whether intervention events cause significant changes in exchange rate 
movements in the post-event period, and this corresponds to the direction test. The 
second null hypothesis (S"+) is used to determine whether pre-event changes in the 
exchange rate are significantly different from post-event changes, and it corresponds 
to the reversal test and smoothing test. 
 
  Event Studies in Advanced Countries 
 
An event study framework is better suited to the study of sporadic and intense 
periods of official intervention than are standard time-series studies (Fatum and 
Hutchison, 2003). Fatum and Hutchison (2003) use the daily Bundesbank 
intervention and Fed intervention variables during the period from 1 September, 
1985 to 31 December, 1995. Following Frankel (1994) and Humpage (1999), Fatum 
and Hutchison (2003) take the direction and smoothing criteria as the measure of 
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success, and introduce a new criterion, ‘reversal’. Using the nonparametric sign test 
and matched-sample test, they find strong evidence that sterilized intervention 
systemically affects the exchange rate in the short run. This means sterilized 
intervention may play a role in moving the exchange rate. The result is robust to 
changes in event window definitions over the short run and to controlling for central 
bank interest rate changes during the event. However, because of the absence of 
more fundamental policy actions, their results should not be interpreted as a rationale 
for the longer-term management of exchange rates. 
 
Payne and Vitale (2003) study the effects of Swiss National Bank (SNB) 
intervention operations using tick-by-tick transaction data between 1986 and 1995. 
The main contribution of their study is to extend the preliminary analysis of Fischer 
and Zurlinden (1999) by matching these data with indicative intra-day exchange rate 
quotes and newswire reports of central bank activity. Using an event study approach, 
Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) exactly quantified the effects of single intervention 
operations on the USD/CHF rate at a 15-minute sampling frequency. Their study 
focuses on the signalling hypothesis, which suggests that intervention operations are 
used by monetary authorities to convey information to FX markets and hence alter 
market expectations and exchange rates. Therefore, if central bank operations are 
informative, signed intervention should have a significant and permanent effect on 
the value of currencies. Fischer and Zurlinden’s (1999) analysis yields four 
important findings. First, SNB intervention operations have strong and persistent 
short-run effects on the USD/CHF. Second, SNB interventions are more effective in 
conditioning exchange rates when they are coordinated with other central banks. 
Third, interventions that are with-the-trend have stronger exchange rate impacts. 
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Finally, the exchange rate can move in the direction of the intervention in the 
minutes before the actual intervention takes place. 
 
Pierdzioch and Stadtmann (2003) use the event study methodology to analyse the 
effects of interventions conducted by the Swiss National Bank (SNB) during the 
period from 1986 through 1995. Like Fatum and Hutchison (2003), Pierdzioch and 
Stadtmann (2003) define the direction, smoothing and reversal criteria, and apply 
the nonparametric sign test and matched-sample test. They find some evidence that 
interventions by the SNB had an impact on exchange rate dynamics. However, the 
significance of this effect depends on the direction of intervention. In general, their 
evidence suggests that the SNB interventions to strengthen the Swiss franc were 
more effective than its interventions to weaken the Swiss franc. In addition, the 
results of the tests for the effects of the SNB interventions depend upon the length 
of the pre- and post-event windows analysed. 
 
Using published official daily data on the Bank of Japan’s intervention during the 
period from 1 April, 1991 to 31 December, 2000, Fatum and Hutchison (2006) apply 
an event study methodology to investigate the effects of that intervention. They use 
the direction, smoothing and reversal criteria to examine the effects of the 
intervention episode, and employ two statistical tests:  nonparametric sign test and 
matched-sample test. The nonparametric sign test verifies whether there is a change 
in direction or reversal of the exchange rate following an intervention event. The 
matched-sample test, which is identified with the smoothing criterion, verifies 
whether there is a significant shift in the exchange rate change between the pre- and 
post-event periods. Pre- and post-event window lengths of 2, 5, 10 and 15 days are 
217	
	
applied. From the results of the nonparametric sign test and matched-sample test, 
Fatum and Hutchison (2006) find strong evidence that sterilized intervention 
systemically affects the exchange rate in the short run (less than one month). This 
result holds even when intervention is associated with (simultaneous) interest rate 
changes, whether or not intervention is ‘secret’, and against other robustness checks, 
such as controlling for endogeneity (when the central bank intervenes for multiple 
days during a single event). 
 
Using an event study approach to test high-frequency (5-minute) euro-dollar 
exchange rates from 4 January 1999 to 17 May 2002, Jansen and Haan (2007) 
examine the effects of oral intervention. Focusing on direction, smoothing and 
volatility, they find that the effects of oral interventions are small and short-lived. 
Whether or not the verbal intervention is captured in the news report headline is the 
most important determinant of the effects. Oral interventions which coincide with 
the release of macroeconomic data are less effective in changing the direction of the 
exchange rate, but do lead to lower exchange rate volatility. There is no difference 
between the effects of comments by European Central Bank Executive Board 
members and those of presidents of national central banks. 
 
Fatum (2008) uses an event study methodology to analyse the effects of official, 
daily Bank of Canada intervention in the CAD/USD exchange rate over the 1995-
1998 period. Like Fatum and Hutchison (2006), Fatum (2008) applies the 
nonparametric sign test and matched sample test to study the main dimensions of 
the effects, namely direction, smoothing, and volatility. He finds some evidence that 
during the period examined intervention was systematically associated with both a 
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change in the direction and a smoothing of the exchange rate. This means that daily 
Bank of Canada intervention was effective for both the direction and smoothing 
criteria. However, the analysis does not find any significant effects of intervention 
in terms of reducing volatility of the CAD/USD exchange rate.  
 
Fatum (2008) also takes into account the issue of currency co-movements. 
According to Eun and Lai (2004), the observed exchange rate movements might be 
driven by major currency factors. Therefore, Fatum (2008) uses the ‘filtered’ 
exchange rate to check for currency co-movements. The filtered exchange rate is 
calculated as the difference between the % change in the ‘raw’ CAD/USD rate and 
an equally weighted average of the % change in the GBP/USD, DEM/USD and 
JPY/USD exchange rates. Fatum (2008) shows that the effects of intervention are 
weakened when the model is adjusted to capture the general currency co-movements 
against the USD. 
 
Using Japanese data over the period from 1992 to 2004 and an event study approach, 
Gnabo and Teiletche (2009) estimate the effect of different strategies on the 
USD/JPY exchange-rate risk-neutral density. Like Fratzscher (2004, 2006 and 2008), 
they find that communication policy can play a significant role in the exchange rate 
policy. More generally, a policy of transparency (actual and oral interventions) has 
greater effect than does a policy of secrecy. The results indicate that the effects are 
achieved mainly through the coordination channel and the signalling channel. 
Moreover, the effect is greater when policies involve a financial cost (risk), 
suggesting that simple announcements can be considered as only an imperfect 
substitute for actual interventions. 
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  Event Studies in Emerging Markets 
 
Leon and Williams (2012) contribute to the literature on the effects of intervention 
by analysing a unique daily dataset for the Dominican Republic, covering the period 
from 1997 to 2005, thereby providing a case study for small developing and 
emerging markets. A matched-sample test shows that sterilized intervention by the 
central bank can produce short-term effects with regard to the direction and reversal 
of exchange rate movements. The authors also use alternative event window 
definitions and alternative criteria to check the robustness of their results for the 
intervention effects. Their paper finds that during the sample period the Dominican 
Republic authorities were following a policy of leaning against the wind, aimed at 
either smoothing the exchange rate or reversing the trend direction, and that they 
were successful in keeping the exchange rate within a ‘target’ corridor. Furthermore, 
the results reveal two objectives of intervention in the Dominican foreign exchange 
market, namely ensuring and maintaining export competitiveness. The findings 
suggest that the authorities intervened in part due to the ‘fear of floating’, in 
particular fear of strong appreciation that could conflict with their objective of 
ensuring competitiveness. In addition, the results imply that interventions can be 
used effectively in emerging market economies and developing countries to 
contribute towards maintaining export competitiveness, while containing imported 
inflation. These findings constitute an interesting case study, suggesting that 
intervention can be an appropriate policy tool in some small open and emerging 
market economies. 
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There is great controversy as to which exchange rate model should be used or which 
channel should be considered when measuring the effects of exchange rate policy. 
Since most of the literature relies on structural models to address the identification 
problem, the validity of the results largely depends on how accurate the assumptions 
are in describing the full extent of the economy. Using an event study approach, 
Echavarria et al. (2013) compare the effects of different types of central bank 
intervention for the Colombian case during the period 2000-2012, without imposing 
restrictive parametric assumptions and without the need to adopt a structural model. 
Following Fatum and Hutchison (2003), they define four criteria to evaluate the 
effects of intervention: direction, reversal, smoothing, and matching. Echavarria et 
al. (2013) find that all types of intervention (international reserve accumulation 
options, volatility options and discretionary) were successful according to the 
smoothing criterion, with volatility options having the strongest effect. Results are 
robust when using different window sizes and counterfactuals. Two counterfactual 
exercises are conducted. First, they consider the evolution of the Brazilian exchange 
rate in periods corresponding to pre- and post-Colombian volatility interventions. 
Second, they consider periods in which volatility options should have been 
conducted if the intervention rule was in place, but were not, because the board of 
the central bank decided to suspend interventions in that period. 
 
7.4.2 An Event Study Methodology for this Research 
 
In this section, we begin by defining the length of the intervention event, or the 
‘event window’. This comprises the pre-event days (also known as the estimation 
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window), the event day or days, and the post-event days (MacKinlay, 1997).  
Thereafter, some measure of a successful event is established. 
 
The reason for choosing the event study approach to analyse intervention is that 
communication tends to happen in clusters. In certain periods several interventions 
may occur within a few days, while on other days there are no interventions 
(MacKinlay, 1997). The most likely explanation for this lies in the fact that monetary 
authorities often continue to use sequent interventions until they achieve a certain 
objective or else realize the efforts are in vain. 
 
In finance, many events, such as earnings announcements or issuance of new debt, 
may take place on a single day. However, it is problematic to define each single day 
on which exchange rate communication occurs as a separate event. The pre- and 
post-event windows allow us to compare exchange rate movements around the 
defined event. Since the central bank often intervenes on consecutive days, a one-
day event definition would lead to other one-day events happening within the pre- 
and post-event windows around one-day events. Therefore, exchange rate 
movements around one-day events might be caused by other one-day events 
occurring during the pre- and post-event windows. This would make the event study 
useless. For example, in the period 18-24 May 2007, exchange rate communications 
between the PBOC governor and the US Treasury Secretary occurred on six 
consecutive days, all around the theme of appreciation of the Chinese yuan. These 
six days should naturally be viewed as a single event. 
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Another important issue is the length of the event window. On the one hand, the 
longer the event window is, the more interventions will be clustered. If the event 
period is set too long, then it may put together interventions that should belong to 
different intervention episodes. On the other hand, if the event period is set too short, 
then it may separate into different events interventions that should belong to one 
intervention episode. Furthermore, too-short event periods may lead to a number of 
overlapping event windows.  When selecting the appropriate length of event window, 
we also need to decide how many consecutive days of no intervention should be 
included. Finally, we define an event as a period of days with exchange rate 
communication tending in one direction, pushing for either appreciation or 
depreciation, and perhaps including a number of days without intervention.  
 
Following Hutchison (2002), Fatum and Hutchison (2003), and Fratzscher (2012), 
we set the lengths of the pre- and post-event windows to be two, five, ten and fifteen 
days. This variety of event window length also means that the results can be 
employed in the robustness checks for different model specifications. 
 
Following Fatum and Hutchison (2006), Fratzscher (2008), and Echavarria et al. 
(2013), we look at the dimensions of the effects of an intervention. Specifically, 
these dimensions involve intervention outcomes in relation to exchange rate changes (∆6) before (‘pre’), after (‘post’) and during the event (‘eve’); the average exchange 
rate change (∆6); and the event type or objective of the intervention event (,). We 
standardize exchange rate return by an estimated standard deviation for RMB 
exchange rate, as one solution to the heteroscedasticity is to standardize return 
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(Ederington et al., 2015). Based on Jaffe (1974), Mandelker (1974) and Patell (1976), 
we calculate standardized returns as follows: 
 ∆sa = era σa                                                                                                        (7.4) 
 
where era  is RMB exchange rate return ( logRMBa − logRMBak$ ), and σa  is an 
estimate of the standard deviation of the era. 
 
To capture different directions of exchange rate movements, we set  ,<0 to indicate 
an attempt to strengthen the domestic currency and ,>0 an attempt to weaken it. The 
‘event’ type is used when investigating whether the direction of change to the RMB 
exchange rate is related to the interventions during the event; that is, whether or not 
an oral intervention leads to strengthening of the Chinese yuan: 
 ∆6]l] > 0, , > 0 	>8	(∆6]l] < 0, , < 0)                                                          (7.5) 
 
Frankel (1994) argues that a suitable criterion to determine whether exchange rate 
movement is in the direction desired by the central bank is simply whether the 
direction of the movement is the same as the direction entailed in the central bank’s 
intervention operation. For example, intervention carried out by selling the foreign 
currency should lead to a drop in its price. If the actual price of the foreign currency 
on the foreign exchange market declines, then one can say that the exchange rate 
movement is in the direction desired by the central bank. Therefore, in this research, 
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the ‘direction’ dimension is defined as positive if the exchange rate movement over 
the post-event window is in the desired direction, and negative otherwise: 
 ∆6YZ[. > 0, , > 0 	>8	(∆6YZ[. < 0, , < 0)                                                       (7.6) 
 
The next dimension of the intervention effects, ‘reversal’, refers to whether the 
intervention succeeds in appreciating (depreciating) the currency after the event if 
the exchange rate had been depreciating (appreciating) before the event: 
 ∆6YZ[. > 0, , > 0		34	∆6Y\] < 0 	>8	(∆6YZ[. < 0, , < 0			34	∆6Y\] > 0)        (7.7) 
 
Although the fourth dimension, ‘smoothing’, also considers the pre-event period, it 
is less demanding. This concept investigates whether intervention has reduced or 
smoothed the strength of the pre-event exchange rate movements: 
 ∆6YZ[. > ∆6Y\], , > 0		34	∆6Y\] < 0   
	>8	(∆6YZ[. < ∆6Y\], , < 0			34	∆6Y\] > 0)                                                        (7.8) 
 
Overall, testing of the reversal dimension is the most demanding of the four tests. 
This is because the direction test does not consider the pre-event period, and the 
smoothing test does not require the exchange rate to appreciate after intervention by 
the central bank. 
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It is natural to begin by considering the application of parametric tests to check the 
effect of oral intervention. However, parametric tests are valid only if the variable’s 
distribution is normal. It is known that distribution of the daily changes of the 
exchange rate departs from the normal distribution. Results of formal statistical 
analysis of the intervention variable are presented in Table 7.4. From the table, we 
can see that the exchange rate change variable fails to pass the JB normality test. In 
addition, the skewness is smaller than 0 and the kurtosis is far away from 3. This 
evidence all points to the eventuality that the distribution of daily changes of 
exchange rate is not normal. In this case, parametric tests are not appropriate. 
However, we still use parametric tests, together with nonparametric tests. We can 
then compare the results of the two types of test. 
 
 
 
Table 7.4 Descriptive Statistics for Exchange Rate Changes 
 Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Oral 
intervention 
2087 -0.001 0.007 -0.131 7.813 2020.421 
[0.000]* 
Notes: * means significance is at the 99% level. 
 
We then choose the nonparametric test for our model, which does not require the 
distribution to be normal. Table 7.5 gives the details of parametric and 
nonparametric tests. We use two statistical tests, the sign test and the rank test, in 
our nonparametric estimation. The reason for using the sign test is that, unlike the 
Wilcoxon test, it does not assume a symmetric distribution. In addition, Mood’s 
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Median test focuses on testing whether the medians of two or more groups differ, 
while the Mann-Whitney test and Friedman test need two samples. The 
nonparametric sign test is used to test whether or not two groups are equally sized. 
Also called the binominal test, the sign test is based on the plus and minus sign of 
the observation. The null hypothesis is that two populations are equal or are equal 
in their central tendency. In our model, we employ the nonparametric sign test to 
investigate whether there is any difference between the exchange rate movements 
before and following the intervention events in terms of	 the event and direction. 
Following the generalized sign test (Brown and Warner, 1980, 1985), our null 
hypothesis is that the number of positive values (‘success’) (:p) is the same as the 
number of negative values (‘non-success’) (:k ). If the hypothesis is correct, the 
probability of successful events is the same as that of non-successful events. A sign 
test based on a binomial distribution checks whether the probability of a ‘successful 
event’ (K ) is greater than 0.5 (:p~C3:>A3?@(:, K = 0.5) ), where  : is the total 
number of events. 
 
Table 7.5 Description of Nonparametric and Parametric Tests 
Nonparametric tests Alternative parametric tests 
Sign test 1-sample Z-test, 1-sample t-test 
Wilcoxon test 1-sample Z-test, 1-sample t-test 
Mann-Whitney test 2-sample t-test 
Rank test One-way ANOVA 
Mood’s Median test One-way ANOVA 
Friedman test Two-way ANOVA 
Notes: ANOVA, which can compare means of different groups, is analysis of variance. 
 
The sign test is a relatively weak test, since it tests the pair value below or above the 
median only, but does not measure the pair difference. There is another 
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nonparametric test, known as the rank test. Based on the Wilcoxon rank test and 
developed by Corrado (1989) and Corrado and Zivney (1992), the rank text, like the 
sign test, does not require distribution symmetry (Dutta, 2014).The null hypothesis 
of this test is that the rank of exchange rate changes is equal to the mean of total 
observations (‘success’). Under the null hypothesis, the rank of exchange rate 
changes is uniform distribution (Corrado, 1989). We use the rank test to check the 
effect of intervention in terms of exchange rate reversal and smoothing. The rank 
test statistic is given by: 
 
r = stksu(s)                                                                                                               (7.9) 
 
where vX is the rank of exchange rate changes; v is the average rank (v = wp$+ , x is 
the number of observations); J(v) is the standard deviation, and is calculated as: 
 
J v = $w v. − v +w.y$                                                                                (7.10) 
 
This statistic is distributed asymptotically as unit normal. 
 
7.5 Results of the Event Study 
 
7.5.1 Results from Parametric Tests 
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In this section, we evaluate whether China’s interventions are successful based on 
the criteria given above. Table 7.6 displays the numbers of China’s exchange rate 
communication events. Table 7.7 reports the results for the success of exchange rate 
communication in the whole sample period. In each table the columns from left to 
right show the different event window lengths: 2, 5, 10 and 15 days. The rows 
display the total number of communications, the number of successful 
communications (as a percentage), and the probability value for the four criteria. To 
study the first two criteria, event and direction, we use sign test based on a binomial 
distribution; the hypothesis is that the number of successful events is the same as the 
number of non-successful events. The remaining criteria are tested by the rank test; 
here, the hypothesis is that the rank of exchange rate changes is equal to the mean 
of total observations. 
 
 
 
Table 7.6 Number of Exchange Rate Communication Events 
  2z  5{  10|  15}  
Total Comm. 
Num. 
 270 187 120 85 ,-. = 1  100 76 57 44 ,-. = −1  170 111 63 41 
Notes:  a. pre- and post-event window length is 2 days; 
              b. pre- and post-event window length is 5 days; 
              c. pre- and post-event window length is 10 days; 
            d. pre- and post-event window length is 15 days. 
 
As can be seen from Table 7.6, for the 2-day pre- and post-event windows the 
number of appreciating communications ( ,-. = −1 ) is larger than that of 
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depreciating communications (,-. = 1), accounting for 63% of the total. However, 
the difference between the numbers of appreciating and depreciating 
communications decreases from the 2-day event window to the 15-day event 
window, where the numbers of the two types become almost equal. In order to avoid 
overlapping communication days, the longer the event window length is, the more 
communication days are included. For example, in the 15-day event window, we put 
12 communication days into one event, which runs from 12/04/2007 to 21/06/2007. 
According to the trend of difference between the numbers of appreciating and 
depreciating events, we find that appreciating communication is more compact. In 
other words, the authorities, especially the US President and Treasury Secretary, try 
to appreciate the RMB exchange rate with greater pressure. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.7 Results of One-Sample T Tests for Event and Direction and ANOVA 
Tests for Reversal and Smoothing 
Event Window Length 2 5 10 15 
Total 
Num. 
,-. = 1  100 76 57 44 
 ,-. = −1  170 111 63 41 
Event ,-. = 1 Success %(Num.) 46%(46) 50%(38) 81%(26) 34%(15) 
  P-Value 0.387 0.117 0.389 0.326 
 ,-. = −1 Success %(Num.) 52%(88) 52%(58) 60%(38) 71%(29) 
  P-Value 0.234 0.318 0.320 0.147 
Direction ,-. = 1 Success %(Num.) 45%(45) 37%(28) 28%(16) 34%(15) 
  P-Value 0.833 0.423 0.000* 0.006* 
 ,-. = −1 Success %(Num.) 49%(83) 55%(61) 75%(47) 78%(32) 
  P-Value 0.323 0.001* 0.000* 0.000* 
Reversal ,-. = 1 Success %(Num.) 29%(29) 37%(16) 25%(14) 20%(9) 
  P-Value 0.988 0.249 0.000* 0.436 
 ,-. = −1 Success %(Num.) 19%(32) 16%(18) 16%(10) 15%(6) 
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  P-Value 0.902 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
Smoothing ,-. = 1 Success %(Num.) 45%(45) 45%(34) 56%(32) 43%(19) 
  P-Value 0.987 0.009* 0.000* 0.006* 
 ,-. = −1 Success %(Num.) 30%(51) 27%(30) 17%(11) 20%(8) 
  P-Value 0.323 0.001* 0.000* 0.000* 
Notes: * means that p-value is significant at the 95% level. 
 
Based on Table 7.7, we find that interventions have no effects according to the event 
criterion, because there are no significant p-values for this criterion. Another finding 
is that the intervention is more effective in the long term than in the short term. The 
significances in 10-day and 15-day event window lengths are larger than in 2- and 
5-day event window lengths. We also use nonparametric tests to prove our finding. 
 
7.5.2 Results from Nonparametric Tests 
 
 
Table 7.8 Results of Sign Tests for Event and Direction and Rank Tests for 
Reversal and Smoothing 
Event Window Length 2 5 10 15 
Total 
Num. 
,-. = 1  100 76 57 44 
 ,-. = −1  170 111 63 41 
Event ,-. = 1 Success %(Num.) 46%(46) 50%(38) 81%(26) 34%(15) 
  P-Value 0.484 0.088 0.596 0.050* 
 ,-. = −1 Success %(Num.) 52%(88) 52%(58) 60%(38) 71%(29) 
  P-Value 0.701 0.704 0.131 0.012* 
Direction ,-. = 1 Success %(Num.) 45%(45) 37%(28) 28%(16) 34%(15) 
  P-Value 0.368 0.029* 0.001* 0.050* 
 ,-. = −1 Success %(Num.) 49%(83) 55%(61) 75%(47) 78%(32) 
  P-Value 0.818 0.343 0.000* 0.001* 
Reversal ,-. = 1 Success %(Num.) 29%(29) 37%(16) 25%(14) 20%(9) 
  P-Value 0.001* 0.001* 0.000* 0.002* 
 ,-. = −1 Success %(Num.) 19%(32) 16%(18) 16%(10) 15%(6) 
  P-Value 0.007* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
Smoothing ,-. = 1 Success %(Num.) 45%(45) 45%(34) 56%(32) 43%(19) 
  P-Value 0.160 0.005* 0.001* 0.012* 
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 ,-. = −1 Success %(Num.) 30%(51) 27%(30) 17%(11) 20%(8) 
  P-Value 0.424 0.211 0.000* 0.000* 
Notes: * means that p-value is significant at the 95% level. 
 
Table 7.8 shows the results from the sign tests based on the event and direction of 
exchange rate movements, and results from the rank test based on the reversal and 
smoothing criteria for successfulness of an event. From these results, we can find 
that: 1) the exchange rate communication events have no effect according to the 
event criterion; 2) all event window lengths are significant in terms of the reversal 
effect; 3) the longer the event window length is, the more significant the oral 
intervention effects are. Compared with the results from parametric tests, we find 
that nonparametric tests have more significant p-values. 
 
For the event dimension, both appreciating and depreciating communications have 
no effects. The only significant communication effects are at the 15-day event 
window length. This means that China’s exchange rate communication cannot 
impact the exchange rate movement during the event. This finding is the same as 
that from the parametric tests. Another notable phenomenon is that, in terms of the 
direction and smoothing dimensions, oral intervention events are only significant at 
the 95% level at the 10- and 15-day event window lengths. This means that the 
communication intervention has a property of leaning against the wind, and the 
strength of pre-event exchange rate movements tends to diminish two weeks after 
the oral intervention. Reversal is the only dimension for which the communication 
events are significant at all event window lengths. In other words, if the exchange 
rate was depreciating before the event, oral intervention can be effective in 
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appreciating the RMB after the event; alternatively, if the currency was appreciating 
before the event, the intervention can be effective in depreciating the RMB. 
 
Based on the difference between the results at different event window lengths, we 
can see that the effects of oral intervention via exchange rate communication are 
more obvious in the longer term than in the short term. Communications have more 
significance in the 10- and 15-day event window lengths, and especially in the latter. 
This suggests that, in the Chinese context, oral intervention via exchange rate 
communication would have more effect on the RMB exchange rate after two weeks. 
This finding further confirms the robustness of the parametric test results. 
 
7.5.3 Specific Results for Domestic and External Communications 
 
Oral intervention in the RMB exchange rate has two sources: domestic and external. 
The US authorities have for a long time tried to pressurize China to appreciate the 
RMB exchange rate. Here, we examine to what extent exchange rate 
communications initiated by the US may influence the RMB exchange rate. In 
particular, the US Treasury is required by Congress to submit a half-yearly 
examination report on China’s currency issues. If China were found to be 
manipulating the RMB exchange rate, US law requires that the US government must 
impose punitive tariffs on imports from China. In order to avoid this punitive action, 
the Chinese government seems responsive to the oral intervention via such reports 
and would, in most cases, appreciate the exchange rate secretly.  
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Table 7.9 Parametric and Nonparametric Tests for Domestic and External Communications 
Type Domestic External  
Event Window Length 2 15 2 15 
Total Num. !"# = 1  100 44 0 0 
 !"# = −1  78 48 119 41 
Event !"# = 1 Success %(Num.) 46%(46) 34%(15)   
  Parametric test 0.706 0.868   
  Nonparametric test 0.484 0.050*   
 !"# = −1 Success %(Num.) 46%(36) 56%(27) 55%(65) 71%(29) 
  Parametric test 0.669 0.914 0.012* 0.010* 
  Nonparametric test 0.571 0.470 0.359 0.012* 
Direction !"# = 1 Success %(Num.) 45%(45) 34%(15)   
  Parametric test 0.031* 0.013*   
  Nonparametric test 0.368 0.050*   
 !"# = −1 Success %(Num.) 51%(40) 77%(37) 47%(56) 73%(30) 
  Parametric test 0.091 0.000* 0.160 0.001* 
  Nonparametric test 0.910 0.000* 0.582 0.005* 
Reversal !"# = 1 Success %(Num.) 29%(29) 20%(9)   
  Parametric test 0.000* 0.000*   
  Nonparametric test 0.005* 0.001*   
 !"# = −1 Success %(Num.) 21%(16) 15%(7) 18%(21) 10%(4) 
  Parametric test 0.004* 0.000* 0.005* 0.000* 
  Nonparametric test 0.017* 0.000* 0.017* 0.000* 
Smoothing !"# = 1 Success %(Num.) 45%(45) 43%(19)   
  Parametric test 0.031* 0.013*   
  Nonparametric test 0.317 0.035*   
 !"# = −1 Success %(Num.) 33%(26) 15%(7) 29%(34) 15%(6) 
  Parametric test 0.091 0.000* 0.160 0.001* 
  Nonparametric test 0.821 0.000* 0.774 0.003* 
Notes:* means that p-value is significant at the 95% level.
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Table 7.9 displays the results of parametric and nonparametric tests for domestic and 
external communications. For both tests, there are more significant results for all 
dimensions of intervention effects in the 15-day event window length.  This proves 
the robustness of the finding that exchange rate communication has more effect on 
exchange rate movements after two weeks. Reversal is the only dimension of the 
intervention effects for which the communication events are significant at all event 
window lengths. Based on the results in Table 7.9, the appreciation exchange rate 
communication from the US can influence the RMB exchange rate movements, as 
the table shows that communication events are significant. The Chinese government 
is responsive to oral pressure from the US, and would initiate the RMB appreciation 
after some delay, perhaps about two weeks. 
 
7.5.4 Volatility Analysis 
 
Government intervention usually has two main objectives: to change the level of the 
exchange rate in a certain direction and to calm excessive volatility (Sarno and 
Taylor, 2001; Utsunomiya, 2013). Previous sections in this chapter are mainly 
concerned with the first objective, i.e. changing the level of the exchange rate. Next, 
we examine the effects of oral intervention on the volatility of China’s currency. For 
this purpose, it is pertinent to use open, closed, high and low daily exchange rates 
from 2005 to 2013. The data are obtained from Bloomberg and the event window 
lengths are set to be 2 days and 15 days. We investigate the volatility in 207 pre-
event and post-event periods for the 2-day event window length, and in 28 periods 
for the 15-day event window length. More specifically, we calculate the range-based 
variance of the USD/CNY exchange rate during the 48 hours (2-day windows) or 
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360 hours (15-day windows) before and after each event, respectively. The formula 
(Garman and Klass, 1980) to calculate the range-based variance of the USD/CNY 
exchange rate is shown below: 
 
!"#$ = 0.5[ln	(./0/)]$ − [2 ln 2 − 1][ln	(6/7/)]$.                                                  (7.11) 
 
where !"#$  is the range-based variance of the exchange rate; 89 is the highest price 
of the :9; trading day; <9 is the lowest price of the :9; trading day; =9 is the closing 
price of the :9; trading day; >9 is the opening price of the :9; trading day. 
 
For the event window length at 15 days, 14 events have lower post-event volatility, 
while for the 2-day event window length, 121 events have lower post-event volatility. 
We use the Kruskal-Wallis test to study whether the oral intervention can reduce 
volatility. The null hypothesis of the Kruskal-Wallis test is that the mean ranks of 
the two groups are the same. In our study, the null hypothesis is that pre-event 
volatility is the same as post-event volatility. The ranks are always whole numbers 
from 1 to N. We check the variation ranks among the groups: 
 ??@ = ??A	BCD	:ℎF	DGHIJ                                                                               (7.12) 
 
where ??@ is the total variation and ??A is the variation among the groups. The test 
statistic is given by: 
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8 = K$L(LMK) NOPQR − 3(T + 1),                                                                          (7.13) 
 
where T is the total number of observations, HV is the number of observations in 
group W, and XY is the rank of observation. Table 7.10 shows the results of difference 
of volatilities between the pre- and post-event periods at 2- and 15-day event 
window lengths. Based on the results in Table 7.10, we do not find evidence of a 
link between oral intervention and volatility reduction, as no variables are significant 
in the test outcome. 
 
Table 7.10 USD/CNY Exchange Rate Volatility during Pre- and Post-Event 
Windows 
Event Window Length 2 15 
Total Num.  207 28 
Event Success %(Num.) 58%(121) 50%(14) 
 P-Value 0.978 0.935 
 
While we find no link between oral intervention events and exchange rate volatility, 
it should be noted that this result might be influenced by certain factors. The 
exchange rate communication data used in this chapter are available only at daily 
frequency: we cannot know the exact time within the day when the communication 
happened, nor the length of communication time. In other words, the pre-event 
volatility window may end before the first day of the communication event; the 
communication event may take place over successive days; or, the post-event 
volatility window may start after the event has ended. 
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Then, we test whether successive oral interventions can reduce volatility. Table 7.11 
shows the result regarding reduction of volatility when two or more successive oral 
interventions happen. Based on Table 7.11, we find evidence that successive oral 
interventions can reduce volatility. Therefore, the central bank tries to calm 
excessive volatility by successive oral interventions. 
 
Table 7.11 Effects of Successive Interventions on Volatility 
 Two or more successive oral 
interventions 
Total Num. 48 
Success %(Num.) 58%(28) 
P-Value 0.020* 
Notes: * means that p-value is significant at the 95% level. 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter evaluates China’s exchange rate communication and its efficacy on the 
level and volatility of the RMB exchange rate. Daily data are employed to 
investigate the oral intervention effects during the sample period from 22 July, 2005, 
when the most recent reform was launched to sever the rigid link between the RMB 
and the USD and allow the RMB to move within a certain band, to 22 July, 2013, 
when the most recent data are available to this research. The chapter employs an 
event study approach. In the empirical examination, we postulate that the effects of 
an intervention event can have four dimensions, namely event, direction, reversal, 
and smoothing. 
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Given the property of the distribution of our datasets, this research uses parametric 
and nonparametric tests for the four dimensions of the oral intervention effects. The 
two samples for tests are constructed at the pre- and post-event window lengths of 
two, five, ten and fifteen days. In general, the results show that oral intervention can 
have effects on the level of the Chinese exchange rate. While the outcome shows no 
significant effects in the event dimension, all event window lengths are significant 
in terms of the reversal effect. Finally, the effect may vary with the event window 
length. Compared with the 2- and 5-day event window lengths, communications 
have more significant effects at the 10-day, and particularly the 15-day event 
window lengths, suggesting that in the Chinese context the most significant 
intervention effects would occur about two weeks after the exchange rate 
communication. We also find that nonparametric tests have more significant effects 
than parametric tests. 
 
Findings with regard to the international aspects of the exchange rate 
communication provide further insights on China’s exchange rate intervention. 
Evidence of China’s response to calls from the US authorities for changes in 
exchange rate policy, especially for exchange rate appreciation, confirms that the 
Chinese government is generally responsive to US pressure for RMB appreciation. 
However, the response is moderately reluctant, as the authority would quietly 
appreciate the exchange rate after a delay of around two weeks.  
 
This chapter also sheds light on another objective of China’s intervention, namely 
calming excess volatility. We use a range-based variance model to calculate the 
variance and employ the Kruskal-Wallis test to study whether or not exchange rate 
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communication can reduce volatility. We find that, regardless of the event window 
length, there is no evidence of a link between isolated oral intervention and volatility 
reduction. However, the results show that successive oral intervention can reduce 
volatility.   
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusions 
 
8.1 Main Findings 
 
The aim of this thesis is to improve the understanding of China’s exchange rate 
policy by offering a comprehensive investigation of official foreign exchange 
intervention as a key plank of China’s exchange rate regime. China’s foreign 
exchange interventions are classified into three main categories, namely CB 
intervention, CPR intervention and oral intervention. With this classification, this 
dissertation researches the behaviour, strategy and efficacy of China’s foreign 
exchange intervention operations. 
 
Study of foreign exchange intervention has always been a challenging task and this 
is especially so for the Chinese case because of the data availability issue and the 
complexity of the intervention regime. This thesis employs two methods to collate 
the intervention data. First, the CB intervention and oral intervention are identified 
through searching an extensive range of news media reports from the Factiva and 
Reuters China databases. Second, we construct a CPR intervention index. These data 
enable us to establish the intervention days and to test for the determinants and 
effects of interventions. 
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Following the introduction of the developments of China’s exchange rate regime in 
recent decades, Chapter 4 begins by testing the determinants of China’s CB 
intervention during the whole sample period. We divide these determinants into 
three sets: basic determinants, domestic market determinants and foreign exchange 
market determinants. The empirical model for testing the significance of the 
determinants is the bivariate probit model.  
 
CB intervention happens when the central bank issues buying or selling instructions 
or guidance via the state-owned banks, or engages directly in purchase or sale of 
foreign currencies. The findings show that the PBOC has a strategy that conducts 
intervention in a leaning-against-the-wind fashion in the medium term, while 
leaning-with-the-wind intervention is used in the short term.  
 
Analysing the dummy variables for volatility on the days with above average level 
of volatility and the days when the Chinese RMB is in appreciation or depreciation, 
we find evidence that China’s CB intervene is deployed to constrain volatility of the 
RMB exchange rate movement, indicating that one of the PBOC’s policy objectives 
is to ensure there are no big swings in the RMB exchange rate.  
 
A related interesting finding is that deviations of the current exchange rate from the 
central parity would powerfully prompt the PBOC to intervene, highlighting the 
central role of the parity in China’s management of the exchange rate. In addition, 
the empirical evidence suggests that large deviations from the central parity could 
trigger purchase intervention, and that the sale intervention is addressed at small 
deviations from the central parity.  
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Study of the CB intervention also sheds light on the behaviour of China’s 
intervention in different sub-sample periods spanning the global financial crisis. 
Evidence shows that the main objective of the PBOC during the crisis was to steady 
the Chinese foreign exchange market. 
 
In Chapter 5, we examine what factors would trigger China’s CPR intervention. To 
construct the CPR intervention index, the indirect fair value approach is employed 
to estimate the equilibrium RMB exchange rate. Based on China’s practice of setting 
the central parity rate, we test to what extent the USD/CNY exchange rates proposed 
by designated market makers, the broad currency index and the yield curve spread 
could influence the CPR intervention for the whole sample period from 22 July 2005 
to 22 July 2013. Determinants of CPR intervention are tested in a Bayes Tobit model. 
The time-varying drivers behind CPR intervention across different sub-samples, and 
between high and low intervention, are also studied. 
 
CPR intervention is conducted through the setting of the central parity rate. Results 
show that the proposed exchange rates by market makers, the broad currency index 
and the yield curve spread are significant triggers of CPR intervention. The proposed 
exchange rates by market makers reflect the market evaluation of the RMB 
exchange value and hence the mean of these RMB evaluations can be deemed as a 
proxy for the market exchange rate; the broad currency index is a proxy for 
international currency movements and the yield curve spread embodies macro 
conditions of the Chinese economy. We find evidence that, in the context of CPR 
setting, the PBOC follows a leaning-against-the-wind intervention strategy since the 
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sign to the coefficient on the mean of the proposed exchange rates by market makers 
is negative, suggesting that the PBOC employs intervention to dampen or even 
reverse deviations of the mean value of market makers’ proposed exchange rates 
from the fair value of RMB. In addition, both bad (good) conditions of international 
foreign exchange markets and macro conditions of the Chinese economy could 
influence high (low) CPR intervention. In terms of magnitude of the effects on 
PBOC’s CPR intervention decision, the yield curve spread is the least important 
factor, while the broad currency index is the most important factor. 
 
The driving forces behind daily CPR intervention are also found to be time-varying. 
The significances of determinant factors vary in different sub-samples, and also 
between high and low intervention reaction functions in the Tobit regression. The 
evidence across different sub-samples indicates that during high intervention, the 
PCOC’s decision on price intervention takes into consideration of international 
foreign exchange conditions since the broad currency index is significant and 
positive. The yield curve spread variable is insignificant in high intervention 
equation but is significant for low intervention. This suggest domestic economic 
conditions have some effects on PBOC’s price intervention decision, but only in the 
in-frequent intervention period.    
 
In investigating efficacy of China’s interventions in Chapter 6, we use threshold 
GARCH models to conduct the tests. The evaluation here mainly involves CB and 
CPR interventions. First, Hansen’s model-based bootstrap procedure is applied to 
determine the number of regimes in the whole sample and the three sub-samples. 
Then, we use Tsay’s arranged autoregression method to get the order of the lag 
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structure (p) for the AP model and the optimal delay parameter, and apply Chan’s 
test outcome to obtain the threshold value and the RSS from which we can find how 
many regimes existing in the samples. Third, we test whether or not China’s 
intervention and intervention frequency can move the USD/CNY exchange rate in 
the desired direction and reduce exchange rate volatility in the whole sample. Finally, 
this Chapter examines the different effects of interventions across sub-samples. 
 
It is found that the Chinese central bank adopts the strategy of leaning-against-the-
wind interventions to influence exchange rate movements. CPR intervention can 
affect exchange rate levels when the RMB exchange rate is appreciating. However, 
when the RMB depreciates, only CB intervention impacts on the exchange rate level. 
For intervention frequency, results show that low-frequency CPR intervention has 
stronger effects on the exchange rate level than that low-frequency CB intervention 
has in periods when the yuan is appreciating. Furthermore, both CPR and CB 
interventions can increase exchange rate volatility. But, high-frequency intervention 
can reduce the volatility, especially when the yuan appreciates. 
 
In analysing the time variation of China’s intervention effects on exchange rate 
levels and volatility, evidence suggests that before the global financial crisis the 
effects were stronger when the exchange rate was appreciating, while after the crisis 
interventions have large effects when the exchange rate depreciates. During the 
global financial crisis when China temporarily re-pegged the RMB exchange rate, 
only CB intervention has an effect on exchange rate levels. In contrast, CPR 
intervention has no such an effect. For volatility, both CB and CPR interventions 
would increase volatility of the RMB returns.  Regarding intervention frequency, 
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only high-frequency CB intervention could have significant effects, and on both 
exchange rate levels and volatility. 
 
Oral intervention is a special form of China’s intervention, which is studied in 
Chapter 7 in the event study approach. Using newswire reports, we get the data for 
both domestic and external events that have a bearing on the RMB exchange rate. 
In these events, Chinese monetary authorities communication to state banks in forms 
of formal and informal meetings, telephone conversations and policy briefings et al. 
to instruct domestic units to do what the central bank wishes.  Tests for whether 
domestic oral intervention is successful in influencing exchange rate levels are 
conducted against four criteria: event, direction, reversal and smoothing. Sign and 
rank tests are based on 2-, 5-, 10- and 15-day event window lengths. For 
international events that involve the RMB, especially those in the USA, we assume 
that around these events Chinese authorities may give directions in various forms to 
domestic banks on things to note and actions to be taken.   We then examine whether 
the RMB is responsive to such events. Finally, for volatility, the Kruskal-Wallis test 
is employed to investigate whether the oral intervention can calm excessive volatility. 
 
In general, evidence indicates that intervention via communications can influence 
levels of the RMB exchange rate in the desired direction. Of the four criteria, all 
event window lengths are significant in the reversal dimension, while there are no 
significant effects against the event criterion. We also find that oral intervention has 
more significant effects at 10- and 15-day event windows than that at the 2- and 5-
day event window lengths. This means that the effects of oral intervention on 
exchange rate levels would surface about one to two weeks after an exchange rate 
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event. For intervention’s effect on volatility, regardless of the event window length, 
there is no evidence that standalone oral intervention can reduce volatility of the 
RMB exchange rate. However, if the oral intervention is successive, we find that it 
can reduce volatility. 
 
In addition to domestic occasions, we also consider external events where pressures 
are exerted on China’s exchange rate policy, usually calling for appreciation of the 
RMB. Notable examples of such events include speeches by American political 
heavyweights or congressmen, high level Sino-USA meetings, or ministerial reports. 
The results show that while China has publically stood firm to external pressure, its 
exchange rate policy is responsive to international calls for RMB appreciation. 
Typically, the Chinese government would not make an instant policy response to 
external events, but quietly it would allow the exchange rate to adjust (usually 
appreciation) after a delay of around two weeks. 
 
8.2 Findings between Advanced Countries and China’s Market 
 
The main findings of this thesis are consisted of two major parts, the first of which 
concerns with determinants of China’s intervention and the second involves the effects 
of intervention and its efficacy. It would be beneficial to further examine these findings 
in the comparative perspective with findings from previous research on that of other 
countries, especially advanced countries. 
 
The Chinese intervention takes three forms, which are CB, CPR and oral interventions. 
In comparison however, intervention in advanced countries, including the US, EU 
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countries or Japan, normally takes only two forms and intervention through direct 
control over and adjusting the CPR exchange rate is rare. This is largely due to the fact 
that there are limited channels of intervention existing in China and so the PBOC has 
to resort to more forms of intervention to hide its operations from the market traders. 
 
Although China’s intervention increases volatility of the exchange rate movements, 
we find that sequential intervention can reduce the volatility. Especially we show that 
combined with other forms of intervention, oral intervention can be effective in 
reducing the volatility. This finding is a new contribution to the literature. 
 
Another important difference between interventions in China and in other countries is 
about the oral intervention. China’s oral intervention is shown to be responsive to 
outside pressures, especially those from the US government. In other advanced 
countries, this is not always the case since direct international pressures are rare for 
those countries, except for a few countries like Japan and Germany.  
 
Similarities also exist in both China and other advanced economies. For example, in 
both China and its counterparts, official intervention usually follows the leaning-
against-the-wind strategy. Second, they have all experienced varying effects of 
intervention on exchange rate movements due to regime shifts in the exchange rate 
arrangements in the recent decades. It also common to both of them that, low-
frequency intervention can be effective on changing exchange rate levels, while 
high-frequency operation can reduce volatility of exchange rate changes arising 
from official intervention. 
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8.3 Implications of the Research 
 
This research contributes to the debate on China’s exchange rate by offering an 
avenue for a better understanding of official intervention in China, which is a key 
feature of the country’s foreign exchange rate policy. Several important implications 
can be drawn from the research of this thesis. First, research findings of the thesis 
call on the Chinese monetary authorities to upgrade their intervention objectives and 
strategy. In examining different types of intervention, this thesis shows that the basic 
intervention strategy that the Chinese policy-makers employ is to play a decisive 
role in leaning against the wind while ensuring that there are no large swings in the 
RMB exchange rate. However, not every movement of the exchange rate is 
destabilising and not every move of the exchange rate needs to be reversed. In reality, 
on various occasions movements of the exchange rate are towards its equilibrium 
value, and in this case it does not make much sense to lean against the wind. Rather, 
the central bank should encourage or facilitate such reversion of the exchange rate 
to equilibrium. 
 
With the development of modelling techniques, there have emerged several methods 
for determination of the equilibrium exchange rate, e.g. the IMF’s new External 
Balance Assessment (EBA) Methodology (IMF, 2013). With increasingly refined 
model-based estimation of the equilibrium exchange rate, at least in broad directions, 
the central bank can judge whether the exchange rate movement is in the direction 
of moving away or towards equilibrium. As such, intervention by the central bank 
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can become “smarter”, or be more targeted at combating the destabilising 
movements of the exchange rate, rather than a cross-board leaning against the wind 
intervention. 
 
Related with this is a further possible improvement in China’s CPR intervention, i.e. 
in providing the central bank with better informed decision on setting and adjusting 
of the central parity exchange rate as a way of intervention. At the time of this study, 
China’s benchmark exchange rate, the central parity exchange rate, is not model-
based, but a product of a mixture of taking account of market opinions and the 
central bank’s discretion. This can be improved upon by adding the imputed 
equilibrium exchange rate based on model estimation for the central bank’s 
assessment of the desired level of the exchange rate. Adding this model-based 
equilibrium exchange rate will prove particularly useful when the central bank tries 
to initiate ‘smart intervention’, i.e. intervene when the exchange rate moves away 
from equilibrium and refrain from intervening when the exchange rate is moving 
towards equilibrium. In short, this will be helpful for the central bank to withdraw 
from the practice of intervention on all large movements of the exchange rate. 
 
From these results, implications can be drawn for the demand and supply theory and 
for the principal- agent model. For the demand and supply theory, the intervention 
strategy follows the leaning-against the wind hypothesis. This means that when 
purchase (sale) intervention happens, the supply for foreign currency will decrease 
(increase) in the open market, and then the domestic currency against the foreign 
currency will depreciate (appreciate). In the principal agent model, the PBOC has 
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the information advantage. It can use the oral intervention which offers information 
to the market, the agents, such as the noise traders and fundamentalists, will change 
their expectations, and then the exchange rate will change under the influence. 
 
8.4 Limitations and Avenue for Future Research 
 
Despite the advances that this thesis has made in achieving a better understanding 
of foreign exchange intervention in China, this thesis has certain limitations. 
Addressing these limitations in turn present some promising avenues for future 
research. 
 
First, this research is limited owing to the lack of government intervention 
information. Future work should dig out more relevant information in this area. 
Better information would allow for a more precise study, and comparison between 
the officially stated intention and the research evidence would provide critical 
insights on the Chinese foreign exchange policy. 
 
Second, future work should continue the focus on the changes to China’s exchange 
rate system. This research uses the time period from 2005 to 2013. However, since 
the end of that sample period there have been at least two further changes. One is 
the increasing of the RMB exchange rate band from 1% to 2% on March 17, 2014. 
The other is the improvement to the process of setting the central parity rate, 
implemented on 11 August, 2015. Future work should seek to find out the effects of 
these two changes on China’s foreign exchange market. 
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Because of the data availability problem, it is not straightforward at the time of 
current research to conduct meaningful exploration of the possible channels through 
which Chinese intervention exerts its effects. However, with the development of the 
Chinese foreign exchange market and improved data collection, it may become 
possible for researcher to examine the channels including the order flow channel. 
With the presence of this microstructure channel, the central bank has superior 
information to other market traders. It is then will be interesting to find out whether 
and how the central bank would use this information advantage to shape the market.   
 
Finally, interactions of foreign exchange intervention with other components of 
monetary policy are a very promising area for future research. As a tool of monetary 
policy, foreign exchange intervention interacts with other parts of monetary policy 
in various ways. These interactions would involve supply of base money, interest 
rates and transmission mechanism of monetary policy.  Expounding on these 
interactions and their consequences certainly can better our understanding of 
China’s exchange rate policy, but it can also shed critical lights on the working of 
the Chinese economy and its repercussions on the world economy.   
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Appendices 
	
Table A. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Garch (1,1) 
Mean Equation ∆[\ = ]^ + ]_∆[\`_ + ]a∆[\`a + ]bcd\efe[\\ + ]ghi\ +]jcd\k,[,\`_ + m\ 
 Coefficient Std.Error ]^ 0.0001**   4.767e-005 ]_ -0.140***   0.024 ]a 0.007    0.024 ]b -2.343e-005  1.955e-005 ]g -7.839e-005*  3.019e-005 ]j -2.876e-005  4.861e-005 ]j 1.423e-006  5.804e-005 
Variance Equation n\ = o^ + o_n\`_ + oam\`_a + obcd\efe[\\ + oghi\ + ojcd\k,[,\`_          o^ -0.358***     0.047      o_ 0.951***    0.003    oa 0.025***    0.001    ob 0.002    0.003    og 0.022**    0.005     oj 0.004     0.011     oj 0.007     0.012     
Skwewness 4.48 
Kurtosis 39.041 p(20) 5.575 p$(20) 0.295 
Observation 2086 
Notes:  ***means the coefficient is significant at the 99% level; **means the 95% 
significant level and * means the 90% Significant level. 
	
  
253	
	
Table B. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Asymmetric Garch (1,1) 
Mean Equation f\ = q^ + rsf\`s + o^ t\ − t\∗ + o_vw\ + ]^ + ]_x\yz{ yz{\ +ks|_}^ + }_x\yi yi\ + ~\
 
 
 Coefficient Std.Error q^ 0.0087   0.0100 r_ -0.0380   0.0243 o^ 0.0010***    0.0003 o_ -0.0055  0.0053 ]^ 3.8459***  0.4716 ]_ -2.764***  0.7736 }^ 0.0062***  0.0022 }_ 0.0013 0.0064 
Variance Equation n\ = ^ + _n\`_ + am\`_a + Ä^ yz{\ + Ä_ yi\ + Å^x\yz{ +Å_x\yi + ÇÉ\`_a
 
         
^ -5.46E-07 8.89E-07 _ 0.7398***    0.0081    a 0.1702***    0.0226    Ä^ 0.0407***    0.0028    Ä_ 3.89E-05***    7.13E-06 Å^ -5.68E-05*** 1.29E-05 Å_ 0.0001***     2.18E-05 Ç -0.0220 0.0290 
Skwewness -0.3414 
Kurtosis 7.0916 p(20) 0.043  (0.613) p$(20) 0.078  (0.300) 
Observation 2087 
Notes:  ***means coefficient is significant at 99% level; **means coefficient is significant 
at 95%; *means coefficient is significant at 90%. Numbers inside the brackets are 
asymptotic p-values. 
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